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Protection of Electronics LlI"'I<>,""" Underwater t:XjOlo~)lorls 
A. Roux 
the :::IUU'llC\.il " ... n...-'''' to contained electronics due to underwater hl .. , .. ti ... ,., has 
nAI'IAri:lll" been prone to 5pl~lJllalllOI 
available in recent times. The nm,hl ... m 
have become 
ti!:lr .... !:1~' ... to enclosed electronics and 
the blast environment have now come to 
attention as an 
direction with reS,Delc:I 
Rationale 
This 
and to solve the 
In the milieu of sea mine it is often to mines that are to be 
at small distances from each other. A tactical purpose may that each 
mine be set to at controlled instances in time without the of the 
other mines in the detonated reactions. Thus two nr",hl".m!l: 
are ....... "",.1, ....... two mines in close 
considered: 
The first is detonation. This is the term used when one extllos,ion 
another ex"los,ion to occur, due to the of the blast of the 
cause of this "\I""'I"I~lIthg •• i ... I"Ih ........ 'm •• I"I .... 1"I 
the blast of the first eXE)lo!lion 
detonation chain 
chain. and 
insensitive .. v, ... I ....... ;" ..... 
...... i'nhlh .... '"i ... ,., mine 
insensitive munitions are not n .... ,Ari:lll" 
I"Irnl"ll""m of detonation should 
nrllm .. I"I, elxolloSlives. This detonator forms 
under certain 
rI"'t'................ which contains 
which is constructed mechanical as well as electronic assemblies. The detonator is 
electrical means. If a failure of the SAFU is the of the mine 
The ... VI" ... ,.;' ...... ,· .. 
In it was observed that detonations occur when 
the standoff distance between the two bodies are relative 
to the size of the mass. When the standoff distance is increased to the extent that 
1 The word "hardening" refers to a design process to protect the electronics against the blast effects of this 
exllilosiives that are not as stable as the 
in .... ,n";t;",,, e:KDlclsiV1e8 final of an chain. Primary 
exolosh/e chain and part sections of the 
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c:t\lrnn~=th,"'ti" detonation does not occur, the shock effect was still nn\A/ ... IT, 
the SAFU of the mine. A of rI~rn~I'I'" 
also cause 
conclusion that the second 
detonation. 
..... ",hl ... "", as discussed the basis of ,n""n",110>11 to 
n""rn""r, ... to the SAFU at standoff rlic:t!t~n'r' ... c:t as 
n<:O+h""ti" detonation distance. 
as 
Results and 
The shock wave of an underwater eX~)IOSiion 
and therefore 
r ... "'.,....r~' to the c:tn':.t'ifi,. nlrnhll ... m 
On the evidence found in 
shock wave "hl:ar~,,.t ... rlc:ttil'c:t 
this dissertation. 
it was h,,,V\tll'l ... e,ic:t"1I'I 
towards the 
acceleration into an Electronics Enclosure aCJacl!!ntlly nr\c:t~rlnrl"'''' mine the mine 
This induced was then Dassea circuit board which was mounted 
inside the and hence to the electronic ""rnn,,,,,,,,,nt .. 
Each then 
a different mass 
a different momentum and 
DraKe~lae occurred. 
Field tests were n""i'fnr'm,,11'1 to obtain of .:o ... '· ... I ..... <:o+inn of the 
acceleration of the ... I ...... t .. '''ni'·c:t hardware under different conditions. Internal 
rlJ:lInnnir'l'" devices were also tested to measure the acceleration attenuation. 
The results obtained indicated that a very had 
been and that the mathematical rI ... c'l'rilntil'1.n 
eXDlosil:m of 














1: This rn'~nH'" 
course it was 11~1';~::i':Si:iIIV 
that had been done on this 
data sets which are 
structural 
2: This I"'n~~nT~~r nr~o::,~nr!:: the main literature which the main 
contributions to this as well as some of the literature 
for the sake of ..... hl:;!r~('r~ The rationale was 
of the 





The I'\",V"'"",,,, that certain measurements be 
whether the was true. 
2 were taken into consideration to 
sensors and measurement The 
characteristics of the sensors and the characteristics of the as 






























This ,..h,~ ... t.",. describes the aim of the For better of the 
course of the it was necessary to describe to 
that had been done on this before this was undertaken. These 
data sets which are summarised in 1 have not been 
before. The reasons for the 
which discusses the main 
as well as some the literature 
The rationale was 
of the 
... "" ... "", .......... ,. .... which causes to electronics an acc::eDtable and 
be found to counteract the The 
literature research therefore concentrated on the characterisation of an 
underwater and its effects on in close 
in the form of an 
and Janzon and a set of raw 
measurements 20 measurement series. It was thus 
elaborate on this data in order to form the basis of the to steer the 
in the <:I .... r\rnr' .. ''''1t''' 
wave in the far field. 
and to characterise an underwater shock 
1",,,,,li ... n to the cause 
of the characteristics establishEICI 
be found. 
3 furthermore considers a DD!lSlble 
as the main ~"'''''I''''''' of measurement and <:1,,,01,,.,,,,,, 
I""h, ...... ·,"'·4: The in that certain measurements should be 
taken to be able to the was true. 
The shock wave characteristics established in 2 were taken into 
cili,,..r.:rtinn to select the sensors and measurement "' ....... "',.,00+, 
The characteristics of the sensors and the characteristics of the ..... ',,, ...... ,,,,. .. 
as well as the estimated time and the .. ",. .... h .. ,.. ... i .... +i,.. ... 
....... ~......... t ....... ""I'h"" .. with the limitations of the fast 
measurement to be used for the data 
collection. A discussion waveform that was to be 
and the measurement limitations of led to 
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5: 
Loll ...... ",.,' 6: 
This ... h~~nh=or nr"' ........ ·"" field work that was undertaken to obtain 
led to the solution of the stated 
", ... rl",ri,m""nt was aimed at ", ... r''''fl,'''nl''''' with 
a convenient size of scaled mass in relation to 
the wall thickness the Enclosure at convenient scaled standoff distances. 
No sensors were due to the uncertain variables. In the second and third 
arc)mrnel:-sllsD,emsion was evaluated. 
r"',.,., ........ ,t.. with a softer 
• __ , __ ~,i __ mo=,th".t'I which was 
method. ", ... r,,,,rimo=,nt!l: that included sensors, it was 
method was not ideal. A fifth ", ... rl",ri,m""nt 
evaluate the use of a sensor for imrlrn\/M !l:vn ... hrnni'!I:~ti 
A sixth and final 
sensor which 
was successful. This also used sponge rubber as a 
method to that this was the best method. 
This ... h~~nh~r 
had been found. This 
towards the shock wave 
shock wave effects. 
5, and verifies that a solution 
the contributions made 
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The Te,t setup i, depocted graphically in Fi9ure 1 The test results were evaluated by Roos 
[18], but the tests were found to be illConciusive due to the fact that some damage was 
sustained at orog distances. wh ile less or no damage of the same killd was sustained at 
closer stand-off di5tances. The stand-off distances which produced no damage were also 
decl,..-ed unacceptable This test was the catalyst that iroduced further research to find a 
solution to the problem of operafn g equipment much closer to an underwater explosion 
without the risk of damage 
,-tCr; ! 
, . ~ 
Figure 1: Test Setup for the damage tests 
Further research was conducted by Hattingh [8] whose approoch was to add a shock-
absorbirog protective layer to the outsKJe of the equipment to reduce the intensity of the shock 
before the residual shock wave made contact with the equipment. According to Hattingh [8] 
pum c e-stone is used in the USA for this ,000k-absorbirog purpose, but he also states that this 
material is not readily available in the RSA Four different materials were used in the research 
conducted by Hattingh ]8], and a general-p..Jrpose electro-mechanical time clock was used a, 
test object The test object, were fully enclosed in the shock absorbent materia ls , and placed 
at a stand-off distance of 2 m from a 253-gram charge, at a depth of 3 m Thi5 ch,..-ge would 
generate a shock wave w·,th peak amplitude of 14.86 MPa at a stand-off distance of 2 m 
accordirog to the Cole [5] Equation. Hattingh [8] concluded that two of the four types of 
materials used were not suitable due to excessive heat release durirog the casting and curing 
phases. The other materials protected the electronics adequately for that specific test setup, 
but it was eshnated that only one shock of this magnitude wwld be Withstood, due to 
cracking of the material after the first blast 
Hattingh's [3] resu l s showed that this type of external shock absorber casing h~s the distillCt 
disadvantage that it covers the equipment completely, and doe, not allow for testing or 
settings after the casing is moulded into position. The requirement for accuracy of external 
dimensions, plus characteristics such as testability, oetting ability, alld waterproof ability can 
not be met when using the prescribed material for the application 8, ad&e"ed by this study 
See Figure 2 for damage to the shock-absorbing material. Unfortunately, not enoogh tests 
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Figure 2: Cracks on the test sample of shock-absorbent 
protective material 
Page 20 
The inconclUSive findings derived from Hattingh's [3J work I<ld to a decis'o n to do more trial~ 
with a typical au mlnium enclosure containing typical eleclronics to r.,d soullOns with 
im proved resu Its 
Further trials were conducted with three of the units as described by Malan [12], but the 
electron ics were replaced by a single CCA containing typical electronics for this discipline, 
such as a battery, ICs, capacitor! . LEOs and micro-switches (see Figure 3). The design was 
kepi simp le. for easy testing before and alter the blast occurred 
Figure 3: Custom electronics used by Malan [13] 
The results were recorded by Malan [13[, who used three mechan'c al housings (containers) 
containing the special custom electronICs The units were placed at three stand-off distances 
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Figure 4: The test set.up by M". n [13] 
Pag621 
The I,I.MS were retrieved ooly m.,utes afte< me detoolt~n and It was immedlalely apparent 
tI\!It al l uniti S'-IstaH>ed severa damage It was atso apparent ttl at tile un it closest to me 
charge &us!aned the most damage. and the unit furthest away from ttl e bias l sustaoned the 
teast amount of damage. as would be expected Bolh mechamcat assemblies and electronic 









Etectron~ damage as re<:oftied by Malan \13J 
The damage was slJlfic:iendy ""amlned at the labclO'alOry Partlcutar at~on was grven to 
tlelailS to enatlle a conGiUSlOn 1hat 1he electronICS damage was mainly eauS&d by collateral 
effects Mechamcal parts were Meared off trl)m their mountings and snuck the electronICS 
d~e to the momentum of lho parts tha t were d islOdged There os some degree 01 ev.eence 
that the e~t"'nLc components susta ined damage Without interference fro m tho moving 
mechano;;a l paris . A re<:ommerodati¢n was maCle by Malan [13[ to perfmm funher tn als, but 
with tn e use of a custom-deSigned enclosure, Whk:h woold ensure that (If th e e lectronlca 











Protection of Electronics A(;Jainst UndeIW31er E~plosJ(Jns 
A Roux 
1.4. Research Design 
1.4.1. General 
Page 22 
The conclusion drawn from the preliminary 1,leralure sludy summarised above, is Ihat recent 
tests done at sea found that t~pical ESAD eleCtrOllics in watertight cOlltaillers in cklse 
proximity to a blast sustain damage due to the effects of underwater blasts, 
The extent of such damage has been enough to rer.::Jer the elecuooics unserviceable_ This 
posed a general question aboot the physir;al design parameters of the present equipment for 
use under these Circumstances, ~nd ~bout whether it is able to withstand the effects of an 
underwater blast. There are no user specih::~tions as ~et to specify the sIze of the explosive 
m~55 and the stand-off distance to be achieved without damage to the eleCtrOllics, but 
preliminary target figures are defined as, 40 kg PE4 explosive charge, at a star.::J-off distance 
of4 m 
The electronic unit of choice that was to be used in the experiments as input to this 
dissertation w~s a generic ESAD, contairling most of the popular electronIC compoilents 
generall~ used for ~n ESAD, as well as specifc 'soft'" components_ which were expected to 
sustain damage more readily, The soft compoilsnts, as shown in Figure 6, were 
Commerci<ll plastic enclosed switches Figure 61A) 
Cr~sI~ls Figure 6(B) 
Socket-mounted irltegrated circuits Figure 6(C) 
Through-hole soldered transistors Figure 6(0) 
Commercial Batteries Figure 7{E) 
Total maSS 
ofCCA = 
Figure 6: The electronics Circuit Card Assembt~ (CCA) used in 
experiments for thiS dissertation 
• By '~.oorpor.t'"~ '.oft.' oompo"",t., tho ruggM~" ~ • mi~d-romponer.t de,,,, oou id be .. _sod fOO' "",;g' 
refe reme p",pose. , If ,t _~ '" ract tr"" th .. rhe , e oam por"" t, d.:f not ...,t'.t .... ,d "" ',,""<C' of ~ "'porm"",o 
<Ie" ""'91 opoO{lCaliono oolid be drawn up conoor" n~ oomp<l~r" (0( CQmp<l~rl ''IP'') tn. t have", be O<T1itt." 
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The eeA that was desigood for the experiments of this thesis were contained in an 
Aluminium enclosure, of wh-o;h the wall thickness and general layout was a good 
representation of a typical ESAD mechanical design (see Figure 7)_ The mechanics were 
designed in such a manner that four CCAs GOuld be fitted into one enclosure to gain a larger 
statistical vatue for t~ experiments 
Tolal mass 
incu ding eeAs, 
battO!ries and 
mounting screws 
= 1996 gram 






The preliminary literature study gave the background to th-,s study, wh-lCh seeks to determine 
the causes of electronics damage or failure In environments where they are exposed to 
severO! shock_ No dear concu sion coukJ be drawn up to this point in the investigation as to 
thO! rOCot cause of the damage_ and therefore no process could be implemented to harden the 
electronics against the shock effects of blasts 
It is important to distinguish between the different characteristics of an undelWater blast and 
its effects on an object in dose proximity to the blast, to make it possible to formulate a 
postulation that will lead to a solution to the research problem_ The research deslQn thus 
indudes an in-depth study of the characteristics of an undelWater blast From the knowledge 
of these character"lsl"o;s, a clear understanding of the cause of the electronic damage was to 
be derived 
The research problem is based on practical experience gained throLlQh placing sen.or 
equipment (for measuring and recording data) dose to underwater explosions, as well as 
subsequent experimentation as part of the investigations to solve the problem The results 
obtained during these in~estigations have not led to a solution yet. This present study is 
therefore designed to include an overview of invest>;Jatlons -Into th-IS specific problem that 
were executed in South Africa, and to conclude whether the principles that were 
followed/suggested by the investigations_ constitute possible true and effective solutions, or 
whether different approaches should be followed 
A literature study invol,;ng current literature on the subject was reqUired to determine what 
has been published Ct1 an international level, to direct the postulation for the sotubon of this 
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The this dissertation was underwater 
measurements in measurements were taken in a of 40 m, at 
a measurement 20 m, and at distances 3.5 m to 20 m. 
measurements taken and Janzon [10] were and is 
195. These measurements were taken in the far field of 
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2.2.1. Characteristic 1: Shock Wave Propagation Velocity: 
Page 27 
A consolidation of the calculatons of the propagation velocity is shown in Figllfe 8. A curve 
re;;o-esenting all the velocity data waS fitted Over the vebclty measurement results. The "best 
lit" for a ~ near glaph that replesents the data set. is y = 1469.6x - 0.0387_ This result means 
that the average propagation veocity is 1469.6 mls {the offset of ·00233 soould be igr--.ored), 
ard the lact that this lit IS linear to a probaljlity of 99.95% (R' = 0.9995) means that the 
yeloclty is constant over the data range of the data set. The stard·off d"stal"lCe ranged 
between 3.5m and 20m, ard the charge size ranged between 9.41 kg and 27.33~g The 
largest charge radius (27.33 kg lor Plastic X Blast 3) is calculate<! to be 160 mm if a relative 
density of 1.6 is asslJll1ed, The charges closes: to the blasts were at stand·off distances near 
to 3.5 m. This is more than 20x the Chalge radii. As discussed in the paragraph labelled 
Conclusions drawn from the Literature Reyiew on page 40, the charge diameter (or radius) 'n 
relation to the stam·off distance is generally used to determine whether the stand·off distarce 
is in the near field or the lal liek/ of the exploSlOll, 
1O.oc 
•. " . 
,. , , -" 
I 000 , , , .CO 





Shock Wave time vs distance 
)CO' 
·~ _tKX_,, ' 
.~ ... ""-,,; 
... "'x .... , , 
-"""' ..... " 





Figure 8: Graph of the shock wive distance propagated, vs. tLme. 
If the irdividual velocities are ta~en (tram Table 44 to Table 48) as data input. the aver<>ge 
propagation veloc~y is calculated to be 1460 mls. This IS a good correlation with the graph· 
average 01 1469,6 mi. shown in Figure 8. Trois Shock Wave PropagatIOn Velocity for Ihis sel 
of data is constant, and is in the range 01 the speed of sound in water 
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2.2.2. Characteristic 2: Peak-Pressure Function 
Strbm <Jnd J<Jnzon [10] defm&{J the peak pressure to r&{Juce at a rate 01 
WOO'" 
R IS the standoll distance in m 
Q is the ch~rge weight in kg 
Page 28 
Tmdition~lIy the equation lor PIT" is written such that the charse weight (mass) is divided by 
the distance Rewriting the Strom and Janzon [t 0] Equation in the traditionallormat we get 
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2.2.2.1. The shock pressure function 
Far Field Pressure: 
Page 29 
Giving due consideration to the above discussion alld ccrnbining the equations fcr the snock-
his:cry-func1ions as given in tne literature, the com plete definition of the sr.:xk pressure wave, 
" 
The peak pressure at a distance R Ircrn the blast 
(given by Cole [5 p241] and Cooper [6 p413] 
for Pentolite) 
Ibiin' 
Or in the metric system 
This equation is true in the far fie kJ ct too expiosion 
The Shock wave Iront end or slope function has 
not yet been determined 
Tne sr.:xk wave decay lunct",n (as defined by Cole [5]) : 
Where 
""""/R), ·n ", H=92.5W' ~ /R ,," 
Where 
P,'m is in Iblin' 
Wis in Ib 
R is the standoff distance 
frern the biast in It 
Where. 
p .. " is in MPa 
Wisinkg 
R is the standoff dIStance 
Irom the blast in m. 
PIt) is in MPa 
For t = 0 to typically 0, when tne most 
im portant energy containing portion of the 
shock front is considered. 
Where 
P, - Peak pressure at time t=R/c in MPa 
R = stand-off distance from the biast in m 
c = speed of sound in water in mls 
t=timein~s 
13 = decay constant in ~s 
Wi s in kg 
Equation 3: Composite Equation for the shock pressure history in 
the far field 
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Near Field Pressure: 
Page 30 
The shock pressure funclion as given in Equati:>n 3 above was qooted from Cole [5]. This 
empirical approach by Cole [51, however, does not present sny accuracy in the near field. Kira 
el al [10] gave a different aj)prosch, using more modern methods as well as numen8ai 
methods to obtsin the pressure functbn. especially in the near field In fact. their 
measurements were taken from the edge of the expkJsive charge (standoff distance R = 0) 
A~hough they did not measure the actual jXessure at R = 0, they calculated the rressure ss 
follows 
Kim eI al [10] first messured the shock wave by streak photography, and then pkJtted the 
Distance vs. Time graph as it was captured by this photography method (see Figure gAl. By 
using nonlinear Curve fitting methods. they extracted an equatioo for R 
R = A, (J - e-;")+ .4,(I-e -.". )+ .4,(1- e-;' l+ e,,1 
Where R '" Standoff Distance 
C, z Sound Velocity in the medi...,-, 
A,and S, z coefficients obtained 
by using nonlinear curve fitting 
methods 
, 
Differentiating Equation 4 with t. the propagation velocity of tile underwater shock wave was 
obtained 
1/, =dR./dl 
{, ---------- 6 
Kim el al [22] as well as Cooper [6 p186] described the relationship between r:o-opagstkln 
vekJcity and particle velocity as follows 
1--', =(',.+SU" -------------------------------------- 1 
Where U, = Shock velocity 
C, = Sound Velocity in the medium 
u,= Particle velocity 
s = constant 
Accordtlg to Kira at aI [10], the constant s = 1,79, while Klaseboer et at [11] named this 
constant the 'shock density ratIO parameter' and qooted it to be 1.815. Cooper [6: p187] 
explatled that the relationship between the shock vekJcity and the part>8le velocity was linear 
and that s = slope of the relatklnship for that material. So it would be expected that s woold 
differ between materiats, but that one should recognise that S in water should not differ. 
U. WaS known from Equation 5, snd substituted tlto EquaflOn 7 to obtain lip 
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Com paring Equations 6 and 7, the following eq uatlQn eouid be derived: 
:. su " =ABe'I'1 , , A,8,c ,;,.' + A_B, ,, ,', , 
Cole [5 p35] and Cooper [22 p182] reported thst 
I' - Po' = p/i,u, 
Where P = Shock pressure 
P,= Atmosp.her>;; pressure 
P. = Density of sea water 
U, = Shock. velocity 




With U, sr>d Ii, derived from Equat>:>ns 7 snd 9 aoo substituted into Equation 10, the shock 
p.ressure P could be cslculsted ss shown in Equst",n 11 
Conctusion tf the shock vekJcity is known, then the shock pressure couid be calcuisted 
Kira et a/ [10] calculated the pressure (presumably) in this wsy, snd the result is shown in 
Fig lJ"e 9B. Note that the curves for all three explosive masses were very nearly the same 
when the experimental results were compared to the csleulated results_ Note also that the 
va~e of the pressure at the oorder condition of the explosive msss slter full detonstion had 
been reached, (R+r)lr = 1). was approx'rnstely 100 000 atmospheres for all three explosive 
masseS. This was also confirmed by Cooper [6]. who ststed that the peak pressure generated 
by an exploson was dependent only up::ln the explosive mass materjai. not the size of the 
explosive mass (ss mijY intuitively be expected)_ 
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Explosive radius = 1Q mm 





Figure 9: The calculated pressure result, photographs and 
results courtesy from the paper of Kira et al [10] 
Page 32 
From the data obtained, Kim ei al [10] an empirk:al equation had been obtained for the peak 
pressure of SEP explosives (Asahi Chemk:allndustry) with a VOD of 6970 ml~ as a function 
of explosive radius st standoff distances in the near field. See Equation 12 
Where P"' Shock pressure 
Po"' Atmospheric pressure 
r"' Explosive ",dius 
R" Standoff Distance 
(, = 1,1x10' 
fi= 1.8 
Note \ and fi are coefficients 
that depend lIPon the 
explosive form ulatlon 
The peak pressure, according to Equstion 12, will therefore aM'ays be the same for the Same 
explosive formulation, regardless 01 the mass of the ex~osive. EqLJation 12 is shown 
grsphically in Figure 10, for three sizes of explosive mass. The figure is only shown in the 
nesr f~d. t>ecause not enough informatIOn is at hand to compare Equation 12 (for SEP) With 
Equation 2 by Strbm and Janzon [10] which was for an RDX lormulat)on with s VOD of 
approximately 8700 mis, and valid for the far field, The coeffiCients " snd fi in Equation 12 
would be different for a different expkJsive formulation. 
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Comparative Peak Pressure graphs for 3 sizes of SEP 
explosives 
Possible Error Conditions: 
In the paper of Kira el al [10], the shock yelocity was measured and calculated by first 
measuring the physical distance on a strea);, photograph (see Figure 9A), ard then by plotting 
the data In this figure, Kim el aJ [10] used the inverse notation for stardoff distance and 
chiJrge radius: R~ Charge Radius and r= standoff distance (in this dissertation the notatIOn 
for stardoff distance. the letter R was used, and for the Charge Radius the letter r was used) 
The yertical line in Figure 9A corresponded to the real distance of 50 mm The horizontal line 
corresponded to the real time of 20 ~s The horizontal straight line EX indicated the explosive 
charge The white line SL corresponded to the light due to the detonation. The edge of the 
curve SW indicated the propagation of the underwater ShOCk wave, A resutt of approximately 
10 GPa (100 000 atmospheres) was obtained (see Figure 98), An error in the measurement 
at the blast origin may have been possible, due to the fact that the p,. for the explosive is 
given by Cooper [6] at approximately 24 GPa or more. That would give a much higher initial 
pressure. and consequ ent~ a higher initial ShOCk velocity jhiln the published results 
A possible method of error insertion was discovered by the author of this dissertat'on by 
synthesizing the data from the results plJblished by Takahashi el al [22]. who also used this 
strea);, photography method to obtain shock velocity (see Figure 11A). It was found that, if a 
small error in physical digitisation 01 the optical data was made, then a large error for the 
ShOCk velocity could be made The data from the printed paper by Takahashi et al [221 was 
extracted as accurately as possible, and the end result corresponded quit well by yisual 
inspection, see Figure" B. The curve-litted data was integrated. and a graph for the velocity 
was obtained (see Figure 11 B) 
However, when a slight change was made to the information aroond the shock origin, 
changing the slope to a larger initial value. a large change in shoe);, velOCity was obtained. A 
visual inspect'on and comparison between the black graphs in Figure 118 and Figure 11C 
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original streak photograph, yet the velocity compar;"oo between the two sets of data differed 
qu~e drssticslly at the origin of the shock wsve, as shown in Figure llC 
Conclusion: 
The conc~sion may be drOlWn thst the streak photography method may not be the best 
method to obtain velocity measurements at the origin of the blast, but is a good method to 
obtain the shock characteristics from a position very close (to within 1 radius) of the blsst 
II the pressure is requi"ed for s certain explosive lormulatioo, the shock speed for that 
lormulatlon sed explosive weight must be measured The pressure may then be calculated 
from Equaton 11, alter lirst determining by non-linesr curve litting methods, the constants A, 
to A.". and B, to B, 
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Figure 11: 
T I ~' I"" 
Synthesized data from the printed data as supplied in 
the paper by Takahashi et a/ [22], and illustrating errOr 
conditions. 
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Figure 13: 
Stond,trDKto nco {""" I 
The relationship between THETA and the standoff 
distance, for several charge radii. 
The maSS Df the explosive charge is dependent upon the de!1Sit~ of the explosive matarial, 
and the charge radius in a nOll-linear equatloo. due to the ~olume t>eing non-linear to the 
charge radius 
The tm e const~nt e can now be cabJl~ted using Equation 15, and the result inserted into 
Equatioo 14. The result is shown ~ Figure 14 
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The normalised pressure decay function (Equation 14) 
for several charge masses, at one standoff distance of 
0.5 m_ 
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The impulse density functbn is the integral with time of the curves shown in Figure 14 
multiplied by the peak pressure at that spec·,fe standoff position It is obvious that the imp<Jlse 
density is more for larger explosive masses 
Note also that. for one specific ch~rge mass. the time constant becomes longer the further the 
standoff distance. This observation is shown in Figure 15, and agrees with Equation 3 
00 
Figure 15: 
"',"p' . S"r>doI'l'Oi.tancc 
- ... --. ... ~'"' I 
".---..~ 
The decay time constant relative to the standoff 
distance, using standoff distances of 0.5 m and 1 m. 
Using the preceding data. the Shock Impulse Density could be calculated 
Cole ]5: p241] gives ~n em piricall~ formulated im p<Jlse for Pentollte as follows 
1([/WI '3 )=IWI"( W~iJJII ________________ 18 
Where W· Explosive weight in Ib 
R = Standoff Distance in ft 
I = Constant = 2.18 for Pentolite 
f3 = 1 05 for Pentolite 
There seems to be some disagreement in the literature on the value of /3: (Held [9] assumes 
that f3~0.89 wh i st Cole [5] reports it to be 1.05 lor Pentolite). These differences could be 
attributed to the fact that each researcher stud·res a different explosive formulatIOn and then 
uses f3 freely according to the researched fonnul<ltion 
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2.3.3. Conclusions: Pressure Pulse Leading Edge Analysis 
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It is clear that in the far field of the shock pressure pulse, the rise-bme of the leadillg edge is 
measured to be approximately (; - 8 I-'S in all cases in this data set 
In the quest to determine the rise function of the leading edge of the shock W'iNe. these 
measuremellts are of some importance. Taking the limitations of the test equipment (and in 
this case more importantly the sensors) into consideration, it cannot be stated that the shock 
wave leading edge is in fact 6 . 8 !-Is, although it has been measured as such. In consulting 
with the authors of these measurements (Paul Strdm and Bo Janzon of FOI in Sweden), their 
comment was that the v.idth of the sensors (approximately 10 mm) and the constant 
propagation velocity in the far field (14696 rnls as shown in Figure 8) causes the pressure to 
rise at the sensor elements (conta'lI1ed within the sensor hous,ng) to maximum value In' 
10mm/1469.6mi.,=6.8f/., ---".---------- 19 
This value of 6 8 liS rise time (see EqUiltion 19) means that the measured value of 6 - 81-'s is 
too inaccurate to determine the actual rise time. Measuring of the actual nse time may have to 
be done by other means, not the Tourmaline galJges used by Strom and Jalzon (101. v.-hich 
were also chosen for the measurements for thi~ dissertatiorl 
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Chapter 3 
3.1. DAMAGE TO ELECTRONICS: HYPOTHESIS 
3.1.1. General 
Page 43 
The purpose of this study, briefly, is to fir.:J a solutio~ to the problem that electronics 
contsined in sluminium enclosures are damaged as a result of underwater blast when these 
containers are placed in close proximity to the blast 
The first courne of action, and methoo that was followed in this study, was to postulate the 
csuses of damage, after due consideration of the facts that were gathered up to this stage of 
the study. A possible solutIOn was deducted, and a model tested in fifOd experiments 
R~fin eme nt 01 the mod~ 1 was necessary, and the refonement wss slso tested in further f:eld 
experiments, with positive results, This chapter is concentrated on the fscts leading to s 
postulation. as well as the postulation 
Note: It would be desirable to build a mathematocal mod~ 1 that would d et~ rmin e th e stand-off 
distance from a specific charge at whK:h erdosed electronic equipment might be placed. 
before 'IIllminent damsge might occur 
The underlying method of research is to characterise an explosJve charge, aoo to meaSUre 
the effect of blast loading on nearby electrMics, Additionally, in this process, also to 
d ~telll1 ine the primary cause of electronic damage, then to prescribe corrective actions 
It's dear that the unde rwat~ r biast causes rapid mov~ment of the eqUipment (enclosed 
electron>cs) The rapid movement of the e nclosur~ is transmitted to the contained electronics 
causing th e electronic comjXl!lents to gain relstively unequsl momentum, These components 
then tear loose from their mounted pOSitions, For exsmple, a switch (such as may somej'lIlles 
be us~ d on a PCB) is constructed by the assembiy of var"",s smaller parts, In this case, each 
psrt of the switch 'IS accelerated to gain the total switch momentum, but each part differs in 
construction and mass and therefore attempts to accelerate at a different rate_ This caus ~ s 
the swHch construction to collapse, and the switch breaks apart 











Protection of Eloclronics Again~t Underwaler Explosions Page 44 
A Roux 
Conskier lhe movement of a shock wave generated by an explosion. as depicted from actual 





Incremental Distance in m 
Normalised shock wave of five blasts, using different 
charge sizes, at SenSor 1 position 
The analysis of the raw data provided by Strom & Janwn [20[ soowed that the shock front 
moves through the water at the speed of sound in water, I.e. 1469.6 m/~ (see Figure 8) The 
~peed of sound is generally rounded to 1500 mls for ease of comprehen~ion of the problem, 
and for quick cak:ulation, 
For ease of reading, the graph in Figure 167 is presented in this sect ,,"n as Figure 18 to soow 
the selected data series. To be able to visualise the phys'~al size of the electronICs container 
of this study, it was necessary to transpose th;!! time axi~ of Figure 167 to a distance axis (see 
figure 18) with the use of the far-fiekJ characteristic (constant propagation velocity (see 
figure 8)) In figure 19, the Plastic X Blast 1 Sensor 1 graph is expanded horizontally, 
keeping the horizontal axis in the distance unit Note. In the near field, the _elocity is not 
constant. The shock pressure propagation veiocity starts at a high value and then drop~ to the 
_elocity of sound within a few charge diameters, depending on the pressure re~ulting from the 
composition of the expiosive material and the su~tained perod during which the pressure is 
above the elastic pressure threshold (Cex>pf!r [6]) caused by the mass of the eJ(plosi~e 
material. The effect of the shock wave in the near field i~ discussed later in tris study 
To be able to formulate a hypothesis on the cause of damage to the electroniCS, the shock 
wa~e in the far fiekJ is considered 
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Figure 18: Pressure results from Plastic X Blast 1, Strom & Janzon 
[20] 
Shock Pressure VS. incremental distance at constant velocity of 141i0rnis 
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The movement of a shock front approaching and 
passing an object 
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'" 
The author considered the fact that a shock wave is a ~iQh-pressure front moving t~roug~ the 
water at the speed of sound (in the far field), This causes impact on any stationary equipment 
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in the water, If the impsct of the extremely high pressure Iront on the electronics container is 
considered, Newton's second isw shoukl be considered: 
l' ",'a -----------------------------··20 
"' 
mil = LF ----.-- .. ------------------ ... 21 
It is iTl~ied thst s lorce F is exerted on all object (container with electronics) with mass rr by 
the moving shock Iront, snd this causes the obje<::t to sccelerste, In this equation, two variable 
characteristics are to be observed: tile force, and the acceleration II anyone of these 
charsctO!ristics is minimised, the damage to the contained electron ics will be minim ised 
If IhO! lorce on an object is to be miniTlised, thO! object could be made physically more 
str~smlined, which impl;"s that the object must be modllied. This is not sn option, becaJse 
the object is a given enclosure containing specific electronICS, and the manufacturer will only 
conSider modilicah:ms to the internsl structure. Therefore, the on~ remaining chsracteristic to 
be mirimised is the acceleraton of thO! object 
The shock wave of an underwster explosion is s high pressure Iront of relatively short 
duration afld moving through the water at the speed 01 soum (in the far fi eld), The /()fce 
exerted by the shock front on the electronics container causes the container to accelerate 
The short duratIOn of the force means that the displacement could be relatively sma" 
Belore sny solution to thIS acceleraton problem is cons·o:Iered. it is necessary to consider the 
amount of movement (displacement) This is possible if the smount of acceleration snd tme 
of acceleration is known 
Whell movement ot an object (e.g electronK;s enclosure) is to be considered, and 
displacement is to be calculated then EqUiltion n should be considered, In the case of 
Equation 22 the acceleration is a constant va lle, and should only be used when a constsnt 
acceleration is experienced by the object. However, when sn average acceleration is known, 




s = distance (disp\<lcement) in m 
u = initial speed in mls 
t = time In seconds 
a = acceleratKln (mIS') 
3.1.2. Acceleration and Displacement Prediction 
To be sble to lormulate the hypothesis of the cause of damage to electronK;s, it was 
necessary to considef the amp.tude of the acceleration, as well as the displacement of the 
object csused by the accelefaton. This was ~Iso necessary /()f determining the type of test 
equipment thst would be required for f ield testing 
Brett et al12l experimented I'oith s metal cylinder placed under shock bading as a result of 
umerwstef explosions, snd obtained results which gave credibility to the amplitudes ~nd 
pefKlds of typK;at accelerations 01 such a metal object 
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Brett Bt al [2] performed sevM tests in all, of wh~h event two had tm-. most signifICant results 
for the purposes of this slLJdy, dLJe to the fact that thO! tMSt amount of damage was caused to 
the cylinder, This 's importan~ becausO!, if damage occurred, the accelerometer fixO!d On thO! 
inside of thO! cylinder would register a different valle to when no damage occurrO!d 
As will be seen later in this study, the O!quipmO!nt (electronics containers) usea by the author 
of this study Was dO!signed to not be strO!ssed beyond the elast~ properties 01 the electronics 
container when subjected to shock loading Brett et al. [6] established that the accO!leration 
on an object as a result of an explosion of 5 gram PE4, at a stand-off distancO! of 300 mm, is 




Acceleration measurements by Brett et a/ [2] 
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Unfortunately the time· axis measurements ta~en by Brett et al. [6] for event 2 were not very 







Figure 20: Acceleration and velocity curves from Brett lOt al [2]. 
Figure 20 shows that the peak acceleration is very short in comparison to tm-. vO!locity, and tm-. 
velocity 'IS positive as well as negative at timO!s, meaning that tho! hydrodynamic effects after 
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the two peak periods caused the cylirlder eit~r to slow down, or to move in the opposite 
directkln 
Consider Equation 22 and assume that the initial corldition of the object was stationary This 
me~ns that u - (}, and t~ subsequent displacement woold be 
- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- - -- - -- .•. -- 23 
Where 
S = distance (displacement) in m 
1= frne in seconds 
a = acceleration (m!s') 
The average displacement was calculated by approximation, assuming that the average value 
of the first peak acceleration in Figure 20B was 50000 g, arid this acceleration was 
maint~ir>ed for 60 ~s, Inserting these approximations into Equatkln 23 we get: 
" 
:. S = O.6nrm 
The result was an approximate displacement of 0,6 mm After 60 ~s, the acceleratkln was 
zero. which meant that the Yelocity was constant at that po<nt This meant that the object kept 
on mOVing, arid the negative part of the acceleration curve during the following 
(approximatel~) 70 ~s caused the object to slow down, and possibly to stop, This me~ns that 
the displacement (in this specific case) would be more than 0,6 ~s, arid was estimated to be 
, mm 
The signifICance of this caK;utatlon is that the displacement of the electronics container which 
was used for this study was also predicted to be in the order of 1mm due to the fact that the 
mass was approximately the same as the mass of the object used by Brett e/ al [2] 
Therefore, when shockiacceieration mitigating actklns were planned, the size of the damping 
materials could be relatiyely small to aliow for movement of only one, or perhaps (in worst 
cases) several mill'rnetres 
Looking ahead at some results of the field work for this study (e.g Figure 80), the peak 
acceleration period of the electronics container (object of this study) correlates very closel~ 
with the 50 ~s per half period. as was measured by Brett et al [21· 
3.1.3. Variables to consider 
Note: if the contained electronics did not accelerate at all. no movement would have been 
experierICed, arid no damage would have occurred This means that one of the solutions to 
be found is a method to preclude the ac:ceieration of the container from the contair>ed 
electronics, or to reduce it to below the damage threshold, 
If this statement were true. it means in theory that, if all components inside the container had 
no mass, or all components were accelerated e~actl~ at the samO! rate (by absolute rigid fixing 
methods), no damage would ocOJr. In most cases, however, not only the electronics are 
contained in the container, but also some mO!chanical moving parts, At most, a combirlation of 











Protection of ElectronicS Against Underwater Explosions 
A Roux 
Page4g 
solutions will haye to be found if a solution of the rigidly mounted electronics only wl!rl! to be 
attl!mptO!d. SuspO!nsion methods should rather be considered 
ConsiderirJg the mass of the container and Equation 22. acCO!tl!ration will be smaller when the 
mass is incrMsl!d This is not a YiablO! solution, dUI! to the fact that the mass specif>eatlons of 
the electronics container will be fixed for a certain application 
The strl!ngth of the contain l! r itself (for obllious rMsons) also plays a major role in the 
damage affe.:ted on thO! containl!d partslcomponl!nts. For this study. and to limit the number 
of yariables, it w~1 be assumed that the container is physicatty unaffected during and aftl!r thO! 
I!xpJosion (no physical damage) 
tt must be accl!ptl!d that Mch so lid statl! I!ll!ctronic compoMnt. although rigidly mounted in its 
packagirJg, has many components internally, constructed by mK; ro silicon layers of differing 
types and dimenslOfls. The characteristics of these materials determine the functions of the 
component. It is readi" understood that these materials, each piece being of different mass to 
its nO!ighlxlur. may, under conditions of seyere acceleration. alter the internal structure of the 
I!lectronics. The leYl!1 of the severe conditions causing internal damage is an unknown 
quantity at this stagl! 
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Consider again the shock wave moving through the water in the far field, and passing by an 
object With a ~ngth measurement of 120 mm (see Figure21). The physical sile of the 
er.:losure used frx- this study is presented relative to a shock wave in the far field which was 
generated by an expklsive charge (Plastic X) of 17568 kg at a standoff dIStance of 3,5 m at a 
depth of 19,85 m. 
,,-
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Figure 21. Typical shock loading of electronic equipment 
From Figure 21. it is clear that when a shock wave passes over an electronics container alld 
reaches the stage shown in this figure, the pressure around the box is in excess ci 200 Bar. 
This is for the short duration of approximately 100 ~s, after which the exponential decay of the 
rarefaction pressure continues to lower tevels 
The consideration is that, although these pressures are present tor a short while, they will 
initiate a crushing effect It is predicted that the time that the pressures are prevatent will not 
be enough to com plete the crushing effect. The hypothesis 'IS therefore form ulated as tallows 















Damage to eler::lronic eqUipment as a result of underwater ex;:iosiolls is caused by 
the plJellomenon of acceleration of the container housing the electrooics 
Minimisir>g the IK:celemtion may avoid damage alld pro·,ide a solution to the 
problem 
Quali~catioll: Simck loading (as a result of an underwater explosion! of an 
electronics container causes the electronics container to accelerate. ThfJ 
acceleration of the container is passed on to the cootained compooents via their 
mO[J{)ting methods Each component (whether electronic Of mechanical! has a 
different mass. and therefore a differellt inertia. In an attempt to resist tllf'J 
perpetuation of the acceleratiOll to all parts within, each com{XX1ent-inertja tellds to 
exert different forces on its mOOlltings if the force amplitudes are I)igl) elloogh the 
breaking/shearing strengths of eithlff the compollent itself or Its fixing mechanic~ i~ 
exceeded, and permanent damage OCCurs 
It was necessal)" to establish whether this hypothesIs was credible before elaboratir>g tests 
were performed to prove the hypothesis. The suggested plan of action was set out as follows, 
From the foregoir>g discussions only, it was necessary to 
1. Conf..-m the envilOnmental parameters prevalent in the watel near the electronic 
equipment and theil influence on an object when (and after) an explosion occurs, 
by measuring the acceieration. 
Establish the en~ironmental effect of the above parameters on the container of 
electronics. Using the information obtained in this study, the parameters coold be 
used to simulate the acceleration and displacement efft!Cts on an object 
Determine a SUitable solution and test the s~utlon to the extent that it can be 
classified as a techn~ogy by which electroncs coold be protected against 
underwater explosions 
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It is postulated tl1at there is an electronics Circuit Card ASSflmbly ecceler~tion 
damage threshold, abwe which the components will be physically damaged, 
and below which the components will f)()t be damaged (see Fi;Jure 221. 
This damage thresllOld is dependent (JPon tile type of componellts used. 
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Typical acceleration of an object caused by an 
undelWater explosion 
Description 
In broad term. the above po.tulation mean. that in speci!>;:; cases 01 electron>;:; design. 
component usage and PCB layout des>gn, there i. an acceleration threshold above wh>;:;h 
electron>;:; component damage would be eXj)eCted. Below that threshold , no phys>;:;al damage 
is ""pected. This also means that the threshold changes for each design!comr>Cnen~ and it i~ 
a .. umed that the mechan>;:;al design does not inlluence the result 
II thi s postulation were true (and assuming that no mechan>;:;al compooent~ caused collateral 
damage). it could be conclLJded that the only environment that would have to be reduced (to 
below a speci!>;:; threshold) to p.rohibit electron >;:; damage. would be the phenomenon o! 
acceleration 
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3.2.2. Postulation 2 
It IS postul~ted that, if the 8cceieratioll on tile PCB is redvced (by means 018 
damping metllod such as "sorr' mwnting methods) to below tile damage 
threshoJd, no damage L,,(wld OCCur. 
An experiment was devised to determine, visually only, whether there was enough e,ideoce 
to support the postulation or rIOt tf there were positive evidence, then further tests would be 
devised to confirm the fmdir>;JS, which coutd lead to the definition of damping design criteria, 
It was foreseen that the first experiment may prodllCe positive results, bLJI that these results 
might root be conclusive because of the choice of soft mountir>;J. which has a limited capability 
to reduce acceleration, It was also foreseen that experiments would have to be conducted 
with dLfferent types of soft mounting methods, to be able to establish the dynamic range of the 
dam ping effect of the chosen mate<Lal and the effectiveness of the damping characteristics 
The ultimate goal was to conduct a number of experiments, which would indicate a choice of 
mounting methods that would be successful for the protection of electronics in a blast shock 
environment as produced by a 40 kg charge at a stand-off dLstance of 4 m, thus wLthstandllg 
a pressure shock wave of 44,75 MPa (see Appendix 1) 
3.2.3. Consideration of a possible solution 
According to the hypothesis. a solution could be found when a suitable damper of 
acceleration i~ used between the source ci the acceleration and the etectronics contained 
within the electronics unit (see Figure 23) 
Refer to Equation 21 and assume that the shock wave exerts a force on the electronics 
container depicted in Figure 23, causing It to accelerate. A good example of the mathematics 
that follows was obtained from Ogata [17:831. The mathematics below is not to be attribllted 
to the author 
The acceteration of the electronics eeA of mass m is investigated, The mathematical model 
of the damping system of Figure 23 is derived from the schematk: diagram of the equivalent 
spr .,g-mass-dashpot system shown in Figure 24. The acceleration ci the electron~s 
container will be measured, and IS therefore assumed to be a known quantity. eonseq..ently 
it can be assumed. for thiS mathematical model that the electron'~s container is Without mass. 
The initial condition for time I < (1 is stati<; (no movement), 
tn the system presented in Figure 24, the following status is denoted-
1.1(1) is the displacement of the container, and is also the input to the system 
v(r) is the displacement of the electronics eeA, and is the output of the system 
b is the viscous friction coefficient of the dashpot 
k is the spriflg-constant 
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Assume that the fricllon force of lhe dashpot system is proportional to y- u 
Assume the spring is a linear sprinQ and the spring force is proportional to y - u 











Figure 23: The submerged electronics container with PCB 








Mathematical schematic equivalent of the damping 
system 
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In Newton's second law, shown in Equation 21 rJI is a mass, a is the acceleration 01 lhe 
mass, and L F is the sum of the forces acting on the mass, 
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Figure 26: The load voltage with a lamp as a load 
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Figure 26 shows the voltage on the output terminals, with a 0.1 0 res'stor in series with the 
.,ad. Th's IS for testing whether the moment when the detonator fuocllons can actually be 
detected accurately. From F'gure 26 it IS clear that this test setup wi l indeed show when the 
detonator funct.,ns, by the rising edge when the current drops to zero 
Practical results were obtained by firing the detonator in sea water when the detonator waS 
inserted into a 30 gm Pentolite charge (see Figure 27). 
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Figure 27: Measured detonator current 
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The rising edge of the detonator current pulse was used as an input to the syochronisation 
circUitry. The result was that the rising edge of the current pulse triggered the digital ci rcuitry, 
which also produced a rising edge within tractions 01 a mocrosecond (44 ns, as shown in 
Figure 28), which was used to trigger the measurement cycle of t s. 
The result obtained and '1Ilustrated in Figure 27 suggests that an accurate indication (within a 
few mboseconds) 01 the moment tI1at the charge was detonated could not be determined by 
usirog this method. Two pulses showing detonator current disturbaoce (shown in Figure 27) 
could have been due to the lunctioning 01 the detonator, and the detonation of the charge 
The disturbaoce was probatly caused by ionisation 01 the water in the immediate proximity of 
the two detonator wires This, however. could not be ver'lfied at the time. and a different 
syochronisation method had to be investigated 
4.1.3. Bandwidth Requirements 
When purchasing the additional eqUipment, it is r>ecessary to establIsh the maximum 
bandwidth 01 the equipment and the effect that bandwidth limitatIOn will have on the 
measurements. The following paragraphs deal with the Question 01 bandwidth concerroing the 
equipment that introduces tI1e bandw'idth problem, i.e. the AiD card. and the signal 
conditioner These test equipment units are arranged in tandem. and th e tandem 
arrangement therelore has to be investigated after considering each unit individually. 
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To expbre the limitation effect of the bandwidth characteristic of the AID card. a square wave 
wss p<oduced by S Signal generator with rising-edge-times much greater than the AID card·s 
abHity to follow the signal due to its bandwidth limitation. The AID card can measure voltsges 
ranging from a ex; level to a bandwidth-limited high-cut-off frequency 
A generator frequerlCY 01 100 kHz (square wave) was chosen, at amplitude 2 Vp-p. This 
signal was fed into the input port of the AID card, and the AID card was set at a sampling rate 
of 2 MSls 
The input signal is shown in Figure 2ea. Figure 28b is a time-amplified verson 01 Figure 28a 
for measuring the rise time of the leading slope more accuratel~ 
Figure 28: Test input signal 
. - .. -
~~,-< ... 
-~, ......... " 
f,~".,_" " ... .. 
The leading edge of the generated signal was measured, using a 100 MHz oscilloscope, to be 
44 ns (see Figure 28b) 
The AID card hss the charocteristk: thst, if a full-scale-amplitude 01 10 V is chosen. the 
bandwidth is 1 MHz_ If a lull-scale-amplitude of 2.5 V is chosen, the bandwidth is 500 MHz 
This characteristic is the result 01 the standsrd concept 01 the -gain-bandw-idth" p<oduct 
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The input signal was appli~d to the ND card at th~ lull scale 0110 V, and measuremMts wer~ 
taken Then the input signal was applied at lull scale of 2.5 V, and measuremMts were taken 
agam In both cases. troe amplitude of the input signal was kept at 2 Vp-p 
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A 100 kHz square wave measured at higher bandwidth 
(top"' 1 MHz), and lower bandwidth (bottom = 500 kHz) 
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From these two measurement, (see Figure 2g). it can be seen that the rising edge starts the 
rising process (bottom edge 01 rising pulse) and shows no "rounded shoukler", but when the 
input signal approaches Its pMk, the measurement "~houkler~" are rounded. This IS 
consistent with low-pass bandwidth limitations 
Applying this bandwidth limitation effect to a square wave such as in Figure 29, the result is 
quite pr~dictable and it may not present a problem when measuring lower fr~quMcies 
Applying a shock wave to this timiting feature. however, may present problems. due to the 
fact that th~ peak amplitL>de of a shock wave is reached in microseconds. but the pulse starts 
to drop "immedi"tely" upon reaching its peak. tt is therefore necessary to investigate the 
respon,e of the measurement system to a typical explo~ion shock waveform But it IS 
necessary to first determine the filter order of the AID card, before such "n attempt is m"de 















It was the intention to measure the explo~ion pressure pulses with the use of the pressure 
pulse sensors (as before) and u~ing a "conditioning amplifier" or "s '!JI1al conditklner' to supply 
the con~tant current to excite the sensors (which have built-in charge amplifiers), and to 
conditkln the signal for recording purposes. 
In discus~ions with the supplier on the ~'tgnal conditioners that are compatible with the 
~ensors. it wa~ found that there are various models that CaM be purchased 
Some sigMI conditioners have only unity-gain amplifiers. They have bandwidths of I MHz 
eoch. Some ~ign"l conditioners have the abilily to amplify the signals by XI, XIO Or Xtoo. 
These conditioners have b"ndwdth limitatKms in the order of lOa kHz, which meoos that they 
may not be "ble to measure the rising edge "nd "mplitude of a shock pressure pul~e 
correctly. The effect of these limit"t""s on the pressure pulse is unknown at this stage, ood it 
therefore becomes necessary to investigate the effect of bandwidth qu"ntifiably. or to be able 
to make the correct choice by simulatIOn. A simulation process to determine the effect of 
bandwidth limitations OIl the measurement end result wa~ attempted in this study 
4.1.3.2. Signal Conditioner and AID Combination 
The combination circuit that wa~ considered wa~ the cascaded signal conditioner and NO 
card (see Figure 30) 
P,I$O Ga""., 
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Figure 30; 
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Combined circuit to be simulated, in simplified fiNlt-
order filter notation 
4.1.3.3. Analysis of Bandwidth Limitation 
Each of the devices connected in series (thf; signal conditioMr and the NO card) had a 
bandwidth limitation The AID card had a boodwidth of 1 MHz. and the best signal conditioner 
supplied by ICP, had a bandwidth of 1 MHz (@unitygain) 
The bandwidth of the NO card was koown, Md the step response had been determined by 
actual mea~urements. The first task, therefore, was to determ'lIle the order of the iow-pass 
characteri~tic of the AIO card, Md then to extrapolate the findings to the signal cOIlditkJning 
equipment. The method was to simulate a step·function stimulus on varkJu~ orders of kJw-
pass fiters, arid then to compare the response with the actual measurement of the ~tep-
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response of the ND card shown in Figure 31_ The response tCist compared best with the 
messured result was to determine the order of the filter of the ND card 
1.inE ·O: r---.-~w~ •• -.-----
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Figure31: Actual measured result with the AID card of a step 
function input 
Nilsson and Riedel [16: p666] showed that the low-pass frequency of a simple (first-order) R-
C circuit, i~' 





From Equation 32, the ,alues for R and C can be calculated for a klw cut-off frequency of 
t MHz_ The values of R = 1000 0 and C = 0 159 nF were calculated and applied to the 
~imulatlon process 
It had to be con~idered thst the bsndwidth of the test equipment (the ND card in thi~ 
instance) would not be s fir,t--order filter. but rather a second or third (or n'") order filter. The 
first task was to simulate this filter, as well as varklus orders of the same filter, and then to 
compare the result to the measured response of the ND csrd. 
Nilsson ard Riedel [16: p742] have indicated that the result of cascading identical low pass 
filters (see Figure 32) will sharpen the bode-pklt (see Figure 33). but the resuttsnt klw cut-off 
frequency wHI stiA be at the original frequency 























From Nilsson and Riedel [16: p743]. the cascading of 
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From Nilsson and Riedel [16: p7421: the bode result of 
the cascading of low pass filters 
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• 
A simulation of the circuit up to the third order (yelow measurement point) in Figure 34 was 
done first, to find the best fit for the measured result of Figure 31 
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figure 34: The cascaded identical 1 MHz low pass filters 
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Figure 35 clearly shows thai the third order fdter was the best fit for the measured result ood 
that it could be concluded that the AID card K>W pass filter w~s a th ird order filter 
The order of the low-pass filter in the signal conditioner was unknown. It was considt!red fair 
to ~ssumt! that the signal conditioner would also have a third order response (The 
conditioners were not availablt! to measure the bandw'dth at that stage). It was possible to 
expand the simulation circuit of Figure 3410 a sixth-order filter (Figure 36 = two third-order 
filters cascaded). and to apply an actual measured pressure shock wave (as supplied by 
Strom & Janzon [20]) as a stimulus (Figure 37) 
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The complete cascaded S"-order 1 MHz lilter 
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Typical measured (norm~lised) shock wave, to be used 
as simulation stimulus 
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The dala points of the actual shock pulse measurement of Figure 37 was taken as an input 
stimulus for the simulation model (Figure 36). resulting in the output response shown in 
Figure 38 
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Figure 38: 
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Simulation results with actual measured data used as 
input stimulus 
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From this simulation. it is clear that the influence of the speCific bandwidth limitations that the 
instruments would introduce into the measured result were oot signifICant It can be seen that 
the peak amplitude as well as the time delay of the result varied very sl~htly compared to the 
actual stimulus, and thus the result was a fair reproductkln of the stimutus. The filtered peak 
voltage differed from the input signal by approximately 1 % and after 13 ~s there was hardly 
any dmerence between stimulus aoo response 
It could therefore safely be said that, if the measurements in Figure 38 were correct then the 
series bandwidth limitations as would be introduced by the signal conditioners plus the AID 
card, (6" Order Filter), would not influence the measurements adversely 
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4.1.3.4. Measured Response of the Signal Conditioner and Sensor 
4.1.3.4.1. Sensor Simulation Circuit 
Page 70 
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Test set·up to test the Signal Conditioner response 







Test set·up to test the Signal Conditioner response 
using ~n excit~tion current of 16 mA 
The signal generator was connected to the circuit shown in Figure 39 and adjusted to produce 
a 1 kHz square wave With 50 % duty cycle, between 0 V and 5 V, The signal conditioner was 
adjusted to deliver a constant current of 5 mA to the sensor simulator shown in Figure 39, The 
osc'lIk:>scope probe (Channel A) was connected to the output of the signal generator, and the 
oscilloscope Channel B was connected to the output of the s'tgnal conditioner, The result is 
shown in Figure 42, The measured result showed that the input signal changed much faster 
from one level (5 V) to the next level (0 V) than the output (·12 V to +12 V) as measured at 
the output of the signal conditioner. This indicates that the combined effect of the sensor 
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simulator and the signal conditionBr introduced a slew reduction to IargB signal amphfk:ation 
The FET produced the inverted response s~ in Figure 42, as waS Bxpecled Notice also 
that the change in output was linear betwMn -11 V and + 11 V This was due to the fact that 
the FET (with ootput iffipedance consisting of a resistance. R.-;s ~ and a capacitance Cos) 
had an output-impedance that is dominatBd by C." (see Figure 41). 
• I ~ , • if ~ , 1 0 , 0 
i , T 0 e 
I Source I 
w L " 
Figure 41: Output impedance characteristics of an FET 
Note: Ros_o" is the resistance measured between the Drain and tile Source of thB FET wilen 
the FET is SWitched ON. 
ThB output from tllB Signal cooditioner to the sensor is a constant curroot (set to 5 rnA in the 
case of Figure 39, and to 16 mA in the case cJ Figure 40) This means that Ros_~ (typically 
0.3 Ohm) does not playa significant role in this measurement, because the current source 
(signal cooditioner) has a much larger internal resistance (typically 1 MO) compared to Ro,_ 
0" The capacitance of the FET in combination with the capacitance of the oscilloscope probe 
is thus the dominant oad impedance of the sensor-slmulatcr on the signal conditioner and 
therefore the typical linear rBsponse sllown in Figure 42 is obtained 
Figure 42: 
.::_:: I:) 
Test results showing the slew action of the Signal 
conditioner with a constant current of 5 mA 
To demonstrate the effect of the capacitive impedance of the sensor Simulation cirCUit of 
Figure 39, the signal conditioner source current to thB sensor waS adjusted to 16 mA In 
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proctlse, relatively kmg cables are used to conrJect the senscrs with the measuring 
instrumentabon. These cables have a certain amount of cspacitance. which is simulsted by 
the test circuit shown in Figure 39. A good cable to use would be one with a very low 
capacitaoce. To oVercome the effects of the cable capacitaoce, the senscr-excitation currMt 
from the signal conditiorler can be irlCreased 
Figure 43: 
_'"' - '-
Test results showing the slew action of the signal 




The results 01 this experiment sIlCMI dea~y that the sleW-fate respollse of tile sensor-signal-
conditio"",r setup was Improved by irlCreasing the current, ooich proves thst the capacitive 
effect of the ca~es would be reduced when the sensor-excitat\on current is irtCreased, 
As expected, the rate of charJge in VeE waS much faster than in the CaSe of a SourCe current 
01 5 rnA confirming (and validatirJgl the findirJg that this wavefcrm was caused by the 
capacitance of the FET in combinatkm with the capacitaoce of the oscilloscope probe The 
slope rate was measured to be 20 V in 400 ns" 50 VIliS cr 0,02 ~sN, 
4.1.3.5. Sig al Conditioner Response 
Experiment To determine the large signal respjrlse of only the signal cooditloner, the test 
setup of Figure 39 was used. but the output from the s);J nal cooditioner was compared to the 
Input to the ,.g nal conditiooer. The graph ·.:;al results are sho'M1 in Figure 44 
FIgure 448 is a time-stretched-oot verSIOn 01 Figure 44A to enable visualislng clearly that the 
rising edge changed from -12 V to +12 V within 1.5 ~s. To see tne difference between the 
input snd ootput signals, the one signal was offset manually With respect to the other. Notice 
that there is no visually detectable difference between the input and output signals. This 
means that a linesrly varying large signal input that changes more slov.1y than a rate of 
16 VI~s {or 0,0625 ~slVl will be reproduced witrout any distortion by the signal corditicoler, 
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Input and ootput 
waveforms 
Figure 44. Output signal compared to the input signal of the signat 
conditioner 
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The small-signal response of the sign .. 1 conditioner was tested using an altered version of the 
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Figure 45; Circuit for small-signal response testing 
.. . 
The signal generator was adjusted to deliver a pre-programmed arbitrary Signal with a fast 
"sing edg~, and an exponential decay, This signal represented a typical shock wave 
response, Unfortunat~ly the capacitive properties of the sensor-simulating circuit changed this 
ideal waveform to a filtered version which had slower-changing propMies. The input and 
output waveforms were compared, alld shown in Figure46A. The amplitude change from a 
maximum value to a minimum value, was 6 ~s, (repetition period" 30 ~s) which is equivalent 
to a shock pressure response in the far fiekJ. The ootput resp:mse was superimposed with the 
Input waveform, and it can be seen that the result showed no visual difference 
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A sine-wave of frequency close to 1 MHz (830 kHz) was measured in Figure 4BB. The input 
to the signal conditioner and the ootput from the signal conditioner are superimposed in 
Figure 46B. It can be seen that a very slight phsse difference was noted between input and 
output signals. lxit no amplitlide difference was detected. This means that the signal 
conditioner performed very well with s 1 MHz signal 
Figure 46; Comparison of the output response of the 
conditioner to an arbitrary asymmetrical 
waveform, as well as a Sine waveform 
signal 
input 
The peliormance of the Signal coodltioner ;;., response to the signal generated by an 
accelerometer was tested experimentally to verify the performance. and to predict what the 
outcome woukj be when an underwater explosion woold not be directed exactly to the centre 
of the electronics enclosure. The accelerometer was fixed onto an Aluminium enclOSUre, 
offset to one s'ide as shown in Figure 47 
Figure 41: Accelerometer position in the Aluminium enclosure 
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The eroelosure was accelerated usirog hammer impact (see Figure 48) Two points of impact 
were used, OM directty adJa<;ent to the point where the accelerometer was fixed for Event 1, 
and at the centre of the enclosure for Even! 2, The acceleration measurement for EVMt 1 is 
shown in Figure 49, and the acceleration measurement for Event 2. is shown '., Figure 51 
Note that the acceteratlOl1 for Event 1 started with a poSItive acceleration, as would be 
expected, The acceleration for EVMt 2. started With a negative acceleration, whi<;h did not 
amount to much before the value changed to a positive vatue wh'o:;h was in the same 
amplitude region as for Event 1 This is because the hammer impact on the off-centre positioo 
01 the enclosure caused the enctosure to have a slight rotational acceleration due to inertia 
which was overcome and dominated by the overall acceleration caused by the direction cI; 
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Impact positions for Event 1 (A) and Event 2 (8) 
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The oscilloscope recorded both the input and output of Event 1 to the signal conditioner as 
shown in Figure 50. These two signals were superimposed, with a very slight offset to show 
the two signals separalely. Note that the wa~elorms 01 the Iwo superimposed signals are 
exactly equal. This means that no distortion was added by the signal condilioner due to 
bandwidth limil<tions (low pass fi~ering ellects) The recording equipmenl also recorded the 
measurement with no dislortion, which means that the highest frequency component of the 
acceleratlOl1 was unaffected by Ihe mBaSUlBment eqUipmenl. The condusion Can be drawn 
Ihal the measurement equipment was adequate lor measuring the acceleration which 
displays characteristK:s of the nature of this experiment 
Figure 50: The 100 MHz oscilloscope response to the input and 
output measurement of the hammer acceleration, 
Event 1 
Figure 51 shows the result 01 Event 2. where the impact was at the centre of the eiectlOnK:s 
container. Note that the first recaded impulse is negative, relative to Event 1 This means that 
the acceleration was in the OPPOSite direction to the direct impact 01 Event 1. due to the sw i~el 
movement caused by an ollset impact 
•• 
Figure 51: Acceleration for Hammer event 2 
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4.1.3.6. Validation o f the measurement equipment 
The condU$lOn that could be drawn from !he fo'ego,ng emponcal analyti5 .... as thai !he 
equ,pment Ihat Wffe selected for the expenments ,n Chapter 5 met the requiremems Of !he 
expected s'9r'>l1ls that were to be measured The bandwo:.llh of the equipment matcr-.ed the 
requ'r ement of the expe.:;ted ",gnal$, and the ssmplil1g rate of tile DAO aqu,pmant was 
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5.1. MEASUREMENTS and ANALYSES 
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5.1.1. Experiment 1: Initial Experiment to determine general 
parameters 
The previous chapter pointed out that acceleration is the phenomenon to be counteracted to 
ensur~ successful protection to electronics contained in a mechanical housing. It is Ihus 
obvious that acceleration measurements are to be taien and analysed in an attempt 10 find a 
solution to the problem 
From the calculation . in th~ previous chapter, and Equation 28, it was clear that the solution 
concerning the required hardware wou k:J have to be &ome method of dam ping (shock 
acceleration filter). and that if the correct damping could be found, the probability of damage 
would be minimised. The strategy that this experiment followed was to Mlect an~ cost· 
effective damper. and to place '6 CCAs at various distances and orientations from a single 
blast (with and without damping for the purpose of comparison). and to analyse the resi..Ots in 
terms of electronic damage, 
The author of this dissertation had no previous experience of the measurement 01 underwat~r 
explosion effects, and an experiment was de'.'ised to produce initial (pre·measurement) 
inlormation about the effects 01 underwater explosions on objects such as electronic 
contain~rs in close proximity to a blast. Due to the author's inexperience, and considering the 
cost of sensors. it was advisable to periorm the lirst experiment without instrumentation. 
5.1.1.1. Purpose 
Thi~ first experiment was aimed at gaining hands·on experience with respect to liflding a 
convenient siole of scaled explosive mass in relation to the wall thickness of the Enclo~ure at 
convenient scaled standoff distances, No sensors were used, due to the uncertain variables. 
Further to the above purpose, additional 'Ifl vestigations were dOlle, e.g to determine the effect 
01 cost·effective damping methods on a CCA uflder blast conditions. This was a first·test ball· 
park estimation eXperiment and was intended to est~blish whether there was visible 
improvement when using stafldard dampers (e.g grommets) as a mounting method, inste~d 
of a rigid mounting method 
The choice 01 "grommets· as a mounting metood stems from the c~lculation (see p~ragraph 
on Acceleration and Displacement Prediction on page 46) th~t a relatIvely small (from 0.75 
mm to 1.5 mm) displacement was predicted during the high d~mage-acceleration time. The 
method chosen for thi s experiment was to select Neoprene grommets ~s a mounting method 
lor 50''10 of the CCAs, and no damping for the other 50% 01 the CCAs Statistic~1 information 
was not expected as an output of this eXperiment. Therefore the physical arrangement was to 
have both a ·soW-mounted as well as a rigid-mounted PCB In the same enclosure and to 
subject it to exactly the same acceleration within practical limits. 
It was acknowledged that, if positive results accumulated from this experiment, further 
experiment>; could be devised to confirm the findIngs statistic~lIy. Simulation would also be 
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required to confirm the findings, and \0 qusntify the damping constants of the mounting 
methods 
5.1.1.2. The UUT 
The most cost·effective damping method seemed to be to use of "off the shelf" Neoprene 
grommets (see Figure 52) 
Figure 52: Grommet mounting method 
Totsl mass 
ofCCA = 
The electronics ooclosures that were u~ed for this experrnent are shown in Figure 53. Two 
;dentical PCBs were mounted onto One side 01 the enclosure, and two identical PCBs were 
mounted to the other side of the encio;;ure, A CCA on each side made use of Neoprene 
fj"Ommet mountings (see Figure 52), Tle enclosure wss closed up with the soft·mounted 




screws = , >l96 
gram 
Figure 53: The electronics shown in an opened enclosure unit 
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Four of thes" erIClosures (each containing foor identical PCBs) were mounted at various 
distances Irom the charge After the explosion, the enclosures were recovered, opened, and 
visual findings noted 
5.1.1.3. Component Choice 
The components were chosen to represent a wide range of component types_ Some were 
chosen to be small outline SM comjXX1<!nts which are predicted to withstand the shock 
environment betler, and some were chosen to represent components which would most 
probably fail under shock conditions These latter components typically were the white 
Burgess switches, the crystal, and the socket-mounted les. The component choice was 
varied to assfst wIth the determination of a damage threshokJ, 
It was expected that the tCs would not withstand the forces that are apparent in the 
accelerations near an explosion, and would be removed from the sockets The removal of the 
ICs would probably dampen the effect 01 the shock, and it was expected that the ICs would 
still operate alter the blast, if replaced in then- original sockets_ 
It was also expected that the crystal~ would sustain internal damage to the extent that they 
would not operate, or they would operate at a dIfferent frequency 
It was expected that the m~itary standard Switches would withstand the shock environment 
much better than the commercial switches, 
tt was expected that the soft-mounted FETs and regulators woukj withstand the shock 
environment. due to the lact that the soldered wires would provide enough flexibility to absorb 
the shock effects_ 
It was expected that the LEDs would withstand the shock. due to their well-known rigid 
construction 
5.1.1.4. Physical Test Set-up 
Four Aluminium enclosures, each containirlg four identIcal CCAs, were tied down with cable-






~' -~~--------~rrr the corresponding 
: serial number of 
• • the CCAs it contained, in the 
retatlve positions 
as mounted 
Figure 54: Four enclosures mounted on a PVC frame 
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A 292 gram Pentolite chalge was placed at the centle of the flame (see Figule 55). Adding 
the deton<ltor expklsrves, this totalled 30 gram of explosives 
Figure 55: 
ThB areas lacing 
the charge Were 




The position of the char:ge, retative to the enclosures 
Thelrame was then hxnM upside down, and su~pendM from" crane at a depth 01 2 m (see 
Figure 56). The frame and enclosures were COve led loosely with a net for easy recovel)' after 
the expkls~, 
Figure 56: The test setup suspended below the water surface, at a 
depth of 2 m 
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The charge was then detonated from a safe distance and the four enclosures were recovered, 
still in the net The frame was damaged beyond repair, as was expected 
5.1.1.5. Results and Analyses 
The results are grouped into four sectlO/lS each relative to a specific distance from the blast 
The dosest electronics container was placed with its face 100 mm from the biast and 
numbered endo~ure 1, The furthest container was 360 mm from the blast and numbered 
enclo~ure 4 
5.1-1.5.1. Enclosure No 1 at 100 mm from the blast 
This container sustained fatal damage to that face which was clo~est to the blast (see 
Figure 57) 
The PCBs contained within this housing, serial m •• rnbers 01 02, 03 and 10, are shown in 
Figure 58, This housing was drenched in seawater as a re~ult of the damage sustained on the 




pronounced on the 
seam, in the mddle 
of the rectangular 
face = 16 mm (jeep, 
The housing with marked face 
closest to the blast at 100 mm 
operauon, and it served nO purpose 
to re·test the cirCUits, 
The peak pressure at the surface of 
this specific enclosure was 
cakulated to be between 180 MPa 
and 200 MPa, according to 
caiculations from Cole [5[ The 
standoff distance of 100 mm was 
less than 10 charge rooii, and 
therefore the equations by Cole [5] 
would have been Inaccurate, and 
the peak pre~sure predicted to 
actually be more than 200 MPa, 
Therefore this p€ak pressure 
equated to a 40 kg charge at a 
standoff distance of less than 
1 15 m (which is closer than the 
target user requirement of 4 m or 22 
charge radii), 
An interesting observation was that the plastiC deformation of th€ battery housing was in the 
opposite direction to the plash::; deformation of the blast impact face (see Figure 57) Thi~ 
damage was caused by the lact that the enclosure movement was fOlced in one direction by 
the biast and the battery housing irwrtla resisted th€ motion. causing a relative movement 
(with consequent plastic deformation) of the battery hou~ing in th€ opposite direction It i~ 
clear that the battery did not cause this battery·hou~ing deformation because both the 
opposing side walls were deformed approximately equally (see Table 3) 
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Deformation of top ofthe sidewall (in mm) 
Table 4: Deformation of the shock-loaded areas. 
Sidewall No Deformatkln of tMe sidewall face (in mm) 
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The deformatkln illustrated that this phenomenon WaS in fact the primary cause of all 
electronic component breakages, and supported the hypothesis (in the relevant cMpter on 
psge 43) that high acceleratkln of the main object (housing) and the translation of the 
acceleration to t~ mechanical and electronic components, wou KJ be the primary csuse of 
physICal failure 


































Figure 58: Damage to the electronics, 100 mm from the blast 
In comparison to other results. it also supported (to a certaIn extent) the postulatiOnS on 
page 52 of this study, that there is a threshold below which no permanent deformatoo occurs. 
The inertia of a component (maSS = ilertia = resistance to movement) tends to fOlCe relative 
mo,ement between the component and the PCB on which it is mounted, tearing it off from the 
ece 
As a result of thiS observation, the solution wouk:J quite obviously be to use "soW mounting 
methods for mounting those extremely inert component~ 
A conclu~ion that pertains to this specific container wa~ drawn that none of the circuitry was 
expected to function. due to ingress of ~ea water, plus the fact that components Were broken. 
Two types of switches were used, white (rIOt MIL-STD, Burgess). and brown (MIL-STD, u~ed 
in other military applical'ons) 
In both cases. the grommet-suspended PCBs were the closest to the exr>osion. It was 
therefore not possible, 'n this specific CaSe. to conclL.de whether the grommets had the 
desired damping effect When looking at the FETs driving the LEOs (~ee Figure 59) on PCB 
No.Ot it is ooticeable that the FETs are bent further than the FET~ on PCB No.02. which waS 
closer to the explo~ion. The grommet-suspended re~ults gave plau~ible indication that the 
damping-effect was evk1ent. The I1OIl·Mll·STD Burgess SWitches were damaged beyond 
repair, except in the cases where they were situated on the grommet-mounted PCB (see 
Figure 60 and Table 5). This was further evidence that the grommet-mounted PCBs had 
succeeded in damping the electronIC components more effectively 






















Card 02 nearest, 
b!.Jt mwnted with 
grommets 
Shock Direction 
Comparing shock acceleration on FETs at 100 mm from 
blast 





Shock Direction -- --
Card 02 nearest, 
"",t mounted with 
grommets 
Switch in tact 
" 
Comparing shock acceleration on switches at 100 mm 
from blast 
Damage to switches. side impact, 100 mm from blast 
Orientation 1 
N8rrow end towards 
expiosK>n 
4 visibly slightly broken (non-
operational) 
Orl<lntallon 2 




1 visibly broken (3 were 
operational) 
1 visibly broken (3 were 
operational) 
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A conclusion was drawn that the HoneywO!II MIL-STD switche5 withstood shock better than 
the commercial Burgess switches. as had been expocted 
TableS: 
General Components 
DIP Integmted Circuit5 
SMICs 
Test Point5 
Damage to generat components, side impact, 100 mm 
lrom blast 
Remarks 
All DIP ICs were removed from the socket~ 
No SM ICs were rO!movO!d from their soKJered po~itions 
2x Test Points were removed from the PCBs 
From Table 6, It was clear that more components SU5tained damage (for example the test 
points) than would be expected, This means that the stoodoff distance was too small 
Furlh~r Oh.~r\'alion. 
There was evidence that collateral damage had been cau5ed by the ICs which were removed 
Irom their sockets during the acceleration stages caused by the blast, and then impacted on 
components In the vicinity (see Figure 61), One LED and one FET was (most j)lobablyj struck 
by the accelerating Ie and bent in the opposite direction to what waS expected, The LED that 
wa5 5truck by the IC was bent over and struck another LED, which then shattered (see 
Figure 61) 
Figure 61: Collateral dam"ge 
5.1.1.5.2. Enclosure No 2 at 160 mm from the blast 
This enclosure contained CCA numbers 04 and [)9, The charge size was 30 gram At a 
distance of 160 mm the peak pressure was pred~ted to be between 108 MPa and 115 MPa 
Thi! was equivalent to a charge size of 40 kg, at a standoff distance 011 ,8 m 
This enclosure was mounted with its (electronic) most susceptible face towards the blast, with 
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Cards 04 and 09 









Figure 62: Cards 04 and 09 after the blast 
Table 7: Faults on Card 04: Soft-mounted on grommets 
Fault 
Broken off from PCB 
(On Bottom of PCB) 
Broken in half 
RemOVBd from thB 
sockets 
Comments 
SM capacitors on thelSCil of thB PCB nearest to the 
explosion, PCB moved away from capacitors 
Does not operate, but PCB connectiOil still OK 
\<\/hen replaced, the circuit was still operational. except 
for ':YN5 
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Bro~en ott from PCB 
(On Top of PCB) 
Brol:en off from PCB 
(On Bottom of PCB) 
Broken off from PCB 
(On Bottom 01 PCB) 





SM capacitors and resistor on the lace 01 the PCB 
furthest from the explosion. PCB wh ip-I~shed, 
SM ,apacitors on the face of the PC B nearest to the 
explosion, PCB moved away tram capacitors 
SM resistors on the face of the PCB nearest to the 
explosion, ~nd mounted near mounting screw PCB 
moved away from resistors 
Ci"ult will not operate, rue to SM components and 
Sl'lo1tches broken or removed. 
Beyond operatoo 
These PCBs were the only instances in this experiment of the SM (surtace mOlJllt) resistors 
Figure63: Sulface Mount 
capaCitors broken 
away from their 
soldered positions 
Measurements and Analyses 
and capacitors having broken away and being 
catapulted from their mounting positions. Although 
there was less damage to the soft-mounted PCBs, 
even they klst 2 components by this means, whi,h 
meant that the Neoprene grommet solution was 
not ideal in this instance, in whi::h the sll:xk wave 
propagaion direction was perpendicular to the 
PCB, and this stand-off (Jjstan,e was maintained 
This gave cause fOI further investigatbn 
A ,Iose-up photograph was taken of one spe'itic 
PCB in which a SM capacitor was removed only 
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Blast onto top 
foc, 
{component 
side) of PCB 
Figure 6<1: Cards 14 and 16 after t~e blast 
Table 9: Faults on Card 14: Soft mounted on grommets 
Fault 
Removed from the 
sockets 
Orte LED {red) was 
non-operational 
Comments 
When replaced, the circuit was still operational 
When another LED was soldered in parallel to th;,; 
LED, t~e c~cuit was again fulV operational 
Table 10: Faults on Card 16: Hard mounted onto enclosure. 
Fault Comments 
Broken off from PCB SM capacitors "nd resistor on the face of the PCB 
{On Top of PCB) rtearest to the explosion 
Page 89 
R20, R15 Broken off from PCB SM resistors on the face of the PCB furt~est away from 
{On Bottom of PCB) the explosion. and mounted nesr mounting screw 
Removed from the Circuit would net operate. due to SM components af"ld 
sockets switches broken or removed 
SW1, &107 Broken Commercial switches only, broken beyond operation 















The cards that were mounted with grommets sustain~d the least dsmage, In fact when the 
ICs were replaced onto cards 04 and 14, (soft-mounted), Ixlth circu~s operat~d correctly, 
except for the broken switch, SW5 
The hard-mounted card (09), sustained more damage: all foor SWitCheS w~ re broken, and a 
number of SM resistors and capacitors were remov~d from the PCB The SM components 
which were rem OIled were from t>cth sides of the card It is probable that the high 
po!rpo!ndicular acce lerstion and deceleration that the csrd experienced duling the shock 
period was adequate, due to inertia, to overcome the bOIld strength of the surtace-mounted 
capacitors and resistors, 
The shock wa~ damped by the enclosure (ss could boo! S~en from the indentations OIl the 
battery compartments), and thus the other hard·mounted card (card 16) lost only 6 SM 
components, compared to card 09. which lost 168M components. 
5.1.1.5.3. Enclosure No 3 at 310 mm from the blast 
The charge sio:e was 30 gram. At a distance of 310 mm the peak pressure was predicted to 
be between 51 MPa a/ld 54 MPa, This was equivalent to a charge size 0140 kg. at a standoff 
distance of 3.4 m 
This ~nclosure waS moonted with its (electronic) IMst susceptible side towards th~ blast, with 
csrds 07 and 1 5 closest to th~ blast; see Fig ure 65 and Figure 66 as well ss T sble lIto 
Table 14 forth~ reSults. 
Cards 07 and OS 
Figure 65: Cards 07 and 08 after the blast 




















Table 11: ' Faults on Card 08: Soft mounted on grommets 
Fault Comments 
No faults Complete CirCUit was operational 
Table 12: Faults on Card 07: Hard mounted onto enclosure 
Fautt 
On~ one (coumer) Ie 
removed from the 
socket 
Does not operate 
Comments 
When Ie was replaced. only the oscillator c;"cuit was 
operational. The ~p circuit was non-operational 
XTAL bent slightly towards the shock, ullCertain if this 
is the cause of ~p malfunction 
Cards 13 and 15 
The results for cards 13 and 15 are shown in Figure 66, as well as in Table 13 and Table 14 
Comp 10 
'" 
l- • ~~ ~""- -~"jI ' , ~ • . 
• 
~ - , 






Figure 66: Cards 13 and 15 after the blast 
Shod 
direc!ion 
Table 13; Faults on Card 13: Soft mounted on grommets 
Fault Comments 
8-Pln Ie was moved 
slighUy, but stili made The complete circuit was operational 
contact. 
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Comp ID Fault Comments 
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Bolh ICs were 
removed 
After re-insertion of the ICs the complete circUit was 
operational. 
Further observation 
All components were unbroken. Exception. card 07, which malfunctioned (or some unknown 
!tIaSOn. Further investigation is required to identily the cause, 
5.1.1.5.4. Enclosure No.4 at 360 mm from the blast 
The charge size Was 30 gram At a distance of 360 mm (from Appendix 2) the peak pressure 
is calculated to be between 43 MPa and 46 MPa This is equivalent to a charge size of 40 kg. 
at a stand-off distililce of 4 m 
This enclosure was mounted with its (electrOflic) most susceptible fuce towards the blast and 
cards 11 and 12 were the closest to the blast, see Figure 67 and Figur<! 68. as well as 
Table 15 to Table 18 for the results 
Cards 11 and 12 
Figure 67: Cards 11 and 12 after the blast 
Table 15: Faults on Card 12: Soft mounted on grommets 
Comp 10 Fault Comments 
Gene",1 No Faults Circuit fully op<!ratlonal. 















Table 1S: Faults on Card 11: Hard mounted onto enclosure 
Fault 
Both ICs w .. re 
removed. 
Comments 
Wren ICs were replaced, only the oscillator circuit was 
operstional, The ~p circuit was non-operational. 
Cards 05 and 06 
Comp 10 
Comp 10 
1 - ~ • •. 111 ~ I~ ', , ' , -" ', J Blast onto top fac .. 
(component 
side) of PCB 
. , - -
,f 
I , • I ! 
'" I ' ~ -\} 
.~ ----- ----- • 
Figure 68: Cards 05 and OS after the blast 
Table 17: Faults on Card 05: Soft mounted on grommets 
Fault 
Both DIP ICs were 
removed. 
Comments 
After re-insertion of the ICs, the complete CirCUit wss 
operationat 
Table 18: Faults on Card OS: Hard mounted onto enclosure 
Fault 
Both DIP ICs were 
removed 
Comments 
When ICs were replsced, only the oscillator circuit wss 
operstional. The ~ P circuit wss IXln-operationsl. 















After re-inserh:m of the ICs, both the soft-mounted PCBs were fully operational. Both the 
hard-mounted PCBs had faults on the ~ P circuitry, in that no function was detected 
5.1.1.6. Simulations 
The result for Enclosure No.1 as was reported on Page 82 and the result for Enclosure NO.2 
as was reported on Page 86. are summarised as follows 
The surfsce srea that faced the shock loading at a standoff distance of 100 mm, 
suffered severe damage due to the enclosure being deformed into Its plasti, 
region. A "dent was created on the said surface 
2 Enclosure No.2 which was positioned at a standoff dIstance of 160 mm, did not 
display any visual deformallon after blast loading 
These large variation in the results were unexpected and difficult to explain. Due to the 
difficulties of inter,.-etallon, Snyman [19J performed a simulation on Autodyne of the two 
instances discussed above 
Snyman [19] used Autodyne for simulation. He used the Euler solver for the water and 
explosive ,hage and the Lagrange solver for the A luminium box. The mesh for the 
computstion of the 100 mm and 310 mm stsndoff distsnce is shown in Figure 69 
."'~.-
Figure 69: The computational model used for the 100 mm and 
310 mm (courtesy of Snyman [19]) 
The result is shown in Figure 70. Visual inspection shows remarkable correlation of the 
permanent deformation, yet the depth of the "dent" was calculated by simulation to be 
11.3 mm, which is below the measured depth of 16 mm. The deformation is therefore under-
,.-edicted by simulatbn. 
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result of Enclosure No_ 1 after shock loading 
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The walls of the battery compartment were permanently deformed in the opposite ctirectie>n 
due to inertia, which is demonstrated clearly in ";gure 71 supplied by Snyman [191_ 
Velocity of ...... ,-
the outer 
walls of the 
enclosure 
.. --,-
of the baHery 
compartment 
walls -.• 
Figure 71: The velocity distribution of the enclosure at 120 jJs after 
the collision with the shock wave 
The simulstion (of the blast using the enciosc'e whkh was posilioned at 160 mm) showed 
negligible permane-nt deformation. This fact correlated well with the experimental result 




















From the evidence it is clear that the soft-
results with ".c>!::".c>,r-t 
A !::lnl"IITI/"'!:InT result is that numbers 04 09. It is clear that: 
a. 
b. The 
acceleration curve. the acceleration is not known at this 
the j.lU::l,lUICUIUI this 
The ~nT'_mnl that were in enclosures the 




in enclosure 2 sustained 
enclosure 4 sustained no This 
52. 
mounted in sockets 
the were still n,",,~,t""\n",1"1 
which the most 


















for no J:lnn.~r'" 
not be the cause 
withstood the shock environment much better than the 
due to the 
as mounted 
as ex~)ec1ted. 
on the three wire 













The of this was to measure the of the enclosure 
and at the same time to measure the of 
which was mounted on The acc:ele!ration 
a conclusion drawn 
the electronic 
A conditioner was used in with sensors. The 
list was as follows: 
a. a AID conversion card with 
box. 
b. box. 
c. 1x sensor with with a 20-m low 
noise cable. 
d. 1x pressure sensor with with a 20-m low 
noise cable. 
e. 2x PCB with low noise cables. 
f. and cables. 
g. 100 MHz for the 
The two ac~:::ellerolmE~telrs were mounted inside the electronics container 72). 
CCAs were used in one Two were mounted onto one side of 
were mounted to the other side of the enclosure. 11.1 .. "" ... " ..... 
were used for one of the on half of each enclosure. The other two 
were mounted onto the The enclosure was up in such 




















Figure 72: Accelerometer mounting positions in the enclosure 
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One of the two identical accelerometers was mounted firmly onto the container through the 
PCB. with a fastenirJg torque of t Nm The other accelerometer was mounted onto the PCB 
(usir'19 s nut to fssten the accelerometer) of s grommet-mounted CCA. with a torque of t Nm 
The orientations of both sensors were such as to produce a positive voltage when the 
directoon of the acceleration was ;' the direction of the movement of the shock wave, This 
catered fo r a shock wave direction as indicated in Figure 73 
Direction 0' movement 
of the shock wave 
One acc"ero:l1eter 
:l1oun:ed on PCB 
Orientation of the 
accelerometers relative 




Figure 73: Accelerometer orientation relative to the direction of 
the shock wave's mo~ement 
The electronics enclosure containing the accelerometers was mounted onto a collapsible 
PVC frame. The shock pressure sensors were mounted onto the fram e in such a manner that 
the shock wsve would reach the enclosure before it reached the sensors, but also in such a 
manner that reflectlOlls from the enclosure could not interfere with the pressure 
measurements (see Figure 74) 











Protection of Electronics Ag8inst Und&lWater ExplosIOns 
A Roux 
Page 100 
Figure 74: Illustration of the frame, showing the mounting 
positions of the sensors, test Enclosure, and the 
explosive charge 
The sensors werB not mounted symlTl€tncally in order to measure thB propagation yelocity 
arod vBrify this in/ormation with tile theory 
5.1.2.4. Custom Synchronization Equipment 
The custom firing and SyncllrOflisation equipment (Figure 75) used In the previous eXpBriment 
(page 78). was used unmodified in conjunction with the IMPI military firing unil The 
syncllronisation eqUipment senses thB positiYB 
rising edge of the current passing through thB 
detonator. This produces a TTL-compatible signal 
w~1l which the PXI computer synchroniSes the 
mBaSUrBment pBrOO 01 t second 10 capture the 
complelB blast BYBnl. Various tests were conducted 
to ensure that thB synchronisatiOfl equipment was 
functional 
Figure 75: The Custom Synchronisation Unit 
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One Aluminium endOSlrB containing four identical PCBs was tied down with cable-ties on a 
relatively "soW frame of PVC piping (see Figure 76) 
Position of 
charge 
Figure 76: The enclosure mounted on a PVC frame with the charge 
and sensors in pOSition 
A 29.2 gram Pentolite charge wss placed st the indicsted position on the frame. With the 
detonator explosi~es added to the Pentolite chargB. the total chsrge weight was 30 gram 
The frame was then turned LJPside down. suspended from s crsne (see Figure 77) and 
lowered to a depth of 2 m below the sll1ace of the wsler. The enclosure was covered loosely 
with a net for easy recovery after the explosion 
A period of two minutes was allowed for the SenSOrS to settle. 10 obtain a steady state for the 
test setllp below the water. Continuity between the signal conditioner and the sensors wss 
checked 
The charge was then detonated from a safe distsnce. and the enclosure plus sensors were 
recovered. The frame wss damaged beyond repair as expected. but the sensors arod wires 
were 100% intact 
It was expected thst the Impsct of the shock on the frame would hsve an effect on the 
measurement of scceierstions. because the electronics encosure was ""t completely 
isolated from the frame. It was fastened by cable ties. and nested on sponge rubber. The 
effBct was expected to be insignif>coot due to the fact that It would occur before the shock 
wave srrived at the enclosure. Sourod travels :'aster in materials of higher density. thus the 
shock travelling through the frame. would reach the electronics enclosure before the shock 
wave travelling route through the water 
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5.1.2.6. Results and Analyses 
5.1.2.6.1. Damage Assessment 
Th<! test box was opened after the lirst blast. and the CCAs were tested, The results are giv<!n 
in Table 19 and Fi~ure 78 
Table 19; 
CCA number 
No 05 (Soft mounts) 
No 11 
No 12 (Soft mounts) 
CCA test results after Event 01 
Remarks 
The microprocessor circuitr~ was faulty. All other compooents 
wer<! unaff<!cted, and the ICs were still in th<! sockets 
The m>::roprocessor circuitry did root functIOn One Ie was 
remo~ed from its socket, whilst the other Ie was still in its socket 
All oth<!r components w<!re unaff<!cted. Wh<!n the ioose Ie was 
replaced , the circuit that it was part of was operational 
Both socket-mowoted ICs were dispaced from the sockets, When 
they were replaced into their sockets. the complete circuit, 
ir>::ludln9 the microprocessor was operational 
Allies were intact in the sockets, and the full circuit was 
operational. 
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Notes: From the results of the previous experiment (page 78), it was found that the 
microprocessor crystals of CCAs 11 and 00 were faulty, These crystals were replaced after 
the experiment using a strain-relief technique. The original crystals of CCAs 05 and '2 were 
kept unchanged for this experiment, and the traditional mounting technique was used. After 
this experiment, both the crystals of CCA numbers 05 and 06 were faulty_ After replacem ent 
of the crystals. all circuits were again lully functional No cooclusion with respect to the crystal 
mounting method is possible Irom this result because one traditional and one strain-relie.ed 
crystal were faulty. Both the crystals of the CCAs which were mounted closer to the 
explosion, were affected adversely 
CCA" ~.rd­
roountod , 
~ .IIi"ll boI~ IC. 
reme_ fram 
the .oeke!> 
Figure 78: The four CCAs after Event 01 
Field replacement of the crystals was not possible, Only the ICs were replaced into their 
sockets, and the erdosure was again assembled for the secoM test. It was noticed that the 
IC insertion was not met with the regular physic~1 reSistance, indicating that less force would 
be required to extract the ICs under s~k conditions, This was due to the numerous times 
(wear on the pins and sockets) that the ICs were replaced, while usil)Q the same components 
that were in the sockets on previous occasions 
A second blast was obtained with the same setup as lor Blast 1, to obtain comparative data 
The second blast results are shown in Figure 79 and Table 20 
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GGA 05. m<:<Xltod 00 
gr"""",,1> . oo..ojng no 
ph ,,,, ,,1 d...., . !I" 
CCA '2. moooted C<1 
gromm ets, s ~ CIWing no 




No 05 (Soft mounts) 
No 11 
No 12 (Soft mounts) 
The CCAs after Event 02 
CCA test results after Event 02 
Remarks 
CCI< " ~ ' r<l-m oonted, 
~'''ng bat~ Ie. rom,,,M 
~om th o " d ot. 
Th~ microproc~ssor circuitry was faulty (un-repaired from 
EVMt 01). All other components were unaffected, and the ICs 
W~r~ still in th~ sockets 
Th~ microprocessor circuitry did not function (un-repaired from 
Event 01). One IC was r~moved from its soc~~t whilst the 
other IC was still in its socket. All other components wer~ 
unaffected. When th~ loose IC was r~placed. the circuit that it 
larmed part 01 was operational 
Both sock~t-mounted ICs wer~ displaced from the sockets 
When th~y were replaced into their sockets, the complete 
circllit, including the microprocessor. was operational. 
All ICs were intact in the sockets. and the lull circuit was 
operational 
The above result is exactly the same as for Event 01 
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5.1.2.6.2. Measurement Results 
5.1.2.6.3. Acceleration Measurements during Event 1 
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Accelerometer 1 was mounted on the PCB. and Accelerometer 2 was mounted on the 
endosure. As can De Seen in Figure 80, the resultant output 01 Accelerometer 1 is an 
amplitlJde-redlJCed, phase-shifted response relative to Accelerometer 2, Compare this result 
with the simulated result Irom the report j1] in Figure 81 and Figure 84 from this result the 
empirical dampir.g lactor can now be determ ined, il req uired lor lu rther simulation, 
Acceteraijon: Event 1 
+50 788 9 
0 
~ ... 2:~ 
-~_I:CCA 
20000.00 
, Accelerometer 2 (on EncbsurnJ , , , 
\ f( /\ 
~1Ofr"IeW 1 (on CCA) , /1SOO Q" P(IonI A In f9-"e 82 
I} \ ,~ r, '~, 
'11' •• 00 v _.00\ 
, 
11,)5Otc \Vl 1150.00 '---./ 12'0./1(1 i ,-" , , ! , 
" " , 
-4aaoo.'0 ~- ... ---.-.... 
'1,,)( -57295; J 
In Figure 81 to F",ure 83. this 
point is referenced to trne 
zero for integration purposes , 
I T;.,~ I~) , 
_80000.00 
Figure 80; Acceleration results for both sensors for Event 01, over 
the first 140 liS after the shock wave coliiaion 
5.1.2.6.4. Object motion during Event 1 
Endo,urt" motiun. £"~nt I: 
The acceleratk!n of the electronICs container that was measured during EYent 1 {Figure 80) 
was double-n tegrated to find the displacement of the container. The resutt on getting rid 01 
the integrat~n constants is shown in Figure 81 This result showed that the disptacement as a 
consequence of the shock wave c~,sbn with the Enclosure occurred approximately 1 mm 
alter 1 ms 
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"~ ,. .......................................................... .. 
,," 
.'.0(; 
., L......! ________ ---' 
Figure 81: 
CCA motion. E\Cnt I: 
""1 ... 1 
Double integration of the acceleration of the electronics 
container, producing the displacement of the container 
during Event 1 over the first 1 ms period 
The double inlegration process applied to the occeleration of the CCA produced the motion 
result depicted in Figure 82 
• , Lp 
]£1 , , . 













Mo'lo" of ,n o CCA: ~vo"' , 
Double integ ration of the acceleration of the electronics 
CCA, producing the displacement 01 the eeA during 
Event 1 over the first 1 ms period 
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Over the first 1 ms after the shock wave collision With the Enclosure. the displacement was 
negative due to the negative <lCceleratbn durin9 the first 50 ~s. The velocity was also 
negative (relstively small amount), cau~ing the displ<lCement to be negative, On f<lCe value, it 
would be expected that the acceleration of the eeA would start With a similar polarity to the 
acceleration of the Enclosure However, if the shOCk front collided with the Encb sure at an 
angle slightly offset from zero degrees a swivelling effect would be experienced by the 
Enclosure, 
The two accelerometers were offset by approximately 50 mm on the horilontal plane, and this 
had the result that the offset shock front changed the polarity of the offset accelerometer This 
effect was also de monstrat~d in Fi(jure 51 in which a laboratory setup with a hammer 
providing the acceleration is shown. The inertia of the Enclosure (approximately 2 kg) caused 
the relatlV~y long tIme delay to obtaining a positive displ<lCement 
lhlatin I)i'plllccment, EHut ., 
The relative dispjacement Detween the Enclosure and the CCA over a period of 16 ms is 
shown in Figure 83. The fact that the shock front collided With the Enck:>sure at a slightly offset 
angle caused the large relative displacement between the Enclosure and the CCA (4.1 mm -
see yellow curve in Figure 83) 
• ., " • • 
j 000 
Figure 83' 
Rol .. ,,,,, Oi.placement 
The relative displacement 01 the Electronics Container, 
relative to the CCA, USing grommet suspenSion during 
Event lover the first 1 ms period 
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5.1.2.6.5. Acceleration Measurements during Event 2 
Event 2: Acceleration in g 
_ 00 
COOJ :, OO 
40000,00 
(\J +576309 I 
Acceleromet.,..- 2 (on Enclosure) 
Page lea 
20000,00 i \ 
) \ l\ 
____ / ~<metef t (onCCA) 








"'" \00 ! 
. . '.=L~=JI,="n~"~.;,," .-'--1 t c • 
In Figl¥e 85to Figure 87 






Figure 84: Acceleration results for both sensors for Event 2 over 
the first 140 ~s after the shock wave collision 
5.1.2.6.6. Object motion during Event 2 
Enclosure :"t-lotiou, EYen! 2: 
The accl!leration that was mMsured on the eGA during EVl!nt 2 (Figure 85) was double-
inteQrated to find the displacement of the GGA The result obtained after elimination of the 
inteQration consta/lts is shown in FiglJl"e 85, This result shows that the. dlsplace.ment as a 
conse.que.nce of the shockwavl! collision with the Enclo~l¥e wh>ch was passed onto the CCA, 
occurred approximate.ly 0,5 mm after, ms 











Protectkm of Electronics Ag3mst Underwater Explosions 
A Roux 
Mo'"", of tn" Enelo"",o: ~ •• nt 2 
1<.00 
leX , 
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.!- i< i ,,, 
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Figure 85: 
CCA motiun, bcnt2: 
T~ .. ",'I 
Double integration of the acceleration of the electronics 
container, produCing the displacement of the container 
during Event 2 Over the first 1 mS period 
The double integr~tion process ~pplied to the acceleration of the eCA prodllCed the motlOll 
result ~s shown by Figure 86 
Over the first 1 ms after the shock wave coI~sic:m with the Enclosure. the displ~cement of the 
eeA was negatiye, due to the negatiye acceleration during the first 50 ~s. The Yeiocity w~s 
also negatiye (relatively small amount) cau~ir\g the displacement to be neg~tive. Simil~r to 
Event 1. the shock wave incident angle was slightly off-zero with the re~ult that a swr;eihng 
effect was most prob~bly expeMenced by the Enclosure 
The two accelerom eters were offset on the horizontal plane by approximately 50 mm, ~nd the 
offset shock front consequently change<! the polarity of the offset accelerometer. The inertia 
of the Enclosure (~pproxim~tely 2 kg) caused the relatrvely long time delay in obtaining a 
positi~e displacement 
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Figure 86; 
",,'" '''' ' 
Double integration 01 the acceleration ot the electronics 
CCA, producing the displacement of the CCA during 
Event 2 over a period 01 the fi r-st 1 mS. 
Rela!i ... Ilisplac.mcni. Event 2: 
The relati~e displacement between the Endosure 8nd too CCA over 8 period of 16 ms is 
soown in Figure 87. During E~ent 2. the maximum relative displacement (yellow graph) was 
approxim8tely 0.9 mm, 8nd it occurred during the first 1 ms of the ",~ent. 
Figure 87: The relative displacement of the Electronics Container, 
relative to the CCA, using grommet suspension during 
Event 2 over the first 1 ms period 
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5.1.2.6.7. Summary: Acceleration Results 
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The two accelerat>on rMults (Event 01 and 02) were similar. a~ tabulated in Table 21 tn both 
cases. the negative half cyde of the acceleratiDn~ wa~ larger than the positive half cycles. but 
the net di~placement wa~ in the direct>on of the posITive acceterat>on. The atlenuabon 
produced by the damping effect of the grommets was therefore calculated in dB relative to the 
acceleration poSItIve half cycle 
Tabte 21: Maximum accelerations. 
Blast 
Maximum Pas Maximum Neg Maximum 
number 
Acceleration Accelerat>on Acceleration Attenuat>on 
Enclo~ure Erdosure measured on CCA 
" 50788 g -57295 g +1500g 15.82 dB 
" 57630 g -77 363 g +1350 g 16.30 dB 
The acceleration attenuation is the amplitude portion of the damping co-effICient (b) of 
Equation 31 The phase relationship is oot discussed in this study. because it wa~ postulated 
that the amplitude of the accelerat>on was the phenomenon that cau~ed the damage, 
J{~sull oftb~ spriug effect of th~ PCB 
The spring effect of the PCB (manufactured from FR4 fibre glass composite material) on 
which the electronic components were mounted has oot been discussed before. It is 
necessary to inve~tigate the movement of the accelerometer that was moonted on the PCB to 
explain the cyclic nature 01 the CCA displacement curve as shown in Figure 83 and Figure 87 
In both the foregoing Figure~ it coold be seen that the Enclosure started moving in the 
direction that the shock waves were moving at the point of collision, The inertia of the CCA 
wor~ing in corteert with the damping effect of the grommet~, as well a~ the sprn g effect of the 
PCB, caused the displacement of the CCA to introduce a time constant, bringing the CCA into 
motion at a delayed time. The inertia of the CCA and the stiflne~~ (spring constant) of the 
PCB then caused the CCA to overshoot the position of the Enclosure at point A, in Figure 87 
At point B in the Figure, the Erteiosure passed by the CCA, relative to its motionless position 
This means that the stiffness 01 the PCB played a large rote when the grommets were u~ed, 
The damping effect 01 the grommet~, plus the damping effect of the PCB. contributed to the 
overall damping effect. However, the combined damping did not atiow enough reduction in 
acceleration to have precluded damage, as noted in Table 19 The cortClustOn could be drawn 
that the grommets were not the ideal solution to the damping problem under shock ioadlng 
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5.1.2.6.8. Pressure Measurement Analysis 
F.vent 1 SlI(Xk Pre"ure 
The pressure measurement results are shown in Figure 88 and Figure 89 
" ....... - ........ .....--- --,---..... 
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Figure 88: Two shock pressures measured during Event 1 
":vent 2 Shock Pres'UTe 
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Figure89: Shock pressures measured during Event 2 
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5.1.2.6.9. Summary: Pressure results 
Page113 
Pressure measurements are discussed here only to conti rm that lhe pressures were in 
relah::>n to the values that would be expected for a 30-gram explosive charge, The measured 
maximum pressures are shown in Table 22 and Figure 90 
Table 22: Maximum pressures. 
EvenVsensor Maximum Pressure Calculated MaximLUn 
Standoff Distance 1m) 
number IMPa) PressL>re (MPa) 
11 Sensor 1 18,1 19,48 0.733 
liSensor2 17,4 , 9 13 0.745 
21 Sensor 1 21,5 '9.48 0,733 
21 Sensor 2 '50 , 9 , 3 0,745 
Sensor 1 denotes the sensor closest to the biast, and sensor 2 denotes the sensor furthest 
from the blast 
Shock Amplitude V$ Distance from Blast 
~ 40,OC .- -
Series l' 
·20,(0; Eq~ation by - -
Cole [4] 
• CJ ()G 
Series 2: Measurements 
" 00 
of Event 01 and 02 on 
two occasions and at 
slightly different standoff 
WN distances (~ar);: blue) 
4 8C~ 
," 00 J 
"' -----
(ot ) 6 (0,7 
Stat>dofl Dilta"". 1m) 
Figure 90: Calculated ~nd measured maximum blast pressures 
The results of the measured peak pressures did not follow the traditional shock pressure 
curvature of a typical blast doseiy, as wouk1 be expected (see Figure 88 alld Figure 89), The 
abnormality cou k1 possibly have been due to a small amount of movemenl of the SenSOr 
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during tne snock wave messurement. Other reasons for tnis msy be reflections or otner 
int",ractions. snd were not researcned as part of tnis study because it wss not important to 
this res"'arcn. Whst was important was the fact tnat the measured pressures (see series 3 in 
Figure 90) correlate with the theoretical values to th'" extent that conlk1ence was established 
in the acceleration measurement values 
5,1.2.6.10, Bubble measurement 
Th", measurement diJratlOll was extended In time to capture the bubble's effect on 
accelerat.,n and pressure as snown in Figur", 91, and the bubble pressure effect is tabulated 
in Table 23 
A~erometer on the PCB Accelerometer on the enclosur. 
SnoCk wave response . /" , . 
i" " l. 
, , ' , /' /I",",' " 
, Bubble Pulse Respons 
-l, _,.~" ~~ '.- .... ..., •• -0=;:;".;"-:, •• J' ,.,... ..' 
Pressure Sensor , 
"n-'-=~""'1 , 
1 " , . , , .. 
Sl10ck lIIav'b Resp::!nse 
.i • 
l_ '. '74 ... ~ -...... ..' 
ellbQle DIIM respon.e 
Shod vJ~"" R<;!sWnse 
~ . 
j: it 
, __ J3utible Pul~e Re ponSII 
, , , . -.. , , . ..' 
Pressur", sensor 2 
.. ~:;"=~h 
i . Snock wave Response 
, ',,/. . 
,./ 
Bubble pulse response 
Figure91: The bubble pulse influence on pressure and 
acceteration 
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Table 23: Bubble pressure and accelerations as a result of the 
bubble pulse 
Blast number 01 
Pressure Sen&Of 1 
Pressure SenSOr 2 
Accelerometer 1 (on PCB) 





Pressure IMPa) (g) 
Page115 
Note. The bubble perioo was measured to be approximately 80 ms (see nJure 91), which 





= KW" i(/ ·d1), 
"a constant specific to a given explosive type = 4.266 for TNT 
= the equivalent mass of the explosive charge in Ib TNT 
= the water depthn feet 
Using Equation 33, and substituting 30 gm Pentolite (equivalent to 0.0746 Ib of TNT) into W, 
2 m (or 6.6 It) into Z. and using K = 4 268 for TNT, the Bubble Period was cak:;ulated to be 
84 ms. This confirmed the measured disturbance at 80 ms as being the first bubble pulse 
Although the bubble pulse produced much less (approximately 1110) presslXe when 
compared to the iI'-~lal shock wave, the acceleration on the PCB was only reduced to 25% of 
the acceleration caused by the shock wave. This was as a result 01 the longer period of the 
bubble pulse as compared to the shock wave, overcoming the inertia with time 
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5.1.2.7. Problems encountered 
The problems encountered during th is exercise are listed as follows 
Page 116 
a There was rtOt suffICient shade on the jetty to be able to see thO! details On the 
oscilioscopO! and computer SCreO!ns. Make-shift screening methods WO!re used and 
these were just adequate for seeing the dO!tails only. but not of adequate standards 
cOi1ducivO! to good O!xperimentation. 
b. The lac~ 0/ shade, as wetl as lack of a proper equipment-safe workspacO! 
contrit>uted to the fact that thO! oscilloscope measurements couk1 not be seen or 
photographed, and was therO!/orO! omittO!d. ThO! tilM of dO!tonator function couk1 
therefore not be taken. The vanance in time from moment of measurement-
onitiation to time of arri~al of the shock wa~e at the accelerometers couk1 tJe the 
variance in detonator function time, t>ut this statement could not be resol~ed due to 
thiS spO!Cif~ lac~ of in/ormation 
c Due to time required for setup. only two ~alid explosion events were possible 
d TherO! is e~idO!nce that the connection between the Pressure SO!nsor and thO! cable 
was momentarily disruptO!d aftO!r the collision with the shock wavO!. See pressure 




circuit in thO! , 
connO!Ctor at thO! - sensor -connO!Ction with 
" thO! cabO!. 
,/ 
, , • • ,
, ' '_'M' ' I 
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Time (~s: 
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Figure 92: Pressure measurements Over expanded lime frame 












3 that the movement of the enclosure 
be small. In the movement 
was to be in the order 1 mm. This led to the 
rI::I:mn,lnn mechanisms could ... n1"';"'~"'"1\1 
1 mm, hence the choice of 
the first 
was 1 mm in 
This meant that the mechanism was, as 
movement of the enclosed electronic to "rn'''' ..... 
n 0::> 1'1 o::>r:::II I allows movement of 
<1 mm, than those 
5. 
a. measurements were within eXE)ecteCl 
if the test were to be 
b. The acceleration was within ex~)ecteCi when 
c. 
d. From the rePleatE~a 
the weak link in the chain with T",., ... "",..t 
that an alternative time 
e. that some ICs were 
a weak link in the chain under the It 
that the ICs soldered onto the 




accelerations close to 100 000 9 have ",Ir,,,,,,rllu 











a. To an on which the sensors could 
minimal sensor movement would the arrival 
b. To the same tests and then to correlate the 
measurements. 
c. measure acceleration 
at4 to 

















to statistical on 
h. AID 
i. box. 
j. 1x sensor with a 0.5 with a m 
low 
k. 1 x Tourmaline sensor with a 0.1 a 20 m 
low 
I. 2x accelerometers with 20 m noise 
m. 
n. 100 MHz measurement 
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Accelerometers 








The assembled urlit corliaining the accelerometers alld the electronics was fastened onto the 
frame elld using duct tape. The electrorlics unit was seated on sronge rubt)er, to minimise 
any hign amplitude movements of short duration of the frame tleing passed on to the 
accelerometers (see Figure 94) 
Fully assembled 
Electronics Unit. 




5.1.3.4. Pressure Sensor Mounting Arrangement 
The Pressure Sensors were mounted in such a manlier that the two sensor elements were 
next to each other, to enatole good comparison of pressure amplitlXfe ard waveforms. These 
sensors were positioned on sponge rubber- and duct taped to the frame see Figure 95. The 
shock wave was expected to reach the pressure sensors uninterrupted by any hardware. see 
Figure 54 
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Figure 95: Mounting arrangement of the Pressure Sensors 









The same custom firing and synchronisat>on equ·'pment used In the previous experiment 
(page 98) was used in this experiment. This means that the stsrt of the measurement cycle 
was synchronised with the rising edge of the firing supply current 
Figure 96: Photograph of the oscilloscope measurement of the 
current through the detonator circuit 
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5.1.3.6. Physical Test Set·up 
Page 122 
One AluminiLrTl ""closure containing tour identical PCBs was tied down on an Aluminium 
frame with reinforCed tape, A layer of soft sponge ruDber plilCed between the frame and the 
enciosure was intended to minimise the transfer of acceleration effects from the frame to the 
eilCiosure (s"" the path of the shock wave in F'8ure 97), 










, , ' A 
~/t---r=='=---r'" ~ ·l 
Aluminium 
Frame, 
·· ... 1 c 
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, 
Figure 97: The enctosure mounted on an Atuminium frame· 
distances are for Event 1 
; Position of 
pressure 
, Position of , 
pressure 
Position of sensors 
charge acceterol1eters 
i enclosure with 
r · .. ,""", 
"'" i . 
' ............. -- ....... 
, ". 
., 
. .1 •••. 
, 1035 mm 1964 mm 
, 
, 
················-::C , ..... ". 
j. ,I A 
-
Figure 98' 
• • , 
The I!nclosurl! mounted on an Aluminium frame· 
distances are for Event 2 
, 
Note: The dis:ances that were coosen did not represent the target user requirement due to 
the measurement limitation of the ilCcelerometers More tests are needed st a later stage, to 
prove that the tsrget requirement will be met 




















A 29.2 gram Pentolite charge was placed at the end of the frame, on a PVC holder. See 
Figure 54 Adding the detonator explosives to the charge explosives brooght the total 
explosi,e charge mass to 30 gram. 
The frame was then suspended from a crane and positioned in the water. Toon the crane was 
removed to enable an independent test station at a depth of 2 m 
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5.1.3.7. Results 
!i.1.3.7.1. Raw data 
The results are shown in Figure' 00. snd Figure' 01 
Synchronisation with 
detonator current 
pulse leading edge 
, --. 
'"'''' . 
Figure 100: Resutts for Event 1, measured in Votts 
""" r----:;::.'-::...''''-






-,~~, .................................................... .. 
Figure 1 01: Results for Event 2, messured in Volts 
M8asuremenis and Analyses 
Page t24 
~""",,,''-1 











Protection of Electronics Against UndelWater Explosions 
A RO(Jx 
Page 125 
The measurement set-up was the sam~ fO/ Event 1 and Event 2, exc~pt lor a slightly different 
charge holder height above the frame. As coukj be seen in these two figures, the time 
between the measured pressure shock pulse and the acceleration, is different for the two 
cases The shock wave average velocity was calculated for both cases in Table 24 The 
shock wave propagates sphercally outwards and could be dep~ted in two dimensions by the 
Curve A-B In Figure 97 and Figure 98. The shock wave travel distance between sensors was 
thus the distance B-C in the same figures. The time taken for the shock wave to propagate 
between the sensors is equal to the time taken to travel from point 8 to point C. This time is 




Table 24: Average shock wave velocity calculations 
Shock wave distance between 










As seen in Table 24. the average shock propagation velocity was calculated to be between 
1553 mis and 1593 mis. This result is significant. because the velocity was greater than the 
small signal sound velocity in water indicatirJ9 that the sensors were positoned in the near-
field' of the exploSion. 
5.1.3.7.2. Pressure analysis 
The pressure measurements are shown in Figure 102 and Figure 103 
Note that the illustrated pressure historOes per sensor are similar lor Event 1 and Event 2. but 
that the two sensor pressure histories differ in form Sensor 1 (in both blasts) has a "rounded" 
positive pulse, whilst Sensor 2 (m both blasts) has a sharp rising edge (measured at 1 ~s in 
both instances). 
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Figure 102: Event 1 Pressure histories for two sensors 
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Figure 103: Event 2 Pressure histories for two sensors 
Mllasur'8mlln/s and Analys8s 
Page 126 
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5.1.3.7.3. Acceleration analysis 
The accelerat,on measurements sre shown in F~ure 104 and F~ure 105 
The dlilracteristics of the acceleration measurements are similar for both blasts of Hils 
experiment. These characteristics entail a large positive peak followed by a large negative 
peak, similar to a Sine fUnction Subsequently, the characteristics dlilnge according to the 
hydrodynamic circumstances during the specific blast period The perkJd of the first two 
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Figure 104: Accelerations for Event 1 
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Figure 105: Accelerations for Event 2 
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The acceleration analysis is shown in Table 25. The attenuat>.:ln is significant with regsrd to 
the reduction of the Etectronics Container acceleration of 15 309 g to 235 g (to 1 54%, or by 
17.7 dB) for Event 1 and 17 224 9 to 210 9 (to 1.22'!, or by 18.7 dB) for Event 2, The fuH 
cycle period of the fr st cycle wss approximstely 60 ~s for both events 
Tabte 25: Acceleration anatysis of the second experiment, which 
included accelerometers 
Attenuation 
Delay from pos peak 
first full between on enclosure to 
Event Pos~ive Max PCB Negative Cycle CCAand maximum acceleration 
"' Peak (9) Peak (g) Perod Enclosure acc~eratK)n on the (~s) 1" ece 
(dB) 
(~s) 
15309 -11490 C2 ''" 17.7 3<2 
2 , 7224 -12498 00 230 18.7 '" 
5,1.3.7.4. Displacement analysis 
The displacement was cslculated by double integration of the acceleration dsta Figure 106 
depicts the motion parameters for the Electronics Encl05ure during Event 1, and Figure 107 
depicts the mot>.:ln parameters for the CCA which was enclosed m the Container during 
E,ent 1 The relative dispiacement shown in Figure 1DS is the result of the displacement of 
the CCA subtracted from the displacement of the Electron>:;s Container showing that the 
relative displacement is less than 0.25 mm. This means that the relative movement was within 
the capability of the suspending grommets 
, , ~ 
,,1 
~ h 
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Figure 106: Motion analysis of the ElectronICS Enclosure for 
Event 1 
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Figure 107: Motion analysis of the CCA contained within the 
Electronics Enclosure for Event 1 
'~ ------------------------------------~ 
Combined spring 
action of the damping 
system and the PCB 
Figure 108: Relative movement between thl! Ell!ctronics Cont~inl!r 
and thl! CCA is suspended within for Event 1 
00 
Figure 109 depicts the motion parameters for the Electronics ErlClosure during Event 2, and 
Figure 110 depicts the motion parameters for the CCA which was contained (suspended) in 
the ErlClosure during E~ent 2. The relative dis;:>acement soown in Figure 111 is the result of 
the dlsplscement of the CCA subtracted from the displacement of the Electronics Enclosure. 
showing thst the relative displacement was less than 0.25 mm 
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Figure 110: Motion analysis of the CCA contained within the 
Electronics Enclosure during Event 2 
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Figure111: Relative movement between the ElectronicS Enclosure 
and the CCA suspended within it for Event 2 
Page131 
There is a remarkable correlation (by visual inspection) 01 the displacements of the 
B ectronics Enclosure. lhe CCA and the relative displacements between Events 1 and 2 
5.1.3.7.5. Damage analysis 
No damage was sustained during this experiment. This was s;gnificant, bec~use parameters 
such as the amplitude 01 the acceleration 01 the CCA and the relative displacement between 
the enclosure and lhe CCA become part 01 the solutkm of preventing damage to the 
electronics 
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5.1.3.8. Discussion 
1. Concerning the shock wave velocity: 
Page 132 
The shock w~ve velocity could not De calculated accurately near lhe point 01 the 
explosbll, due to the fact that the time taken for the detonstor to actually detonate its own 
1 gram explosives and the time taken for this event to De transferred onto the msin 
charge, and also the time taken for the msin charge to actually transfer the pressure to 
the water, could not be determined accurately 
Event 1 revealed some actrvity On Pressure Sensor No.2 (see Figure 100) voltage at 
503 ~s Defore the pressure was measured. This could be due to some form 01 induction 
into the cabies by me~ns of ~ phenomenon like an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), but this 
cause could not be confirmed. Event 2 does not have any prominent induction at a 
correspondillQ point. 
The distance that the shOCk wave covered between the pressure sensors and the 
accelerometers, however, COUld be me~sured. It is sImply given as 1959 mm -1023 mm 
= 936 mm, due to the spherical propsgstion of the shock wave The shock front velocity 
function is non·linear nesr the expJcsJcn (as measured by Takahashi [23]). Therefore the 
average velocity wh;ch could be cak::ulated betweem the sensors would give some 
indication of the velocity profile. This is 936 mm I 602 ~s = 1553 mis. which is higher than 
the normal sound velocity in water (1450 mls - 1500 misj, as would be expecte.d for 
sensors that are positioned in the near field 
2. Concerning the pressure measurements of this experiment: 
The amplitude measurements. seen in yellow triangles in Figure 112 ~re sbout half the 
expecte.d values predicted by the Cole [5] Equation, although sll four measurements are 
~ery sOmilar. This may be due to the mountillQ method used for this e.xperrnen, wh'm 
Introduces stlenustlon of the pressure messurements 
Sh<>ek AmpUt""" V$ motonco Imlll 81.'t 
Equation by 
Cole [5] 
/ Pressure Measurements for prevbus experiment 
I PressLXe Measurements for this experiment 
-- -
,., 
"',""off o"ta<>ec 1m) 
Figure 112: Amptitude measurements shown in yellow triangles. 
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Sporlge rubber strips 
Accelerometer on floating 
(soft-mounted) PCB 
Figure 113: Soft-mounted PCB in an electronics enclosure 
5.1.4.4. Custom Synchronisation Equipment 
Page 136 
The custom firill9 and synchrooisation eqUipment used in the previous experiment was used 
for this experiment in conjunction with the IMPI military firing uM. To summarize: This 
synchrooisation equipment was designed to trigger a measurement cycle on the leading edge 
of the detooator firing current 
5.1.4.5. Physical Test Setup 
One Aluminium electronic~ enClosure containing four identical PCBs was tied down with 
cable-ties on a relatively "soft· (sponge rubber) mounting arrangement on a frame 
manufactured from Aluminium 
The frame was suspended from a fioat (see Figure 114) by means of Polypropylene rope 
Attached to the float were two Neoprene pipes. Each Neoprene pipe had a magnetic coupling 
device fitted to the front end. to enable non-solo coupling with the target. 
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Position of the 
electronics 
erlClo~ure 
• i -".& 








Figure 11-4: The sensor arrangement mounted on an Atuminium 
frame 
The intended linal position of the frame (containing the Pressure Sensors and the ElectronK:S 






, , , 
N...aprene piping and 
magnetic coupling 
with target 
, , , , , , 
I : ___ ----)1-~ 
i - ~-- I lL _____ --.J 
2281 mm 
Explosive Charge 
1 ___ - i 
__ 'f I 630 mm .. -- -
~=;~r='=' ~.:..,~~ 
I Frane { I Pressure Sensor~. I 
Figure 115; Schematic drawing of the test setup 
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Figure 116: The completed measlIrement setup in the sea 
Page 138 
A 3SO grain PEi. char"e W3, pl3CW~' '~e po,itior as ird;:;ateQ in Fi~lIre 115, anQ after ai' 
rneaswernenl cOIwedicns were C'lecKed the Ch3rge W3, de:cn~teQ 















The "raw' measurement results of the four sensocs are given in Volts in Figure 117. to show 




3!iO gm CO,,!, I 0" 2001 
, _'I:::c~_",: 
'""' " -~.: ."., >:0:.; 
, 
Probable point m 
time of the 
expklsion. 
The photograph of the 
detonator current that was 
taken at the test site. (A), is 
matcood up in thi~ f.gure in 
synchronisation Wlth the 
computer test data (8)_ 
Figure 117: All measurements of the four sensors in Volts, matched 
up with the detonator current 
Synchronisation with the moment of detonation arid the explosion cou kJ not be determined 
accurately in this experiment, due to the fact that the explosion occurred some indeterminate 
time after the leading edge of the detonator curren!. A photograph of the oscilloscope 
measurement of the detonator current was taken. and i!; shown in Figure 1 t 7. The horizontal 
axis of the photograph was increased to mat<;h the scale of the Voltage measurements 
An interesting phenomenon, which matcoos a measurement result, is seen on too detonator 
current curve shown in Figure t 17 as the "probable point of explosion' _ Measurements of 
pressure are recorded before the actual shock pressure pulse reaches the sensors. This 
could be explained by the theory that an EM pulse is generated at too moment of explOSion, 
and that thi s EMP causes electrical indllCtion into the measurement (sensor) cables_ 
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The explosbn also causes ionisation 01 the detonator surroonds, which cookJ explain the two 
prominent " hu~s" as Seen in Figure 118, W'here the current illCreases for short periods 
lapproximately 80 ~s each), It is thought that the first "hump' is probably caused by the 
function irog of the detollator explosives (1 gram), and that the secO'ld "hIJ mp' is caused by the 
functionirog of the explosives 01 the main charge, These latter cO'lsiderations are not based on 
facts, and therefore it is suggested that this phenomenon is flll1her investigated in future 
Figure 118 shows two scaled view~ of thi~ phenomenon 
As illustrated in Figure 117, the time taken frO'l1 the leading edge of the pressure shock pulse 
to the start of the leading edge of the accelerometer measurement was measured to be 1037 
I1s In Figure 117 the distance that the ~hock waye travelled from the time that the pressure 
pulse was taken to the time that the acceleromete~ ~tarted reactirog, i~ shown to be 
(2281 mm _ 630 mm) 1651 mm, recording an average pressure pulse velocity of (1651 mm! 
1037 iJS) 1592 m!~, as measured between the pressure sensor distance and the 
accelerO'l1eters, This is higher than the expected sound velocity (1470 mis - 1500 m!~)_ 
Also gathered from Fgure 117, (if the assumption that the time origin of the explosion as 
shown in Figure 117 is true). the time taken for the shock wave to reach the (fir~t) pressure 
sensors was 168 ~s The calculated distance frO'l1 the explosive charge to the pressure 
sensOrs wa~ 630 mm. This translates to an average shock wave velocity of 3750 mis, 
Comparing the average shock wave propegation velocity between sensors with the average 
~hock wave propagation yelocity between the moment of explosion arid the first sensors, 
leads to the condu~ion that the shock wave velocity is non-linear, and that the average shock 
wave velocity of this specific charge for the first half meter is more than double the speed of 
souoo·., the water 
The "humps" that 
may have indicated 
the detooation of the 
detonata- and the 
main charge 
Figure 118: The oscilloscope measurement of the detonator current 
on two time scales: B is a stretched-out Version of A 
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The result 01 the blast effects on the electronics is shown in Figure 119 ~nd Table 26 
Figure 119: Electronics after the blast 
Table 26: Electronic failure analysis 
CCASer. 
" 
General Components Remarks 
05 (sponge 
DIP Integrated Circuits 
mounted) 
SM IGs CGA is fully oper~tlonal 
Crystal 
Both ICs removed 
from the sockets. 
06 (hard 
DIP Integrated Circuits 
mounted) 













Measurements and Analyses 
0' 
0' 
CCA is tully operational 
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The "soft-mounted" PCBs were in full working condition after the blast. The pressure peak at 
the electronic, unit (stand-off distance z 2,281 m) is expected to be 15 MPa according to 
Cole [5] (see Figure 121) This pressure is equivalent to a 40 kg charge at a stand-off 
distance of 10.7 m 
5.1.4.8. Pressure measurement analysis 
The measured pressures were below the expected values (Figure 120 and Figure 121 and 
Table 27, The reason could be that the ca~utated distance from the charge wa, ,maller than 
the actual distance achieved during the experiment. The measured value corresponds to a 
stand-off distance of 0.73 m, instead oj the ca~ulated 063 m This is very reasonable, given 
the fact that the frame Ion which the sensors were mounted), was suspended by 
Polypropylene rope only Movement of the frame relative to the float by 0.1 m is considered to 
be very reasonable 
""' ... , .. 
...  r----~--~-. 
~ "'''' • • 
~ "00 , 
I , , 
,'~.6 _ ".,_ , 
-"~----.""~,-~/'",,,,;::-~.~.:.~:-,".'." .. -' l 
, ... ,,.) 
Figu .... 120: Pressu .... history measurements 
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5.1.4.9. 
Figure 121: Expected ys, measured pressures 












The acceleration history is shown in F·.;Iure 122, The acceleration attenuation accomplished 
by in experimen t was 22 d6, compared to 17.7 dB and 187 dB (see page 128) obtained 
when grommet mountings were used 
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"''''.cc ~ __________ ~~~~! ___ ~A:':':':":':':':=~~~:.::J "ttenu"tloo = 21 95 dB 
' ''''''.c£ 
Figure 122: Acceleration measurements 
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From the result obtained in this experiment, it was clear that the sponge rubber damping 
metnod had improved damping characteristics when compared to the standard grommet 
suspension metnod for this specific Electronics Enclosure. The attenuation for the sponge 
rubber mounts gave an approximate 2.5x advantage over the grommet mounts 
An interesting observation concerns the comparative period measurements: All three fUII-
cycle periods were in the order of 60 ~s, and the delays to the CCA peak accelerations were 
in the order of 330 ~s 
The motion of the Electronics Enclosure and the CCA is shown in Ffgure 123. The time 
reference was shifted (relaflVe to Figure 122) for clarity of reading. The velocity was obtained 
by integration of the acceleration, and the displacement was obtained by integratkln of the 
velocIty. The integ ration constants were diSCarded. Figure 123 shows that the displacement of 
the Electron'ICS Enclosl.l<e dl.l<ing the first 14 ms after the shock wave collided with the 
















Shock wave hits 
the enclosure at 
-0 
Mob"" EflCloouro 
Important period during which the 
displacement rate is at its targest 
Enclosure Velocity stl . 
ato~e zero after 14 ms 
Figure 123: The motion of the ElectronicS Enclosure under shock 
wave load 
The motion of the CCA that WaS contained within the Endosure, and which was suspended 
by means of sponge rubber (only), is snown in Figure 124. The time reference was taken to 
coincide with the accelerations in Figure 123. for reasons of comparison. As was expected 
the acceleration of the CCA was much less than the acceleration of the Endosure. but 
extended Over a ionger period. Consequently, the velocity and the displacement were also 
lower. The ~elocity had not reached zero during the 14 ms that is depicted by the graph 
which means that the CCA had not reached its point of equitibrium, where all the oscillatk>ns 
that were caused by the blast had faded out This was contirmed by the displacement graph 
which shows that no steady state had been reached 


























constant du~ to 
Figure 124: The motion of the CCA contained within the Enclosure, 
under stress from the movement of the enclosure 
For Figure 125 the displacemenl of Figure 123 and thai 01 Figure 124 were plotted together, 
to examine the relative movament The resulting graph (in yellow) was the relative 
displacement when the displacement 01 the CCA was subtracted from the displacement of the 
Enclosure. In a steady state. this resulting dispacement would be zero, and the two relevant 
displacement graphs would end at the same point (not zero). The relati~e displacement 
reached a maximum 01 approximately 4.5 mm, which is plausible due to the lact that the 
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woukj return to zero 
after the transient 
response'lS complete 
~~~/ I 
The relati~e displacement between the Electronics 
Enclosure and the CCA under shock loading 
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According to N<!wton·s s<!cond law it is to be expect<!d tlla! a linear r<!lationship exists 
between force. mass. and acceleration 
Cole [5J has formulated tile fact that there is a non-linear relationship between tile peak shock 
pressure 01 an underwater expklsion and the stand·off distance for a certain explosive mass. 
when detonated 
The data tabulated in Tabl<! 30 were captured during the varKlus experiments of this project 
for measuring accelerato n of a specific Aluminium box containing electron cs. wh<!n 
subjected to different charge sizes and stand-off distanc<!s. The rewlt ',S presented 
graphically in Figure 126. 
Table 30: Relationship between peak pressure and acceleration 
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0 
0 • 
cycle (g) Distance (mm) Distance (radii) 
31346 2281 58.S 
17224 ''''' 119. 1 
15309 1959 118.8 
50788 m 40.9 
57630 "" '" 
Relationship between Acceleration and Standoff 
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Figure 126: Relationship between peak Enclosure Acceleration and 
standoff distance 
The data gathered from tile three experiments (5 events) during which acceleration 
measurements were taken, were used for tile investigation into accel<!ration scaling (se<! 
Figure 126). A trend line was drawn for a non-linear exponential option 
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Although a good correlation is shown in Figure 126 I R' = 0.9519). the number of data 
points and the variation in acceleration messurements were cons',jered to be not enough to 
determine the exponootlal relatIOnship to a required degree of accuracy. especlatly in the 
region doser than 40 radii from the blast 
5.1.4.11. Conclusions 
1. The result that this experiment Bet out to obtain had teen ach'''lVed: The 
acceleration attenuation had ooen improved substsntially by using the sponge 
rubber mounts in stead of the grommet mounts The protection of the electronics 
agalnBt Bhock had improved. but further experiments at stand-off distances ck:lser 
to the explosion are now required to determine whether the target user requirement 
is met 
The ~ast shock wave propsgatk:ln velocity Detween sensors was larger than the 
speed of sound. Tills indicated that measurements were taken in the near field 
3. The pressure measurement from Pressure Sensor 2 iB suspect, due to the much 
k:lwer smplitudes measured No definite conclusion could t>e drawn from this 
measurement. 
4 PresBure Sensor 1 measured the peak pressure to te in the order of the value as 
predicted by Cole [51 
The acceleration ans~sis indicsted that the first cycle scceleration chsracteristics 
were nes r1y identicsl to previously measured sccelerations 
No conclus()n could De drswn (yet) for the relstionship between peak pressure and 
acceleration. due to the small number of data points, 
7, The synchroniBation of the meaBurements with the moment of blaBt had not been 
achieved due to the varying time between detonator current start-of-flow and 
detonator functioning 
5.1.4.12. Recommendations 
Refer to conclus'ton 7 above It is recommended that the moment of explosion of the 
charge is messured (possibly by light-detection techniques) to determine the reference 
PO'lnt of messurement cycles. 
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5.1.5. Experiment 5: Experiment which included only Pressure 
Sensors 
5.1.5.1. Purpose 
During previous execution of the measurement of time-related incidents during underwater 
explosions. some difficulty was experienced with correlating the recorded data with the 
moment of the explosion (see paragraph on Recommendations on page 148). 
The synchronisation was effected by measuring the current flow through the detonator. Some 
detonators have characteristics which would render this method practical for some 
applications. but the time difference between the detonator current and the actual main 
charge completing the detonation process mostly varioo too much to take delicate 
measurements of e. g" the shock wave propagation velocity in the near field 
This experiment investigated the possibility of using" photo transistor (or array of photo 
transistors) to sense the flash that is prodllCfld whoo an underwater explosion occurs, Due to 
the fact that light travets much faster than any other known phenomenon in a transparent 
medium, the measurement of the flash of the explosion was a good method for determining 
the moment of explos'oo 
To valKiate the measurements, the average shock wave velocity was determined through the 
measurement of the shock wave pressure at predetermined positions, and using the light 
measurement as a time marker. A good correiation between blast events would mean that" 
solid time marker had been obtained 
5.1.5.2. Methodology 
An optical sensor was designed to give a high (10Y) voltage output when the flash of the 
expkJsion occurred. In the dark water. the optical sensor h"d a low voltage output (close to 
o YJ. The amount of light that was expected from a light flash of an expiosion was not known 
therefore the methodology was to inclide repelltions with altered designs should the first 
estimation be incorrect 
The experiment was designed to place two pressure sensors in close proximity to a 30 gm 
PE4 charge, and to place the light sensor approximately 0.5 m from the charge 
Five blast events were planned to be executed, in three of whICh the two pressure sensors 
were placed at the same distance from the blast as the l';Jht sensor and in two of which the 
pressure sensors were placed at greater distances from the blast 
The rat'lonale was to calculate lI1e average propagation velOCity of the shock wave by 
measuring the time that elapsed from the moment of the explosion as measured by the light 
sensor until the time of the shock wave's arrival at the pressure sensors at two predetermined 
distances from the blast. The experiment would be successful if the calculation of the average 
shock wave velocity between the equidistant points would correlate above 99""" and the light 
sensor output wou ld give a sharp rising edge <5 ~s. which could be used as the time marker 
of the blast event 
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A 30 gm PEo4 charge was mounted at the centre of the bottcm plate (see Figure 127). For 
btast events 1 through 3. the Pressure Sensors were mounted close to the outer corners of 
the pyramKJ base while during events 4 and 5 they were mounted 00 the edges (see 







630 mm. see 
Table 32 
30 gm PE4 charge 
Pressure sensors mounted on a 
circular plastic base 
Figure 127: Mechanical details of blast events 1 through 3 for this 
experiment 
Direct distance between 
senSor~ and charge is 
approximately 450 mm. 
Table 32 
30 gm PEo4 charge 
Pressure sensors mounted on a 




Figure 128: Mechanical details of blast events 4 and 5 lor this 
experiment 
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5.1.5.4.1. The Optical Sensor 
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OrJ8 of the characteristics of a shock wave that i~ koown to contribute to damage inflicted 
upon a blast loaded object (e,g a ship's hUll). is the speed at which the soock wave 
propagate~ At the oolll1dary condlhon, where the shock wave is transmitted from the 
e.ploded ma~~ to the surround'n g water, the speed of the shock wave is at its highe~t value 
(see Chung & Kinsey [3]) The measurement of the speed of the shock front has therefore 
become an important measurement quantity in the determinatIOn of resultant damage. This 
experiment measured the average speed of the shock wave at two stand-oil distances, uSing 
a custom optical sensor to determine the time origin of the exploslQf1 by capturing (and 
marking the start 01) the light that the burn n g material produces, The optical sensor consisted 
of a ~tring of12 optically sensitive transistors, connected in parallel (see Figure 129) The 
transistor~ were connected to a 20 m RG58 co-axial cable with BNC termination, and potted 
with Elite FR-766 ~yurethane potting in a small pla~tic ookJer 
Figure 129: The optical sensor 
Photo 
1ron.;.tor 
The optical sensor was directly powered by a conditiorling amplifier (model PCB Piezotronics 
482A22), The conditIOning amplifie, ~upplied a con~tant current (limited at 17 mAl to the 
sensor, When the flash of the explosion occurred, the light produced by the explosion 
reduced the forward resistance of the parallel transistor~ 
The light produced by the explos;on of 30 gm of PE4. at a ~tand-off distance of approximately 
0,6 m, was expected to produce enough photon~ to push the SenSOr to it~ ~aturation limit 
This was designed to produce a ~harply ri~ing ~ading edge when the light was applied, No 
small changes of light intenSity were registered when the sensor was in the saturation mode 
The change in current through the transistors was passed through the signal conditioner to its 
output as a .oltage and was measured by the DAQ equjpment 
The opt<:;al sensor was placed on the side of the test sampe in a position where it coukJ 
senSe the flash. yet not be damaged by the blast. tt was secured onto the test sample, using 
3M double·sided adheSIve tape (approximately 3 mm thd) to enable it to tear bas,", without 
sustaining damage during the e'J>osion Figllre 130 ~hows the position of the opt<:;al sl'm~or 
on the underside of the test unit, relative to the charge position. 















Figure 130' The position of the optical sensor relative to the explosive 
charge and the Pressure Sensors 
The positIOn of the pressure sensors was moved from the position shown in Figure 130 (for 
Events 2 and 3) to a nearer position relative to the explosive charge, as shown in Figure 131, 
for Events 4 and 5 
~"",senwr 
Pressure Senso," 
Figure 131: The new position of the Pressure Sensors for Events 4 
and 5 
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The pressur", S"'nSors had built·in charge amplifiers. and required special conditioning 
amplif ... rs (s",,,, Figure 132) to supply the constant excitation current for the bUilt-in charge 
amplif.,rs and th"'r",by to ",xtract the pressure measurements as Were superimposed upon 
the excitation curremt signal This s>gnal condit"ning amp~f ... r was also suitable for supplying 
the drive conditioos of the photo sensor. 
Current adjust 
Intput 
Figure 132: The 4·channel signal conditioner. PCB Plezotronics 
model 482A22. 
5.1.5.4.3. Pressure Sensors 
To m",a~Ure the pressure amplitudes of the explosions at certain stand·off distances. two 
Tourmaline Plezo-",I"'cti"k: sensors with built·in charge amplifiers were used. These were 
specially d",sign",d for tM mMsurement of pressure shock waves as would be produced by 
und",rwat",r blast TM specificatbns are shown 'n Appendix 2. Two models were used. I.'" 
one 138A10. and on'" 138A50 Th'" only diff",r"'nc", betw"'''''' tM two mod",ls iwolv",d Ih'" 
s"'nsiflviti",s as list",d in Table 31 











An RG58CIU co-axial cable of 25 m in ~ngth was attached to each sensor V"" a connector at 
both ",nds. To measure the explosion pressure result, tMs'" senSors and cab;"'s w",re 
connected to a PXI.lormat DAQ card capable of measurn g four channo!ls, with each chann",1 
sampling at 2 Ms/s. The card memory could store up to one second of data samples 
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The measurement recording equipment had memory to record only 1 s of data in tM! four 
channels. Synchronisation 01 the lire command with the start of the measurement cycle. was 
essential. and had to be well Within the 1 s memory limitation to be able to capture all the 
required data This was obtained by means of a custom-built unit (see Figure 133) by simply 
measuring the current that the military SAFU suppned to the detonator when the firing 
commard was given. When this current exceeded a predetermined thresh~d. a TTL trigger 
pulse was generated. This TTL trigger pulse was fed to the DAQ equipment as an externat 
trigger to start the measurement cycle. The measurement cycle therefore started when the 
detonator current exceeded a threshold. and thus aliowed enough time for the measurement 
of the required data. As can be derived from Table 36, the required data recording starting 
POint ranged between 2.024 ms and 11.467 ms 
Detonator Current Measuring 
terminats 
Figure 133: The custom_built synchronisation unit 
The current through too detonator was measured on previous occasions during blast 
experiments, and it was found that the explosoo occurred in a time zone of -milliseconds' 
rather than "mICroseconds' It was also found :hat the time taken for the explosion to occur 
after the detonator current was applied, varied by several m'iliseconds. This fact preclided 
this synchronisation method from being used as a time-of-explosb n marker, but it was a 
reliable method for starting the measurement cycle, 
5.1.5.5. Results and Analyses 
A total of frve charges were detonated for th is experiment. Measurement results were 
obtained for four events The first event experienced a sub-system power loss ard no data 
was recorded Data lor Events 2 through 5 were recorded successfully 
5.1.5.5.1. Pressure Measurements 
Pressure measurements were recorded through two pressure sensors per event. For 
Events 2 ard 3. the pressure sensors were positione.d at the corners of the test jig, giving a 
direct (measured) linear distance from the charge to the sensors of typically between 625 mm 
ard 635 mm (see Figure 130 for the position of too Pressure Sensors and Table 32 for actual 
measurements) For Events 4 ard 5. the pressure sensors were moved to the centre position 
of the pyramK1 test jig edge. giving a stand-off distance of between 445 mm and 465 mm (see 
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figure 131 for new Pressure Sensor positions). The peak pressure results are recorded in 
Table 32 
Table 32: Measurements of the pressure amplitudes as recorded for both 
pressure sensors during Events 2 to 5 
P<!ak Pressure Measurem<!nts 
Event 2 Event 3 EYent 4 
Stand·off Distance to "0 '" '"0 Sensor 1 (mm) 
Stand-off Distance to 
030 020 m Sensor 2 (mm) 
Measurements trom 
24.5 21.0 29.0 Pressure Sensor 1 (MPa) 






The peak pressures were record<!d on a graph, shown in Figure 134. superimposed on a 
graph of the predicted peak pressures according to an Equation given by Cole [5: p2391 
• • • 
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Figure 134: The pressure results as compared to the equation given 
by Cole, and referenced to standoff distance in m 
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The pressure results of Figure 134, with the stand_off distance 
referenced to the number of charge radii 
The pressure histories of the measured results are shown in Figure 136 to F~ure 139 The 
time reference in each of these graphs is taken from the moment of explosion (t = 0) of the 





Figure 136: Pressure history of Event 2 in ~s and MPa 















' ~ I .. ·· 
Figure 137: Pressure history of Event 3 in ~s and in MPa 
• 
Figure 138: Pressure history of Event 4 in MPa 
Maasurements and Analyses 
Page 157 
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i 
Figure 139: Pressure history of Event 5 in MPa 
5.1.5.5.2. Average Shock Wave Propagation Velocity 
To measure tM actual time that was taken for the pressure shock wave to travel from the 
point of d~tonation to th ~ pressure sensors, the leading slope measurement output trom the 
optic"l sensor was used as t = O. Figur~ 140 to Fi~ure 143 show the time reterence ot 
explosions relative to the arrival 01 the shock pressure at the two pressure sensors 
I 
b , n'" 13_0'·"," 
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Figure 140: Event 2 Pressures in Volt, relative to the Optical Sensor - time 
reterence point 0" time of explosion 
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Figure 141: Event 3 Pressures in Volt, relative to the optical sensor - time 
reference point 0 = time of explosion 
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Figure 142: Event -4 Pressures in Volt, relative to the optical sensor - time 
reference point 0 = time of explosion 
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Figure 143; Even! 5 Pressures in Vol!, relative to the optical sensor - time 
reference point 0 = time of explosion 
" 
The lineaf distaoces measured ffom the charg8 to the pressure SenSorS do not represent 
accurate figures (to s.ngle miiiimetres or parts of a millimetrB). dUB to thB flexibility of the 
pressure sensor containment mechanics, and the fixing method allowing for the sensors to 
hang from a single fixing mechanism at thB base of the SenSor (S8B Figure 130). The 
measurements were occurate erlO\Jgh, howevBr. to dBte,mine the average speed from the 
moment of the explosion to thB moment when thB shock wave arrived at the sensorS The 
resu~ is shown graphically in F\;lurB 144 
Nole. The result sliown in Figure 144 is en averooe speed at certain distences from tile 
explosion time-origill. It musl be born in mind thai the speed closer to the origin is Iligher 
(Cole [5.p5]) Ihan at tllfJ measurod locations. and also that tile speed lunctiol1 is non-linear at 
several charge radii from tilfJ explosive charge. The complete near-field speed fUnction 
therefore ,annot be derived from these measurements ooiy. from Table 34, however, it is 
dear thai tilfJ measurements were indicative 018 near-field location of the pressure sellsors. It 
was expeded that tilfJ pressure sensitive elements would (or may) move around when the 
test statiOfl waS submerged due to tile physical flexibility of the sensors in the moving sea 
water. Howevor, figure 144 shows that there was good ,0rrelatiOll belweell measurements, 
and that the average speed was caiculated 10 be above 1500 mls. therefore the average 
speed ofllie shock wave during this expenment was above the speed of SO/1oo. 
The results are tabulated in Table 33. and the resu lting speed calculations am tabulated In 
Table 34. The results showed a tfBnd that waS BXpected, because it clear~ showed that the 
sensors that were positioned closer to the explosOn yieKJed a larger average speed than the 
sensors that WefB positioned lurther away_ The additional information that could be extracted. 
was that the speed of the shock wave calculated from data generated between the two 
sensor positions showed that the speed 01 the shock wa~e had already reduced to an 
average ~alue of 1549 mls (see Figure 132) (which was still above the speed 01 sound). 
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Table 33: Measurements and calculations of the Pressure Sensor positions 











Pressl)re Sensor 1 Pressl)re Sensor 2 to Pressl)re to Pressure 
(mm) (mm) Sensor 1 (~s) Sensor 2 (~s) 
"" "'" Not measured Not measured 
",0 '"0 378.5 389.0 
"" e" 3890 3820 
'" ,0; 276.5 270.5 
"" <eo 2565 2760 
Tabte 34: Speed calculations from Table 33 
Avera!}e Direct Average time to Aversge speed to 
Event No Distance to Pressure Pressure Pressure sensors 
Sensors (mm) Sensors (~s) ( mJs) 
2 and 3 63000 384.63 1637.9 
4 and 5 456.25 272.50 1674.3 
Table 35: Average speed calculations between sensors 
Avera!}e time between 
sensor positions 





1 and 2 (mm) 
173.75 
Average speed between 
PresSllfe Sensor 
positions 
1 snd2 (m/s) 
1549.5 
The peak pressure measl)rement resllits are tabulated in Table 32. The pressure results (see 
Figure 134) indicate that s f"ir comparison with the Equation for peak pressures that were 
defned by Cole [5 p2391. hsd been achieved. Cole stated that his Equation for peak pressure 
was valid up to 10 charge radii from the blast. The d',stance of the pressure sensors 'In this 
experiment WaS >30 ch<!rge radii. USing 30 gm of PE4. The graph in Figl)re 134 tsken from 
the eqU<ltion by Cole [5 p239]. waS drawn starting from 10 charge rsdii 
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Figure 144: A plot of the shock wave distance t",velled versus the time taken 
for that distance travelled, taken from data of two experiments 
5.1.5.5.3. Detonator Firing Time 
' '''' 
The detonator firing times were investigated to determine the actual time-spread from the 
moment that the detonator current was applied by the SAFU. to thO! moment of cletonatioo. to 
correlate the practical findings (as used in the sea water) with the detonator specilicafon 
which was obtained under laboratory circumstances (no leaking currents through sea water, 
ete ). 
The results are tabulated in Table 35. Three 01 the events yie lded results th<it were expected, 
ie that the moment 01 detonation followed approximately 2 to 4 ms after the detonator 
current was applied 
Note This detonation time is the time of detonation of the main charge. The time taken from 
the moment of application of detonator current to the functbning of the detonator was not 
measured'Jl this experiment. 
Table 36' Measurements taken from the moment that the detonator current 
is applied. to the moment of detonation of the main charge 
Detonatioo Time Measurements 
Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 
Time to Deton~tion 3253 2.343 2.024 
(ms) 
Optical Sensor 
Saturation Time 1 335 1.324 1.429 
(ms) 
Measuremenls and An"Jyses 
Event 5 
11,467 
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The graphical results are shown in F~ure 145 to Figure 148. The time durabon ofthtl flash as 
proouced by the explosion ',S also shown 
The result shown in Ihe coloured (light blue) cell in Table 36 seems 10 be oul of line with the 
rest of the resulls (11.467 ms vs. typically 2.5 ms). An assumplion could be made that in that 
specific case. the detonalor current leaked more than usual throogh the sea wOller, causing 
less energy rate to be transferred 10 the detonator. causing a delay in the time-to-detonate, 
This may very wen be expected to happen in pracbse_ 
Note' The optical Sensor c~ledor-emitter capacitance (C.OE) caused the negative slope to 
slew at a slower rate than the posiflve slope. This was due to the fact that the forward 
resistance reduced to a rel<l:ively small value as compared to the transistor capocitance when 
the photo transistors were forward biased by the application of light, ThIS relatively small 
forward resistance (RCE ) of the SWItched-on transistors appear in parallel with the capacitance 
Co, . When the light caused by the explosion was expired, the forward resistance of the photo 
transistors increased to a value which was very h~h (practically causing 00 open circu·lt). The 
transistor capacitance then became the dominant part of the transistor 'rnpedance, which 
caused the vdtage to drop slower when compared to the rising slope of the measurement 
An additional ' slowing down of the reactance of the photo tranSistor, may have been due to 
the ElValanche effect (started at the presence of light. ood activating the photo characteristics 
of the troosistor) which should be stopped when the light disappears. but does not stop 
immediately. This characteristic varies between transistor types. The uncertainty of the 
switch-off time caused the measurement of the "sustained light perloo" to be unreliable 
E,om " 1>_07"to< 
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Figur.145: Figure showing th~ tim .. ~I which the detonator current start~d 
flowing (dlltonatll command) with respect to thl! time al which 
the actual detonation occurred (optical sensor), and rillative to 
the pressure pulse measurl!d by Prllssure sensor 1 (630 mm 
from the blast), approximately 380 ~s after the explosion 
occurred 
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Figure 146: Figure showing the time at which thl! dl!tonator current started 
flowing (detonate command) with rl!Spl!ci to the time at which 
thl! actual detonation occurred (optical sensor) and relative to 
thl! prl!Ssure pulsl! measured by Pressure sensor 1 (640 mm 
from the blast) approximalely 380 ~s after the explosion 
occurred 





Figure 147: Figure showing the time at which the detonator current started 
flowing (detonate command), with respect to the time at which 
the actual detonation occurred (optical sensor) and, relative to 
the pressure pulse measured by Pressure sensor 1 (460 mm 
from the blast), approximatl!ly 275 ~s after the explosion 
occurred 
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Figure 148: Figure showing the time at which the detonator current started 
flowing (detonate command), with respect to the time at which 
the actual detonation occurred (optical sensor) and, relative to 
the pressure pulse measured by Pressure sensor 1 (445 mm 
from the blast), approximately 265 ~s after the explosion 
occurred 
5.1.5.5.4. Sustained Light Period 
'" 
An interesting aspect 01 the sllStalned light period is that it was sustained much longer tMn 
was anticipated. Table 37 records the sustained light period far this expen'ment, It is 
suggested thet the reflection of light from the test specimen may heve contributed to the total 
length of the measured light period 
Table 37: Measured period of light caused by the explosions 
Measured Light Period 
Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 
, 335 , ,324 1.429 1.5' 0 
It is too soon to come to firm conclusions about the light measurement "sustained period" It is 
suggested to repeat the trials, but to replace the optical sensor with a much laster SWitChWlg 
photo diode which WIll switch off within one or two microseconds when the light disappears, 
and then to compare the results. 
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5.1.5.5.5. Rigidity of the optical sensor 
The optical sensor sustained no damage at all and laboratory te,t, before and after the sea 
trial 5 were identical (Within reason) 
5.1.5.6. 
5.1.5.7. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This was the first of a series of tests that would involve the use of an optical 
sensor to dO!tO!rmine thO! point in time that could be u,ed a, s time marker for the 
moment of explosion. in underwater measurement-related exercises in~oI~ing 
underl\lster explosions, This method pro~ed to be reliablO! due to thO! rigidity of the 
sensor, the rapid initial response time, the repeatability of the rO!sults, and the 
good corrO!lation of the cur~O!-fitted graph pro~ing the ~alidity of the 
measurements 
The ,econda.-y information gained from this experiment, the "duration of thO! blast 
(the "su,tained light period"), was oot seen to be reliable, becausO! thO! 
phototransistors were overexposed and revealed a characteristic of switching off 
relatively slowly. If this period should be important it would be ad~isablO! to usO! a 
faster photo transistor or photo diode and then to calibratO! its stand-off distance 
in such a manner that it would not saturato! during the flash perbd. 
Summary of Pressure Measurements 
A summary of all pressure measurements taken during this study is given in Figure 149. An 
explosive maSS of 390 gm was used in one 0/ the experiments. To be ablO! to compare this 
result with the othO!r measurements, all of which used a 30 gm explosi~O! mass. a 5callng 
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The scaled stand-off distance when usir.g a 390 gm explosive weil11t at a stand-off distance 
of 630 mm compares to 30 gm explosive at a stand-off distarlC9 of 268 mm Th'!S value was 
substituted into Table 38 and Table 39 in row 3, c~umn 4. 
Table 38: Table of pressure measurements at the 138A10 (the 






Distance Sensor Type 
(gm) for 30 gm 
" 18.1 0733 0.733 138A10 
30 21.5 0733 0.733 138A10 
390 54.13 063 0268 138A10 
" ''" 0.63 0.63 138A10 
30 " 0.625 0.625 138A10 
30 '" 0,46 0,46 138A10 
30 361 0,445 0,445 138Al0 
Table 39: Table of pressure measurements at the 138A50 (the 





(MPal 1m) Distance Sensor Type 
(gm) for 30 gm 
30 17,4 0745 0.745 138A50 
'" " 0.745 0.745 138A50 
300 3269 0.63 0.268 138A50 
30 186 063 063 138A50 
" 18,4 062 0.62 138A50 
'" 26.5 0,455 0,455 138A50 
30 26.5 0465 0.465 138A50 
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A graphic representation 01 the results in Table 38 and Table 39 IS compared to the Equation 
by Cole 151 in Figllre 149. VislJal inspection revealed a good correlation between the Equation 
by Cole arid the more sensitive Pressure Sensor. The correlation 01 the less sensitIVe 
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Figure 149: Summary of Pressure Measurements for this study, 
compared to the Equation by Cole [5] 
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5.1.6. Experiment 6: Experiment to test softer damping solution 
5.1.6.1. Purpose 
The loregoing experiments tested the appropriate parameters that were expected to play the 
major roles in the process of eliminatin~ damage to erlClosed electronics under blast klading 
In broad terms, th<! conclusion was that' 
I. The electronics "",uk! be precll.lded from damage if adequate damping was 
allawed lor the CCA to filter out the high frequency components of the 
acC<!l<!ration 01 the Enck:>sur<!. 
2 The components on the CCA should folk:>w certain guidelines to harden' the 
el<!Ctronics against blast loadi ng, 
tn this experiment. both the above conclusions were adhered to, arid the purpose of this 
<!xperiment was aimed at positioning the Electronics Enclosure at the target spec~ied 
Standoff DistanC<! of 270 mm from an <!xpiosiv<! charge 01 30 gm Pentolite (see paragraph 
"Aim· on page 18). 
Damping mechaniCS acted as low pass lillers to acceleration, The folklwing transfer function 
waS obtain<!d from the simplest damping mechanism (Equation 30 repeated): 
G(,,) = _y_c,_'J = _;h",~ _____ .. ____________________________ _ 
U(s) m,, ' ·j bs 
In Equation 37, it was assumed that the spring constant was much smaller than the damp',ng 
coefficient, hence the simplili<!d transfer looction d<!5Crib6:::t by Equation 37. Th<! spring 
constant would never be zero, because then the eGA would not be r<!turn<!d to its original 
relative pOSition to the Enclosure, The damping material wm therefore have to be chosen to 
have a larger damping-effect, with a smaller spling-effect 
The unit step response of G(s} in Equation 37 IS 
C(s),.",. = ~* bs 
5 ms'+bs " 
:. C(s) " " 
h 
m, ' +bs " 
It is obvious from Equation 39 that a secorid order k:Jw pass liltering op<!ration wou KJ 
constitute an effective resu~. II the damping coeffiCient is chosen large ertOUgh, then the eCA 
woLJld be accelerated at a mllCh slower rate, and therelore translerring the <!rtergy at a iow<!r 
rate The resLJt is that at a much smaller acceleration amplitLJde wouk! be obtained, resulting 
in no damage effects, 
When the damping material has a large dampllg effect (soft touch to the hand), it 
automatically wouk! have the eCA move mllCh lurther than ...-hen the damping <!ffect is small. 
' The lerm -" .. den ng" of ~otroc;c" w ,," "",nt.,ne<! n tn. Syt>OPOis 00 P"9'" In 'h is o<""rimen', tho oleot",n "" 
hO~,,~ "'9¥5t"'" tn. t "",'0 d"'atod b, ,ho f.-.j i"'l ' of tho pro,,,," , expenmen!> were rn pler>lentod 
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e.g. uSing a grommet for the damping mech~nics. Ample allowance must therefore be made 
for the larger CCA-tr~vel, to ~vokl collision with the Enclosure 
The damping material that was used in the r;.-evious experiment wilt ~g<!in be used for this 
experiment because it waS p.roven tMt the travel distance was sm~tt enough, whilst the 
damping-eff8ct was large enough to obt~'" good resu ls 
The purpose of this experiment w~s to measure the acceleration of the CCA, and to compare 
the result to the me~sured acce~ration of the Enclosure. An analysis of t ile displacement 
should show that the relative movement between the CCA and the enclosure WaS large 
enough to have oblained good damping, but low enough to preclude collision between the 
CCA and tile Enclosure No damage shoukl be sustained. due to enough attenuation of the 
acceleration transfer to tile CCA 
Th8 CCA mounting m8thod {spong8 rubber) WaS to rBduce the acceleration tr~nsfer from the 
Enclosure to th8 CCA to below damage threshold. Accel8ratlon will not be nullifi8d, ~nd 
therefore the component mounting method described ~bove w~s int8rlded to prohibit ~ny 
collateral damage. 
Figure 150 shows the intemal layout of the Electronics Enclosure. Two layers of 5 mm 
spong8 rubber were used as the damping material. See also Figure 151 The one layer was 
glued to the in"",r sidewalls. The second layer was made up from twelve blocks which were 
glued onta the first layer, spaced such that coverage of 50% of the dampirJg area WaS 
ensured The CCA was suspended between twa such double lay8rs af sponge rubber 
eliminating the need to hard-mount the CCA A layer of spong8 rubb8r was added an the 
inner side panels to d~mp side movements (when ~ppropriat8). This double-layer suspension 
method waS chosen to widen the bandwidth of the transfer function to ensure th~t d~mplng 
w~s alsa abtained when the usual drop-tests were performed during the design qualification 
pracess 
Figure 150: The Etectronics Enclosure with the modifications for 
the doubte sponge rubber damping sotution 
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Figure 151, The suspension method (one side)_ 
The transfer function of the suspension method of Figure 151 is derived as follows 
Page 171 
The equivalent system is approximated by a double spring-dash pot system , shown in 
Figure 152, assuming that the mass m, is zero, It IS noted tl-.at the spring constant (.1<,) and 
the damping coeffICient (bz) woold be different to k rand b r respect'rvely_ 
k, k. 
Shock wave 
ANV' M~' propagation- Mass of Ele<::tronics 
direction + PCB + sensor E 
"- ill- --f! m2~42gm 
b, h, 
m, , 
Figure 152: The equivalent system of the doubl& layer suspension 
method 
Appo,ing Newton's second law to the system, we obtain, 
Mass"acceleratlon of electronics GGA-
Viscous force ... spring force 
m <{'x = k, (y_ xl-h,\! dy _ dX)+ k (u -xl+b f du _ dt) ______ . __ _ ___ ___ __ 40 
I dl"" • <il dr I 'tdt dt 
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m, ~i;t =-k'(Y-X)-b,{:~' -~~-} -----.---------------------.-.- .. -- 41 
When m, • 0, Equation 40 could be rewritten as: 
( ) (dy d') ( ) cd" d') O=k, v-x +h,\--- +k u-x +h ,----
- . dr dl - ',dt dt, 
Taking Laplace transforms of these two equatklns. and assuming zO!ro initial conditIOns, we 
obtain: 
[(h +h,)a(k, +k,)]X(.,)" [h,s+k,]r(s)+[hs+k , f;,(.I') ----.--------- 43 
lm,s'l b, 51 k, ~-(5) = [b,5 + k, lr(s) 
X(s)= lm;s' +h,.\+k,Jyt,) 
(h;s + k,) 
_____ . ____ --- -- - --- --- -- --- --- -- --- - 44 
Substituting Equation 44 into Equation 43 and taking the output versus the input. we obtain 
Y(s) (h,s+k,xh,s+k,) 
U(s) = (h,s + k, Xm,s" + h,.\ + kJ- (h .. I' + (Jh;.I' + k,) --------------- 45 
1M1ere(h, +h,)=h, and (k, +kJ=k, 
) (, ) 
1:(,) = b,m,s' + (b,b, 'lIIk, " 
TNs constitutes the transfer f~nctk:-n of the doul:le-Iayer damping materiat for simlliation 
purposes, The measurement of the parameters b, and k, was difficult due to the fact that the 
damping material inheren~y contained both these parameters These parameters co~1d not 
be measured separate" as would be in the case of the suspensk:-n on a vehicle The latter 
had a separate spring and shock absorber. making it possible to meas~re the one wittlout 
interference from the other, The sponge rubber (by nature) has properties of a fluid, with a 
large viscosity, During attempts to meas~re the spring constant. the viscosity caused some 
inaccuracies, and vice versa The equipment to measure these parameters were not avaitable 
to the author, and thus it was decided that a separate project would be performed to 
determine thew parameters, and then to pO!rform the simulation as soon as the corrO!ct 
eq~ipment werO! a~ailable_ Tho! main thrust of this stwy was unaffO!cted 















A frame (see Figure 153) was manufactured onto wMlCh the test unit (Enclosure with enclosed 
electronics and accelerometers) would be mounted in a moveable Enclosure clamp. TMe 
frame was deSigned to enable the repositioning of the test unit after each blast. A scaled test 
using 30 gm of explosive would be executed at a specWted equivalent standoff distance of 
270 mm for one of the tests. equating to a charge of 40 kg at a standoff distance of 3 m TIle 
eeA sMould be tested after each blsst event. and the success criterion sMould be that: 
No damage would be sustained to the electronics 
2 The electronics would be futty operational after the tests 
For the Istter plrpose, a test point was identified which delIvers a square wave wMen the 
circuit is operational. This test point was taken via an umbilical cord through a watertight 
gland to the test station where the accelerations were also recorded. The test point was 
monitored by an oscilloscope to enable on-~ne tests at atl times. 
Swivet 
Fixed position of 
the explosive 
charge 
Figure 153' The frame that was used to hotd the Electronics 
Enclosure in position at various distances from the 
explosive charge. 
The CCA that was used in the preyious experiments was modified at a few places, according 
to the recommendations of the previous experiments, removing the "soft spots·. See 
Figure 154 
These changes were: 
The replacement of the crystal with a surface-mounted component which 
produced the required time base for the microprocessor. 
2, Ie sockets were not used for the larger ICs as before. TIle ICs were directl~ 
SOldered into tl1e PCB 
3 All switches were replaced by military-standard switches. Atl switches were 
orientated in a flat position, ,,00 only" thin Isyer (0.5 mm) of RTV adhesive was 
used to mount the SWItches. No hard-mounts (5cn,ws) w,,'" us~J 
4, The larger LEDs were mounted flat onto the PCB. and glued to the PCB with 
e;v 
5 The transistors which were mounted in tile upright position were glued together 
after the solder operatlOO 
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Figure 154' The modified CCA th~t h~d the soft spots of electronics 
replaced by alternative components 
Posi:ion ~r the CCA i'l tre 
dee close enough J: 
S'r:l ilar poSlJons n Ihe 
Enclo"~r8, one r:lOln:ea 
directly 0'1 tile Enclosuc, 
,1I)d WI<" mOl,.nte~ direc:ly 
ont~:he PCB 
Figure 155: The position of the CCA and ~ ccelerometers in the 
Electronics Enclosure, 















Due to the restrk:ted availability of the range-personnel, it was only possible to execute two 
measurement-events. Only one Pressure Sensor was used. because the second Pressure 
Sensor waS damaged during the previous experiment 
Durirlg the first event, the El1Closure was positiol1ed at 240 mm standoff distance from the 
charge. and the Pressure Sensor was posit>oned behind the Enclosure at 650 mm. During 
Event 2 the Enclosure waS positioned at 350 mm from the explo,ive charge, arJd the 
Pre, sure Sensor was positioned next to the Enclosure. The distance between the centre of 
the explosive charge arJd the Pre, sure Sen,or was measured to be 380 mm, See Table 40, 




Distance of the 
Standoff Distance pressure Sensor 
of the Enclo,ure from the 







from Equation 3 
22.55 
42.03 
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Figure 156: Pressure history for Event 1, 
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The pressure history for Event 2 was recorded as shown in Figure 157 
• 
___ • Theorehcal 
",oc, 
pressure 
W 00 · I - ---.*' 








Figure 157: Pressure history for Event 2, and theoreticat pressure 
history for 12 gm Pentotite. 
The pressure ~istory for Event 1 (Figure 156) u;1 not follow the usual (theoretical CUNe in 
Figure 156) history format This would be exrected, because Ihe Pressure Sensor was partly 
obscured from the explosive charge. The pre~sure history of Event 2 followed the usual 
history format, except that the peak pre,sun, that was measured was smaller than the 
expected vallie, see Table 40. Accordl~g to the theoretical pressure history (also shown in 
Figure 157). the measured value obtained was equivalent to 12 gm Pentalite meaning that 
either the detonation of the charge 'Nas incomplete, or the senSor was suspect 
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The acceleration results for Event 1 are shown in Figure 158, and the acceleration 













Figure 158: Acceleration measurements for Event 1, at a standoff 
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Figure 159: Acceleration measurements for Event 2, at a standoff 
distance of 350 mm. 
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The maximum eCA accelerations ~aried between 1042 g and 6238 9 during Events 1 and 2 
respectively 
The sensitivity of the accelerometers were too high for the chosen standoff distances, 
consequently the accelerometer wh~h was moonted on the Enclosure, saturated at 
approximately 90 000 g During Event 1, both the positive and the negative peak 
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acceleralions were cui off al the saturation voltage. During Event 2. only the positive half 
cycle was cut off at the saturation voltage due to the larger standoff distance 
The attenuation of acceleration could not be quantif.,d exactl~, due to the saturation at 
00 000 g. Taking the maximum acceleration of Event 2 as 100 000 g (conservstively by 
extrapolation). and the peak value as 1Q50 g at point B in Figure 159, the attenuation is -
1979 dB This is more attenuation than previously recorded. II the pea~ at point B IS 
eflrTllnated, then one could expect attenuation ligures in the order of 23 dB. as shown in 
Figure 159 point C. 
The accelerations measured for this stL.dy before this experiment. wss summar~ed by 
Table 30 and graphicall~ illustrated by Figure 126 Adding the accelerstion-peak 
measurement during E~ent 2 01 this experiment changed the curve-litted result as shown in 
Figure 160. (It must be kept in mind that the peak scceleration lor this experiment saturated 
during both Events) The cur~e-litting process ~lelded the result that a curve with the lormat 
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Equation 47 'IS depicted by Figure 160. This finding has a remarhble resemblance With the 
form of the shock ~elocity U, in Equation 6, and confirms that there is a direct relationship 
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Mathematk:al approximation, 
Equation 47. R ~ 0,9542 
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Figure 160: Relationship between peak-acceleration and standoff 
distance 
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5.1.6.4. Damage Assessment 
After each test the electronics were function·tested at the test site and it was found that these 
tests succeeded after both blast events. After the tests, the Electronics EncloslXe was 
examined in the laboratory. No physical damage had occlXred, and all the components were 
in silo as they were belore the tests All repeated lunctionsl tests passed. No damage had 
QCclXred 
5.1.6.5. Motion Analysis 
The motion analysis was not done lor this experiment because the acceleration measurement 
saturated durin~ both events The accee ration was more than the dynamK: range of the 
measlXement equipment 
It is however noticeable, on the CCA acceleration measurement, that a posnive peak 
acceleration occurred at approximately 600 ~s after the initial shock during Event 1 (see 
p~ntA in Figure 158), and at approximately 1400~s after the initial shock during Event 2 
(see point B in FiQure 159. This may have been attributable to the fact that a mechanical 
landing" in the Electronics Enclosure (previously used lor mounting purposes) was too close 
to the position 01 the CCA-mounted Accelerometer 
5.1.6.6. Conclusions 
The conclusions that could be drawn Irom this experiment were that 
1 The accelerometers were too sensitive to measure the acceeration of the 
Enclosure at the selected standoff distal1ces. and the combil1<ltion 01 the serlSOI 
sensitivity and the dynamic range of the NO equipment caused saturation at the 
points indicated in Figure 158 
2 According to the pressure measurement during Event 2, it was concluded that 
only a partial detonation had occurred. The close relationship between the 
measured history and the IheoretK:al history (of a reduced expiosive mass) was 
remarkable. rendering tI1e data valid for a reduced charge mass 
The pressure measurement 01 bent 2 and the "no damage" lindlng indicated that 
the Electronics Enclosure with the selected dsmpinQ mechanism protected the 
electronics successfuHy against an explosive charge of st least 12 gm Pemollte at 
a standoff distance 01 240 mm This was equivalent to a 40 kg charge at a 
standoff distance of 5.5 m 











Protection of ElectronICs Agamst Underwater Explosions 
A Roux 
Chapter 6 
6.1. DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS 
6.1.1. Introduction 
Page 180 
This fllal chapter reviews too work urJdertaken to address the main aim 01 the thesis 
introduced on page 18, and by which the related sub-aims (stated on page 24) were executed 
to erJdorse the cooclusion that the main aim had been accomplished 
6.1.2. Theories noted and defined 
The titerature was studied to note too characteristics of an underwater explosion with respect 
to the effect that the expiosbn had on objects that were positioned horizontally at standoff 
distances which Were applicable to this study. It was found that an underwater explosion 
consisted of two main elements. thai is, the shock wave and the bubble formatbn. The 
hypothesis of this study stated that the shock wave was the main contributor towards the 
damage to electronics in close proximity to the blast, and consequent~ the shock wave 
characteristics (using several sources) Were noted in depth (see Equation 3 through 11). Too 
bubble formation and collapse were thus Ignored during this study 
During the literature study It Decame evident that the shock wave had two regions in wh",h 
the propagation-velocity of the shock wave was different. These regions were called the 
"near-liekJ" (near to the explosbn) and the "far-field" (at furtoor standoff distances than the 
near field). However, no clear delinitlOn of this characteristic was offered by the hterature, arld 
therefore a transition between the two regions was unclear. Hence the author of this thesis 
offered a delinition (see, 'ConClUSions Near Field vs, Far Field characteristic" on page 41, 
and repeated here lor elucidation purposes) which would satisfy the requirements of this 
dissertation with respect to the characteristics of a shock wave which would inlluence a 
damage lactor. 
Definition Offered 
In the far field, the shock wave has reached a cOllstallt velocity 
equal to the speed of SOIIOO ill fhat medium. Before this 
constallt velocity charactenstic is reached, the shock wave 
velocity is highel than the speed of soulld, with a maximum 
value at the border conditioll (0 charge radii), aoo tapers down 
non--linearly towards the speed of soulld as the standoff 
dista(](;e i(](;reases. This is the Ilear field This near field is 
usually defilled by a number of charge radii. 
Briefly, the shock wave propagatIOn velocity in the near field starts with a maximum (several 
times the speed 01 sound in the water, and typically 4000 - SOOO mls) at the boundary 
condition. ThiS propagation velOCity then reduces by a function which approx'rnates an 
exponential format until the speed 01 sound is reached (see Figure 11) (the maximum 
amplitude depends upon the explOSive pressure - Pg - and Is pressure-transfer-coeff.::;ient to 











Protection of Electronics Af/ainsl Underwater Explosions 
A Roux 
Page 181 
the surrounding wster) In ~ far field the shock wave propagstes at the speed of sound. The 
border between the near field and the tar field is not a sharp transition, and therefore the near 
field definition couid be terminated by the standoff distance at which the propagation velocity 
has reduced to within (say) 5°", of the speed of sound 
The nesr field is s~nificant tor the purpos~s of deflf1ing design parameters of equipment thst 
will be situated near immi~nt underwater explosions due to its non-tinear nsture It is 
reasonable to accept that damage may also increase non-linearly in the near field, ss the 
e~plosive charge is approached (standoff distance is decreased) 
6.1.3. The Hypothesis 
During the first experiment, the measurement results showed that more electronic damage 
occurred ck:lse to the blast (see the results of Enclosure Not at 100 mm [= 6 charge radii] 
standoff distance on page 82), than further away (see the results of Enclosure N04 at 360 mm 
[_ 22 charge radii] standoff distance 00 page 92). The damage results could not be presented 
n a more scientific format. because the damage couid not bB calculated on any acceptable 
scientific scale. Also, some design "damage soft spots· were deliberately introduced into the 
CCA-design, and SOme CCAs were mounted on damping material, whilst others were 
mounted hard aga inst the Enc<Jsure. The purp·~se wss to investigste the stsndoff dlstsnces 
where 
1 Damage would occur where it was not expected. e.g. surface-mounted 
compOIlerits being dislodged, switches phYSIcally broken. etc 
2 Damage would occur only to the ·soft spots' on the CCAs. 
3 No damage would occur 
From tile results obtained in Experiment 1. it was reasonab~ to conclude that the damage to 
the test-electronics increased non-linearly as the standoff distance decreased 
Keeping cognisance of the fsct that the water particle velocity associated with the propagah::m 
of a shock wsve is directt.' proportional to the 'hock wave velocity (see Equation 71 and the 
speeding particl~s sre orients ted in the direction of propagation, the baSIS of the hypothesis of 
this study was established. The conclusion drawn from this statement is that the outward 
lorce which is created by the shock wsve wouid also increase exponentially closer to the 
charge in the near lield, and resch s maximum at the boundary condibon. In the tar liekJ. the 
outward lorce would reduce proportionalt.' wilh the shock-wave-generated pressure (se~ 
Equation 10) until the force would be too small to have a signil",ant effect. (Equation 10 is 
valK1 lor the condition where P >~ Po). This outward lorce, according to the hypothesis. is the 
cause of object scceleration. and consequently electron", damage 
The acceleration messurement results that were recorded lor this study suggest that s good 
correlation had been found between the peak aCCBleration of the Electronics Enclosure and 
the scaled stsndoff distance (in charge radii) Irom an underwater explOSion (see Figure 160). 
This val'K1stes a conclusion that the outward force of the expk:lsion (and therelore the 
acce~ration of an object on whd the force is exerted) is relat~d to the shock wsve velocity 
It must also be kept '1f1 mind that the experiments for this study were conducted using a 
standard explos'lve maSS 01 30 gm. snd thst the equstion for the decay function of a shock 
pressure pulse (SBe Figure 10) indicates that a larger explosive mass would sustain the 
particle velocity lor a longer duration This means that the shock impulse density (integral with 
time of the shock pressure pulse history) 'IS also direct~ proportional with the acceleration, 
and would contribute to an Equation which woukj describB this conclusioo. 
It appears reasona~e that an Equat'lon illustrsting this conclusOn could bB given by 
Equation 48 on page 182. Th~ function includes all the properties of a shock wave that were 











Protection of Electronics Againsl UndefWater ExplosIons 
A Raux 
Page 182 
identified in the "Research Design" (sub"paragraph "Methodology" on p~ge 24) to have 
inf~oce on tM dam~~ to enclosed electronics. 
Note also th~t the total force (L F) on the object wh>;;h would culmillate in an acceleration 
01 the object. is ~Iso dependent on the available area on which the force IS exerted (force 




F 0 Force exerted on the Enclosure 
m 0 mass 01 the Eoclosure , • acceler~tion 01 the enclosure 
C. 0 Shock wave velocity 
P. .. ,c 0 Shock impulse fuoction , 0 constant 
A 0 Aperture 
Reft!r to Expeoiment 6, Figure 156. The aperture was reduced ~t the position 01 the pressure 
sensor as ~ result of the Enclosure partly obscuring the shock WfNe, causing the Pressure 
1m p.Jlse energy to be reduced (~rea under the pressure-history curve) 
To summarise. This study showed thai there was an un"quantified relationship 
batwaen the hard-mounted electronics damaga in an Enclosure and the acceleration 
of the Enclosure The conclusion was also that the damage closer to the explosion 
was not ollly due to the pressure, but also dua to the shOCk wave velocity 
6.1.4. Mitigation factors 
The hypotheSiS 01 this study stated th~t the ~cceleratlon of the Eoclosure is the cause of h~rd" 
mounted electronics contained in the Enclosure This implies that mitig~tion techniql.l8s 
shouki incorporate ~ solution to preclude (as f~r as possible) the transfer of the Enclosure 
~cceleratiol1 to the contained CCA 
It w~s calculated as a ball-park /igurt! that the displacement 01 the Enclosure wouki be less 
than 1 mm (Acceleration and Displacement PredocHon on p~ge 46) during the large 
~cceleration penod when a shock wave co~kies with the Eoclosure. This gave rise to the 
coocluslon that an internal (10 the Enclosure) damping mechanism may be provided, which 
would be physKoally small, and therefore cost effectr.le. As a f~st solution, a standard 
Neoprene "grommet" was used to mount the CCA, which would serve as a damper to the 
acceler~tion. However, the grommet-solution would be effectrve for larger distances (e.g. if 
the Enclosure was situated in the far field) on~, Another (softer) damping mechanism was 
tested, and it was found (using Neoprene sponge rubber - see Experiments 4) that the 
acceleration was dampened more adequ~tely th~n for the grommet-mounted CCAs (sponge 
rubber ~ttenuatlon of21.95 dB - see Figure 122 - versus grommet attenuation of 15-18 dB-
seO! Table 21 and Table 25) 
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Note: The relative displacement of tile CCA (relative to tile Enclosure) was larger for Ihe 
softer mountings (as would be expected). Care must be taken in tile deSign of tile eqUipment 
to cater tor the correct expected acceleration because a moI.1nting method which attenuates 
adequately, may allow too much CCA displacement, causing tile CCA to take up all the slack 
during blast loading, Ilnd then colliding with tile Enclosure 
There is some evidence that the selected mounting method for Experiment 6 was too soft for 
the selected standoff distance. In Figure 158 pomt A and in Figure 159 point B indicated a 
sudden increase in acceleration which c<X.J ld be attributa~e to all the slack of the damping 
material being taken up. II these peak acceleratoos were in fact as a result 01 the reduced 
damping material slack, then ~ could weN be envisaged that the maximum acceleration would 
be il the order 01400 g This would const~ute an acceleral'oo attenuation in excess 0124 dB 
(assuming the saturated peak acceleratOon in Figure 159 would be in excess of 100 000 g), 
which is an improvement over the damping method of Experiment 4 Unfortunately the test 
range team was unavailable to execute an experiment to prove this statement 
6.1.5. Field measurements and sensors 
Applied Research had been perlormed on the subject 01 saleguarding electronics that were 
enclosed in a watertight Electron i::s Enclosures against underwater blast kladlng. The results 
of the field experiments were mostly positive, See conclusions on page, 96, 117, 134, 148, 
166, and 179. The following conclusions are highlighted or added' 
The damping solution of Neoprene sponge rubber that was used in Experiment 6 
was adeq(1ate for the protection of the enclosed electronic eCA for the protection 
against blast loading of 30 gm at scaled standoff distances as iow as 15 cllarge 
radii (240mm for30gm explosive charge at a relative dens~y of 1.6), which is 
wlthm the goals for this study. A 30 gm charge produces approximately 73 MPa 
press(1fe at a standoff distance of 240 mm, whicll is equivalent to a 40 kg charge 
at a standoff distaoce of 2.6 m. 
2 The acceleration that the selected Eoclosure undergoes during blast loading in 
the near field region of 20 charge radii, (see acceleration measurements M 
page 177) is too high to measure usmg the given accelerometers (with the 
sensitivity of 0073 mV/g). A fXissibie solution is 10 increase tile mass of the 
Enclosure, after all scaling factors were considerad, because the force (and force 
aperture) is constant 
3. A good correlation between the explosive cllarge radius and the acceleration was 
obtained (see Figure 126) from which it could be predicted what the expected 
acceleration wolid be at specified standoff distances for a 30 gm explosive 
chiHge Estimating that tile maximum acceleration of E',ent 2 during 
Experiment 6 was 100 000 g, this point was added to Figure 126. which produced 
the graph shown in Figure 160 A CUlYe (with R' - 0.9542) was fitted over the 
data pomts In Figure 160, producing an equation of' 
A ademli on = 1.,O()()O(e -'l.w.,) --------
Where x = number of radii 
And R' = 0.9542 
_______ 50 
This cUlYe was valid for an explosive mass of 30 gm Pentolite, an Enclosure with 
mass = 1.996 kg and with an aperture of (180 mm x 120 mm = 0,0216 m') and a 
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GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF THE COLE [5) EQUATION FOR PEAK PRESSURE VS. 
STANDOFF DISTANCE FOR PENTOLITE. 
Graph of shock wave peak amplitude relalive to ~tandoff distance, for a charg~ w~lght 0140 kg 
Pentolile 
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P~, is in Iblin' 
Wisin IIJ, 
Ri • ..,/t 
Equation for Panlolile translated to the metric system: 
,I,IPa 
Where; 
Pmax is in MPa, 
Wisin<g. 
R is in m 
! 
3.5 4 45 5 
The specificatbn of 40 kQ at a standoff distance of 4 m equates to 44.75 MPa and thus an equivalent 
charge mass of 30 gm at a scaled stardoff distance 01 360 mm This dislance equates to 22 charQe 
radii 















SPECIFICATIONS OF THE TOURMALINE PRESSURE SENSORS USED IN THIS STUDY 
Figure 161: Model 138A Tourmaline Pressure Sensor. 
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Figure 162: The schematic design of the detonator firing electronics with synchronisation to measurement equipment. 
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This unit operates in conjunction with the IMPITM firing unit, and provides a synchronization pulse to 
the measurement equipment as soon as current is detected in the detonator circuit. 
The high-level principle of operation is described by Figure 163 below. The IMPITM supplies a high 
voltage (from an internal capacitor) on its output terminals as soon as its firing button is depressed. 
This voltage is applied to the detonator via a long (variable between 100 m and 1000 m) cable. The 
synchronization unit is placed in series with this detonator current, and for easy operation, the 
synchronization unit is polarity protected, meaning that its two input terminals may be connected in 
either way. This is quite necessary, because the IMPITM output terminals are not marked, and the 
operators of the IMPITM may connect it onto the detonator circuit in either way, without heeding the 
polarity. 
The IMPITM Synchronization :, Detonator I 
Detonator Firing Unit 
Unit 
Arrows indicate Detonator 
current flow 
Figure 163: The high-level connection-diagram using the IMPITM connected 
to the detonator via the Synchronization Unit. 
The IMPITM has its own battery, making the unit a voltage-floating unit. The synchronization unit also 
has an internal battery, which also makes this unit a voltage-floating unit. Two diodes connected back-
to-back (D3 and D4) facilitates that the current may flow in either direction. One of the terminals are 
connected to a voltage divider (R1 and R2), placing the TPS at half the vee voltage (2.S V). This 
voltage is connected through a high impedance resistor (R6 == 100kO) to the two input terminals of the 
voltage comparators in U4. 
Steady state: 
As there is no (or negligible) current flowing through R6, the voltage at pins U4A1p2 and U4B/p6 is 
also 2.S V. The voltage divider at U4A1p3 (R11 and R12) gives a voltage of 2.2S Vat U4A1p3. This 
means that, if the unit is at rest (no current flowing through D3 or D4, the output of the comparator 
(U4A) at U4A1p1 is in a LOW state (== GND) due to the voltage at pin U4A1p2 being higher than the 
voltage at U4A1p3. This LOW state is fed to the input of a comparator (USAlp2). This latter comparator 
performs the function of a logic inverting amplifier because the voltage divider at USAlp3 (R14 and 
RiS) sets the voltage at U5A1p3 to 2.SV, and the input at USAlp2 is expected to be either logic HIGH 
(S V) or logic LOW (0 V). With the input of the comparator USA at USAlp2 in a LOW state, the output, 
USAlpi, is in the high-impedance open-drain state. This means that the conductor marked N-EDGE is 
pulled to a HIGH state by Ri8, because the outputs of all the LM393 comparators are in the "open 
drain" configuration. 
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In the steady sate, the voltage at the input of the comparator U4B at U4p6 is 2.5 V. The voltage divider 
(Ri7 and Ri9) sets the input of the comparator U4B at U4p5 to 2.75 V. This means that the output at 
U4B/p7 is also in the high-impedance state with U4B/p5 (positive input) at a higher voltage than 
U4B/p6 (negative input). This output (U4B/p7) is also connected to the conductor marked N-EOGE. 
Both the outputs (U4B/p7 and U5A1p1) of the comparators are in the now in the high-impedance state, 
allowing Ri8 to keep the conductor N-EOGE in the HIGH state. 
The conductor N-EOGE is connected to the input of a mono-stable multi-vibrator (U3A), which needs a 
negative edge to trigger the output of U3A. In the steady state, there is no negative edge, and 
therefore U3A1p13 is steady at a LOW level. 
Positive current flow when detonator is activated: 
A positive current flow is relevant when the current is in the direction as indicated on the schematic 
diagram, flowing into Terminal 1. This means that the voltage across 03 rises from 0 V to 
approximately 0.7 V in a relatively short time. For the purposes of this circuit, the current performs a 
0.7 V step function. The voltage at U4B/p6 therefore rises from 2.5 V to 3.2 V, which is higher than the 
comparator voltage threshold of 2.75 V. The output of U4B/p7 then flips from a high-impedance state 
to an active LOW, due to the fact that U4B/p6 (negative input) > U4B/p5 (positive input). 
This means that the conductor N-EOGE is pulled LOW by U4B/p7, providing the negative edge that is 
required at U3A1p1 to trigger the mono-stable U3A at U3A1p13. This output steps to 5 V, and stays at 
5 V for approximately 1 second, providing the required synchronization pulse. This mono-stable time is 
a function of the values of R3 and C7. 
Negative current flow when detonator is activated: 
A negative current flow is relevant when the current is in the opposite direction to the indicated current 
on the schematic diagram, therefore flowing into Terminal 2, through 04, and out of Terminal 1. 
In this mode, the voltage drop across 04 (approximately 0.7 V) causes the voltage at TP4 to be 0.7 V 
lower than the voltage at TP5. The voltage at U4A1p2 (negative terminal of U4A) = 1.8 V, which is 
lower than the voltage at U4A1p3 (2.25 V). This means that the output of U4A (U4A1p1) flips to a high-
impedance state, pulling the input to U5A at U5A1p2 to a HIGH state via the resistor Ri3. This means 
that U5A1p2 > U5Ap3, and therefore the output U5A1pi is pulled into an active LOW state. This means 
that the conductor N-EOGE is pulled LOW, providing the required negative edge for the mono-stable 
U3A to activate a 1 seco d positive pulse at U3A1p13, which is the synchronisation pulse. 
Output indicator: 
LED 05 switches ON when the voltage at U3A1p13 goes HIGH, indicating when a synchronisation 
pulse is obtained. 
Other circuits: 
Comparator U5B, and mono-stable U3B are not connected to function. 
U2 provides a regulated 5 V, called VCC from a 9 V battery. 















A PX I com pute r containing a 4-channel AID card was used, in a configu rat ion tor measurement at 
0 5~ s intervals, The specif~stions for the AID card, i ~ shown in Figure 164 
• Analog Inp ut fAl) 
.~-------------, 
• Number of channels: 4 diffe rential 
• /lJD conv.ner. 
• ·~dB 5rwall 51gnal bandwidth: (Typic al, 250(;) 2010- L TC1414 or equiv~lent 
2005 AlD761i5 orequivalent 
2006 AlD7663 orequiv3le1l1 
DeYice InWRarqe _(-3dS) tnPIIIRq. _(,3d!I) 




• Reso lution: 
2010- 14 bits, no n~ssirlg code 
2005I200I3-16 Pits, I1Q misw><;l code 
• FIFO buffer size: 
2010 8K samples 
200512006- 512 sampl<'5 
• Programmable Input range: 
BiPOlar: ::;1O'V, : 5V, ±2 5\1, ±1.25Y 













• Operation al common mode voHalte range ±l lY 
• Overvol1age protec1on : 
Power 00_ cootinuou. ± 30V 
Power on cooli"""". ± 15V 
• Input Impedance: l Gn1100pF 
• Gain error. 
Belore Calibration :::0 6% 01 outpUl maX 
After calibratIOn: :to 1 % of ootput m~" lor OAQiPXI-201 0 
:::0,03% of output rna>: lor DAQIf'XI-2005l2OO6 
Figure 164: Specifications of the OAQ card, 
1170 !<H~ O~IO", j()OOkHz 
1050 !<Hz 0-5V 1020 kHz 
~~ O-H'/ 700 1.11~ 
~~ tr-l,25V 5J4lIJt 
1100kHz 0-10'/ l~lC.Hz 
I05() kHz ,-~ lOs;) • It: 
raD ,ru Q-2S.' no kH~ 
~D kH,;: Q-l ~5V S3C kit 
630 kH< 0-10': &to kK;: 
620 kH.l 0-5'1 S2U kHz 
54D , ... 1>--2.SV 54D kK;: 











Protection of Elecrronics Against Underwater Explosions 
A Roox 
APPENDIX 5 
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON LITERATURE 
Major Sources: 
Slriim and JanLon flO] 
The data-sets of the measurements were given to the CSIR in two formats 
1. A short report explaining the test set-up 
2. Data files in TXT format on a CO of the raw data as it was recorded on site 
Page 195 
The four pressure senscrs that were used Were lI/lknown at the date of publication of this dissertation. 
The sampling rate was 500 Hz 
The meaSLJrements done by Strom and Janzon 1101 are regarded by the CSIR (custod'lan of a copy of 
the information) to be very significant. The results obta~ed are the most comprehens''''E results oj 
unMrWater blast measurement that the author could find, and the raw data was made available to the 
CSI R to analyze independently, The raw data was presented to the CSI R in raw (not analyzed) format. 
thereiore this dissertation analyzes the data in detail 
One of the tests performed by Strom and Janzon It 0] will be described In this literature re.,ew. 













Typicat Test Set-up in a Swedish fjord. 
Barge 
• Weight 
Four presSlire sensors were jXlsitiorled at var'l)us distarx:es frOOl an explosive charge. The distances 
were typically 3,5 m, 6 m, 11 m, and 20 m (see Table 43 for acCLJrate recorded distarx:esj, As can be 
seen from Figure 165. the four sensors thot were used were strung horizontally away from a charge, to 
enSLXe constant depth. The depth was typically 20 m, in a40 m deep zone 
Five charges were exploded, and recordings made from an jour sensors, and stored as ASCtI files 
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shown in Figure 166. The very sharp rising pressure shock pulse can be seen, as well a, the pre"ure 
effects of the bOOble formation roughly 360 ms later The five charge, were of differing charge 
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Figure 166: Plot of one of the five explosions, pressure versus time. 
Some reference figures mentioned in the report by Strom and Janzon [101 














Ulilizing TNT as the reference. the energy can be calculated as 2 MJlkg 
Theta = 0 264 m, 
Shock energy i, cslculated utilizing the Equation 
4J7f' " e""", - -- f pu<il 
Q , 
Maximum pressure is calculated as foilows: 
The graph (Figure 166) shows that t~ shock wfJve pressure pulse has a very large peak pressure. as 
opposed to the bubble pressure pulse wh;:;h has a much lower peak pressure pulse On face value the 
shock wsve will have the largest probability to cause damage 
The data as supplied by Str6m and Janzon [10] is discussed below in terms of the characte(rstics as 
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Characteristic 1: Shock Wave Propagation Velocity, 
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The test set-up (Figure 165) was constructed to have 4x sensors, which were placed "t roughly 3,5 m, 
6 m, 11 m and 20 m from the blast. The task to determine the propagatlon-vekl city is simply to take 
the known distance between sensors, and di,ide this distance with the time taken for the shock wave 
to prop"gate between the known positions This will give an average value of the propagatbn velOCity 
The time-base 0/ the pressure measurements was given as 2 ~s. As can be e'pected, the practical 
pI"cement process of the sens.ors coukJ not be executed to a very high degree of accuracy, and 
therefore the sensor positions were recorded by Strom and Janzon [10] to be at ~Iightly variable 
distances from the blast. as compared to the intended 3.5 m, 6 m, 11 m. and 20 m This in itself does 
not constitute a problem , if it could be accepted that the actual distar-.:es from the blast is measured to 
a high degree 0/ accuracy 
The experiment was conducted by executing the detonation of five charges , and all four sensors were 
activated to start measuring sinultaneously. Unfortunately, lrom the raw data it was not possible to 
detect a marker which indicates the moment of blast. This means that the poSition (in time andlor 
distance) of the first sensor cannot be determined from the raw data. This "Iso means that (for a f{ st 
Iteration approach) , the pOSition of the first sensor has to be accepted from Table 42, as 3.5 m 
Some of the data from the report by Strom & Janzon [20] is shown in Table 41, PI P2, P3, and P4 
denote the four positions of the four pressure sensors from each blast 
Table41: Recorded sensor standoff dist nces from the blasts. 
". Type Weight E(s) E(s) E(s) E(s) Bubble [kg] [MJlkg] [MJlkg] [MJlkg] [MJlkg] Period 
" " P> PO [ms] 
PL Blast 1 
, PlastiC X 17.586 1 1573 1,0624 09849 0,9696 322.95 
PL Blast 2 
, Plasli:; X 22,448 1.2626 1.0994 1.0429 0.9733 351.28 
PL Blast 3 C 
Plasti:; X 27.328 1.208 1,1398 1 1047 1.0431 370.72 
HB Blast 1 
, HBX3 9.41 10614 1,0189 09878 0958 33682 
HB Blast 2 
; HBX3 9,48 1.073 1.00D9 0.9733 0.9653 339.02 
For more clarity, this study will denote the five blasts as Plash: X Blast 1 PlastK: X Blast 2, Plastic X 
Blast 3, HBX3 Blast 1, and HBX Blast 2 respectively from the top to the bottom oITabie 41 
More information about the recorded standoff distances is shown in Table 42. The cell shown with a 
yellow background is assumed to have incorrect informatIOn. Correct Informatoo waS obtained from 
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Table42' Standoff distances and recorded peak pressu r€s of fi~e blasts_ 
" Distance PmaK Distance Pmax Distance Pm~x Distance Pmax 
P1(m) (MPa) P21m) (MPa) P3(m) (MPa) P4(m) IMPa) 
PL Blast, 
, 
" 3701 6, 1 7 ,8,68 1 , ,06 9S6 1995 4ee 
~, Blas12 
, ,", 3701 5,37 19,94 1, 46 999 202 493 
PL Blast 3 
, 3 71 4C,59 5,39 21,62 11.44 , 1 .4, 20,23 59'9 
liB Blast, 
, '6,% 23,45 3,37 12.81 , 1 39 362 2C23 35~ 
11881as:2 " 3,88 22,12 6,52 12.54 , 1 54 343 2C37 3.4~ 
A discr€pancy of the data in T~bte 42 with r€spect to the r~w data h~s been 
found, and Tabte 42 has been r€wriUen by the author as 
Tabl~ 43, correla:ing the data in t~e tab'" '.'.'lIh tre da:a contair.ed io :he "8'.'.' data 'iles 
Tabte 43; Tabl" with information taken from the raw data of standoff 
distances and peak press lire va Illes ofli~e blasts. 
No. Distance Pmax Distance Pmax Distance Pmax Distanc" Pmu 
PL B,85t 1 
PL B,as: 2 2 
PL B,8st 3 3 
HBBlast~ 4 
HBBlast2 5 















1 3, , ~ 
1 ~ 46 
















Plas!>: X BiasI 1 crc(ju~ed tre r-resswe resJI:s as shown in F>:J.I'" ,67 It is imporla1: to 10te thal:he 
independent axis (Tim,,) denc:es :he titre ta<e1 f'O,l1 the tr,omenl of the s:art ~f Ire record ,,; 1- does 
1~t Qe10le t~e lime taken frotr the mome1: Ira: Ire blasl c(:cJ'red 
'Hi' '" 1 cO'ljO"l> ,"fo',~>1"" i'~' '>corroo: " " ~ ""«t,t,.,, for Ir. " 'PO'"' 01 """""Y of ",,0:>''''''), ,~''''' ~'"" (OC,"'OO 
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P/sstic X Blsst 2 prodl.lCed the pressure results as shown in Figure 167 
". 
, 39.<K MP. 
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Figure 167: Pressure results from Plastic X Blast 1. 
TIle calculstion of the propagation velocity for Plastic X Blast' is shown in Table 44 
Table 44: Calcu lation of propagation velocity for Plastic X Blast 1. 
PlasticX Blast 1 
Distance from ~ast from report (m) 
Distance from tj sst on raw data records (m) 
Shock Time between sensors (~s) 
Dist~nce between sensors (m) 
Velocity (mls) 

















Tru e betwesn first sensor and last sensor (~s) 11304 ~s 
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PlastIC X Blast 2 produced the pressure resu~s ItS V!OIon ,n Fogure 168 
-"" 
JII ~3to."", I ""-, i- ,,_ . 
.,-- ~ 
" ......... , .-
, f-
~ • • J 2O~; MP, I 
l 1 IOBlIIP • • 
\ 
~\ I 
5-0'- lIP • I . 
"" 
- L - p - - - - --~ ", ,,'-.00 ~ ; >eo:" - - - --' , • 
Figu ... 168 ' Pressure resu ll s lrom PI_ie X Biasi Z. 
The calculahon of U1. propagation veluClty lor PlaStiC X BIaSI! i5 sl>own In Table.5 
Table45: Ca lculation 01 propagat ion velocity for Plastic X Blaa! 2. 
O,stanoe from blast from report (m) 
DlslBoco from bLK! on taW (lata records 1m) 
Shock Time between Set'l6OfS (jJS) 
Dostante between $en~ (m) 
Veklclly (mls) 
Distance betwe&n ~rst a'1d last sensor (m) 
Time between lirsl sensor and la5t sensor (I's) 




'" '" 0 1792 
0 '" 1.,2
1 1 . 0 202m 
1 I 46 2{) 20 m 
",. 6028 jJs 
509 B 74 m 
"" 1450 mh; 1636 m 
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The -;alculahon ot the prOP"llat,on veloClly lor Plashe X Biasi 3 is lihown In Table 46 
Tabkl46: Calculiltion 01 prop~gltlon velocity for Plaslic X Blast 3. 
Plastk;X Blast 3 
Q,stance Irom bias! tr(m report (ml 
Oi$lilnce from blast on raw data rerords (m) 
Shock Time befWe4ln sel\$Ol"S (iJSI 
Oistance betwoan WflSOrB (m) 
VelO<ily (m/s) 
Distance betw""" lir,1 and last sensor (rn) 
2733kg 
'" '" , , 
5.3Q 11 44 
'" 1 '.44 """ ,." "" '" "'" "., 
20 23m 
" ""' """ .. 
"''''' l4l'i 6mls 
1652 m 
n ne between lir~t sensor arod last sensor (~s) 11258~s 
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H8X3 8last 1 produced the pressure results as shown in Figure 170 
HIIXl III ... 1 
"" ....... ....,.....,."..T"-----------;'< ,') ,/P. 
, , 




, , , , 7C">MP. 
Figure 170: Pressure resutts from HBX3 Btast 1. 
The caKoulation of the propagah::m ,00locit  for HBX3 Blast 1 is shown in Table 47 
Tabte 47: Catcutation of propagation ve locity for HBX3 Blast 1. 
HBX3 Blast 1 
DistancO! from blast from report 
Distance from blast on raw data records 
Time betwO!en sO!nsors (~s) 
Distance between sensors (m) 
Velocity (mls) 







5,37 1 1 ,39 
1870 3445 








Time betweM first sensor and last sensor (~s) 1 1354 ~s 
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Figure 171: Pressure results from HBX3 Blast 2. 
3.53 MPa 
The calculation of t~e propagation yelocit  for H8X3 Sisst 2 is shown in Table 48 
Table 48: Calculation of propagation velocity for H8X3 81ast 2. 
HBX3 Blast 2. 
Dlstsnce from blast from report 
Distance from blast on raw dsts records 
Shoc~ Time between sensors (~s) 
Distance between sensors (m) 
Velocity (mls) 






652 11 54 
6.52. 11 54 










Time between lir,t sensor snd last ,ensor (~sl 1 1280 ~s 
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(,hara~terjstjc 2: Peak·Pressun Function 
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Figure 167 to Figure 171 show the pressure functions as measured at standoff distances between 
3,5 m and 20 m from the blasts. From these figures. it can be seen that the peak pressures reduce 





R is the standoff distance In m 
q,s the charge weight In kg. 
...... --.--.- ...... - 51 
Traditionally. the equation for Pm .. is written such that the charge weight (mass) is divided by the 
distance Rewriting the Str6m and Janzon [10] Equation in the traditional tormat we get' 
p - -- - -j ] _li5 1' Q~r " MPa -.............. 52 
tn this format, Equat ion 52 can be compared wIth the Equation offered by Cole [5]. which IS graphically 
il ~ strated in Appendi. 1 on Page 188 
Equation 52 was superimposed graphically ~ver actual measurements taken by Strom and 
Janzon [10] in Figure 172 It IS clear that the theoretical Equation has slightly larger values than the 
actual measurements as produced by the specific HBX3 blastl This is due to the tact that the lormula 
was composed lor a different expiosive material 
.,. , 





Pressure Curve by 
Cole_ 
Measurements by 
Strom and Janzon 
>1-,,,,, " IX< 
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In another format (for better amplitude comparison), the measured values 01 the two HBX3 blasts 
(blasts 4 and 5) are shown relative to the cOffes..",dif19 calculated Peak Pressure in F~ure 173 A and 
B, It can be seen that, for both the HBX3 blasts, the measured peak pressure values are generally 






















'''' _., Ill, .. 1 
Equation 52 
Calculated Peak ~~ """ .. ' --
Pressure Curve " • • ,", ",' _ c" . • u ' ' '_'''''0 ' 
(Magenta) 
Calculated Peak 
Pressure Curve b~ 
Cot.. (~ellow) , 
Measurements by 
Strdm and Janzon • (blue) 
• W 
".'.", "-'.", >+>,' 
......... d .. ""'''H,I." d ~ ... ~" ....... 
,,, H. X' BO, .. , 
• • 
"'''' "'" .,,,, 
Comparison of the measured Peak Pressure values against the 
calculated Peak Pressure values for HBX3" 
The opposite findingrs true for the Plash: X composition (blasts 1 to 3). Figure 174 A Band C shows 
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Comparison of the measured Peak Pressure values against the 
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It can be seen that. for all three the Pla,bcX blasts, the measured values are slight ~ above' the 
formul<ited curve of Equation 52 A conclusion could be drawn that the PlesticX explosives are 
therefore more successflll with respect to the peak pressure amplitude than the HBX3 composition 
The mathematical equation given by Strom & Janzon [20] hils an asymptotic result when the distance 
approa<:he, 0 m, Thi" in theory. mean, that the lXed ~ted peak pressure at the point of explosion--,> " 
This anoma~ was discu"ed in paragraph on Charllcteristic 3: Shock Pressure Leading-Slope Rise-
Times on page 207) , wh ere it was shown that the description of the leading edge doos not allow 
in finite amplitudes at th ~ explosion origin (boundary condition of R --'> a, wher~ a., is the charge radiu ~ ) 
Ob,enations: 
The mathematical model that is given by StrOm & Janzon [20] is applicab le to their own proprietary 
composition , called Plastic X (unpubl ished composition) 
The mathematical Equation for each type (compositIon) of explosive differs with respect to the 
expected peak amplitude of the explosK>n at any given distance from the explosion, If a company 
produces its own composition of explosive, it wi. prob<ibly be reqLJired to meaSUre a number of 
exp~sions at a given distance to determin~ the sp~cific mathematical mod~ 1 to Do! used for that 
specific composition , This statement is general knowledge amongst explosive manufacturers 
Ch3ract~ri.tk 3: Sh""k Pr~"M r~ u.ading-SIOJle Ri~e_ Tim.~ 
The interest-valU€ of the ris~-time lies in rel<itionship 01 the rise"times with respect to the acceleration 
(that is caused by an explosion) of an enc~sure containing electronk:s in close proximity of the blast 
This study investigate, this relationship 
The main purpose of this Section was to determine the rise times 01 explosion ~ OOck fronts as derIVed 
from th~ raw data as given by StrOm & Janzon [20], Information on this topc waS not readily available 
in the literature, except that it was referred to as "discontinuous" or -pra<:tk:ally instantaneous" Actual 
values for rise times could not be found in the literature, and therefore th is dissertation analyzed the 
data as ,uppl ied by StrOm & Janzon [20]. Figure 175 shows that all normalised rise-times have 
approximately the same history characteristics, and for the re levant twenty measurements supplied by 
Strom & Janzon [20], the rise times were approximately 6 ~s 
' Tho tn'''I5 U", cA ' , I 9'1~ .tx>.e' roforo 10 tho inlk;eo,. of a , ombrnhon of the oooot" t in Equ.tion ~2 •• ...0< 1 .0 tn o p"""r to 
wt>cn tho quonht, in ",act<et. or. r ",.e~, eo ", [5] .ub>crlbe. the coo,tort .0 5-<,~ • • oPr<>"'o 10 tho coo""'" b, Strom "'-
Jon""" [:10] 0/ ~ 1 175, The pow« 01t"" q"riity _ •• ; "'''keto io . lil.cri b<><! by Colo [5] 0' 1,13, wnle StrOm ~ J , nzQ n [2a] 
de1no~ it to be 1 1255, It muot .t ,o t>e , opt " tn",!(! '" 01 tho typo 0/ e<pio, ,,,, detno. the.e two num t>o" , n~ t ",. i. doe, "'" 
(fI". 'n be_on typ>' of «pi"""'" 10 an exa ct . m"""t WO n ,.,..., ct to t ile pe .. 1"." ' ''' p<o;f""od by tho ~,p~" n, bu, r" he , 
wh.t "'00< 0/ p .. " ur. i. nd , noc, wave prop'~"" ve< ",,"y ) ",II t>o o'p.>rio"CO(! by on a bjo ot " ".,-,:l_on' d~1 once. 0/ 
. ppro~m a1e~ 2 m from. bI .. t of . 40 ,~ CIl~, D"" to r~"" "" from ",,,.rby cqeClo, e,~ , • ", ;p', nLi I, I ~ expected th. t 
the po., p", .. , ,,, "';1 '''y by .. tnu ,"" . 30'\'" The Mler. ",. be_. n qu ",><Ije, give n by C"'" [5] 300 Stre<n "'- Jon""" [:10] 
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Figure 175: Rise-times VS, normalisl!d shock at all four sl!nsor positions. 
ThB ircnnation to suspect that the similarity between thesB mBasurements was induced by bandwidth 
limitations of the test equipment could i)e discarded due to 
The fact that bandwktth timitation would keep the dPldt charactBristK: of the wavBform 
constant (over the linear regiOn) for all value~ that the prBssure slBw action is faster than 
thB bandwidth capabitlty of the measurement equipmBnt. and 
The fact that this is not the case for the measurements taken by Strom & Janzon [201 
because thB dPldt characteristic decreases with range, although thB risB timBs rBmain 
constant. 
It is also necBssary to investigate the PrBSSUre history, not in the time dimen,,;on, but in IBngth 
dimension. Cole [5] refBm to this length dimension to determine the "thickness" of thB shock front. Now 
that it ,s known that the shock front moves at constant velocity in the far field (at approximately 
1470 mls) , and togBther with the fact that the rise times are approximately 6~s in the far field, the 
shock front thickness Can be quantified for the f?' field as 1470 mls x 6 ~s = 8.82 mm (or 
approximatel y 9 mm to round off the reSUlt). This is S'9ni~cant , because oow thB nse tlmBs can be 
superimposO!d upon the physical dimBnsions of the electronics container, see F'o::Jure 19, for 
applications in the tar field, 
Figure 176 dBpicts the same data as was used by Figure 175, but tran~lated into I'InBar dimensions as 
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Figure 176: Incremental distance VS, normalised shock at all four sensor 
positions. 
lli"<'u«ioD 
The results (in all cases shown in Figure 175) illustrate that the rise limes were recorded to be 
approximately 6 ~s {or 9 mm). irrespective of peak pressure value, or distance from the blast Tllis 
observation was va ' d for tM data as supplied by StlCm & Janzon [20], i.e. for distances between 
3.5 m and 20 m, relatIve to explosive masses between 9.5 kg and 27 kg, for the two different explosive 
compositions that were used 
Strbm & Janzon [20[ offered the explanation that the sensor width was approximately 10 mm When a 
shock wave with an infinitely fast rise-time approached the sensor at a constant speed, (typicalty 
1468 mls), the rime taken for tM shock wave to completely engulf the sensor from tile time tllat the 
shoc~ front touched tile sensor, was 0_Olm11486mls = 6.n~s. If the rise-time was measured to be 
6 ~s, tllen the actual rise time would be 0.73 ~s. However, tile rise-times were not measured with 















The manuscript by Cole [5J grv~s insight into th~ eatiy research years about the subject of underwater 
explosions. His manuscript was first published in 1946. but over the years thi~ document remained the 
prime referertCe manual for most explorers of the subject of underwater blast 
One should realize that in the years prior to 1946. equipment was oot as sophisticated as modern 
equipment. Keeping in mind that the Cole [5] research in many ways is sti l holrung water his 
manuscript is a remarkable achievement 
The specific characteristics that are researched by the author, is found in Cole [5p40j: 
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Figure 177: Velocities at a shock front as a function of pressure. 
Cole [5:p4] reports that, if the pressure is small enough. the rate of propagation .~ proc1lcally 
independent of the magnitude of th~ pressure This statement refers to pressures, which are small 
enough to be considered "acoustic" pressures, as coukJ be found in the far foeld " of a SOOck W8Ve. 
The threshold of the tranSition to "small enough" is not given. 
Cole [5p40] shows that (see Fig~re 177) the sOOck front propagation yelocity is hiQher than the speed 
of sound for high pressures He also reports that (Cole [5:p51l. when a blast occurs , the shock wave 
velocity propagation is several times' the "limiting value of 5000 ftls" (ie. the speed of sound) at (8nd 
very near) the expklsion. This sOOck wave velocity drops to the speed of so~nc quite rapidty as the 
sOOck wave advances outward 8nd the pressure falls to acoush:: yalues Cole [5] does not giye a more 
detaHed descripbon of the propagation velocity near the blast. 
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Cole [5:p5] states that the pressure level in the 5pherical wave falls off more rapKJIy with dostsnce than 
the inverse first power law (11R) predicted for msll amplitudes. but eventuslly approach this behaviour 
in the limit of large distances. He also states that (Cole [5p711 the pressure-time curve at a given 
distance from the explosion will have the Same general form 
Cole [5_p122] reports that it has been found thst for limited ranges of the argument W"'fR (where W is 
the weight of the explosive charge, snd R is the stsndoff d'lStsnce) the pesk-pressure p~ can be 
approximated by power laws of the form 
, ~' I, _,'W ' I' '"' - I R 
, I 
Cole ]5:pl22] also reports that this Equation IS '-'a fairly accurafe e~pressicm of theoretical results 
between 10 and 100 charge radW He plotted va lues lor TNT on a grsph, and empirically fitted a 
straight line of sbpe " ~ 1 16 onto the data_ He reports (Cole [5:p123]) that on ~ 1.16 gives a good fit 
except fO( W"3/R > 0_3 (R/a, < 25)" a," the charge radius. This meanS that a less accurate fit lor" " 
1 16 was experienced lor standoff distances that were less ttlan 25 charge radii 
To complete the Equation of Cole [5], too values for "." 113 snd k ~2.16 {from Table 7.3: Cole 
[5:p242] for TNT, which differs slightly from (\ ~ 1 16 as reported in Cole ]5:p123]) is inserted into 
Equstion 54 
1 I) 
( , 11 
P ••• =:!_16X10'111;~ 
, , 
lbiin' ________ 54 
Equation lor TNT 
Where W is in Ib and R is 
in feet 
Cole ]5:p238] slso reports On experiments done wHh spher.:;al Pentolite ctlarges. His data were 
obtSined from 47 records at 12 distances from 51 snd SO-pound charges, as well as from 75 records 
at 4 distances from 0.5, 3.8, and 7.S-pound charges_ Peak pressures were plotted against W""fR 
using logarithmic scales A straight line of slope 1 13 (different Irom too 1 16 as shown in Equation 54) 
on a log-log scale fitted the data fairly well, and Cole [5p239] reports a completed Equation for the 
peak pressure~ as generated by Pentolite ctlarges 
r 
' I' 




Equation for Pentolite' 
Woore W is in Ib and R is 
in feet 
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_ Jr .' { ';{' P,,,,,-54.5 Rj MFa " 
Equation for Pentolite in SI: 
Where W is in kg and R is .m 
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This result of Equation 56 is depicted ill gr~phic~llorm for Pentolite in Appendix 1 The startlrJg point 
of 2 m is purposely selected to be more than 10 charge rooii, because 01 the inaccuracies reported by 
Cole [5] at closer distances than 10 charge radii. 
Characteristic]: Shock I'r"",ure Leading-Slo"" Ri ..... Time. 
Cole [5:p230] measures the shock wave as shown in Figure 178' 
Figure 178: Pressure history as measured by oscilloscope prior to 1946. 
Cole [5: p5] reports that the pressure rise is for ~ II pr~ctical purposes discontinuous 
Churactcristic 4: SIwek Pre,sure-Time Histor~ 
Cole [5:p230] reports th<lt the pressure history that follows the initial peak pressure, decays 
expooontj~lly_ and the pressure shock wave c~n be approximated by Equation 57 
0 0 1' ,_.' ." 0 1 .~, ( 
fI is the time-constant of expooential dec~y, and this time-constant is given by Cole [5]. (converted to 
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( ) "" e = 92.5W l'J WI ,/;; - ps 
Where: 
Wisinkg 
R is in m 
Characteristic 5: Shock Impulse En.rllY 
Page 213 
'" 
Cole [5,:>231] reports "For many purposes, Ihe effectiveness of a shock wave depends on the lime-
integral of pressum, or impulse, more significantly than on the detailed (orm of the pressure verSlis 
time" In general lorm, thiS is shown in Equation 59 
f{!) = Il'(l)dl " o 
Cole [5:p239] experimented with a time constant 0, and derived an empirical Equation for the tmpulse 
for an integration period 016.7 x e. ~5 5hown In Equation 60: 
Appfmdices 
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Chung & Kinsey [3] of DSTO in Australia made great strides forward In 1998 to measure the shock 
detonation velody making USe of opt",al methods (fram'f1g and streak records of a camera which is 
capable of 10' frames per second), Both the initial velocity of the shOCk wave and bubble formation 
were measured, and the results shown in Figure 179, This figure shows the rapid initial expansion of 
the detonating Pentolite spher<! (section AB) and the shOCk wave (BC,) rapidly separating from the 
bUbble of detonation products (section BC) , 
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Figure 179: Expansion of the shock wave and bubble surface in the 
distance·time domain. 
This means that. in the inHla1 stages of the explosion (aft<!r the detonation has been completed) the 
bubble and shock waves are effective~ moving together at the same speed. unti point B is reached, 
approximately 2 ~s after th<! <!xplosion, The bubble and shock waves then sepa.'at<!. and the bubble 
starts slowing down at a greater rat<! than th<! shock wave Chung & Kinsey [3] plotted the velOCity of 
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The author is of the opinion that ChunQ and Kinsey maintained a high degree of accuracy for this type 
of experiment, yet the Qraph shown in Figure 180 may not be entirely accurate, due to the tendency of 
the vetocity to become less than the speed of sound when the graph is extrapolated The expected 
knee in the graph may be too prominent see Figure' 81 
• '. • • '. .... 
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curve 
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Figure 181; Sound velocity compared to shock wave velocity. 
Nevertheless, it has been substantiated that the velocity of propagation of the shock wave is non-
linear for ranges between the reduced distances of 12 mmIkQ1.~ (0,23 charge radii) to 120 mmlkg'" 
(2,3 char~e radii) and that the initial velocity in thiS segment is approximately 34 mml~s, This means 
that the initial velocity is approximately 2.3 tlmes!he speed of sound in water, depending on the size of 
the charge and related pressure that is created 
Chung & Kinsey [3] also showed that the mathematical Equation which fits this velocity curve, IS given 
by curve-fitling methods as: 
-" .. '; (;'=11.33R mmi,us ----."--------.-.--- 61 
The correlation of the curve fitting process was R' = 0.83 
ChunQ & Kinsey [31 also shows that (see Frgure 1821 the section closer than 0.23 charge radii 
(12 mmlkg''') the velocity follows a different curvature In this region. the hiQhest velocity is recorded 
as 6 mml~s. This equates to 4 times the speed of sound. AlthouQh FiQure 182 depicts the 
measurements reported for the bubble expansion, it has been shown in Figure 179 that the first 
portion of the curve, the velocity of the shock wave is equal to the velocity of the bubble Therefore the 









" '" -..... 
~. 


















Ham morld ]7] set out 'to develop a Ilumeocal SimulaliOl1 roothod for predicti'19 the structural response 
of submerged, air-backed plates to far-field UflOOrwater eXpfosions and to h!lther the understandifJQ of 
the pllysics associated with the coupled fluid-structural response, inciudifJQ local cavitation-
phellomell"" 
His discussions on the definition of the near field and far field of an underwater explosion are directed 
towards his specific application needs, arid does not give the definitions in absolute terms, Hov.rever, 
Hammond [7] indirectly supports the auth<x's view that the definition of the near and far fiekJs should 
be related to the shock wave propagation velocity Hammond [712]' 
"The v&<ocily of the shock wave ill the near field to the undefwator explosion is typically Sflvoral 
percent gmater than the acoustic wave velocity ill the far fiold mgion. Acouslic ",avo velocities are 
attailled at approximately Iwonty chargo radii from the detonation celltre" 
Burdick ]15] 
Burd'K:k [15] states thst underwater sound velOCity is formulated by: 
c~1449+-\.(;T {LO'; 51" + OJ)lJ03T' + (1.39 - 0.0 12T Xs - 35) I {Ull 7 h 
Where 
C- Velocity of Sound in mis 
T~ Temperat...-e in 'c 
,s. Salinity in parts per thousand 
h= depth in m 
Using a temperature of 15 · C, a salinity of 48 %, arid s depth of 20 m, the velocity of sound IS 
calculated to be 1461 ,3 mls. This result shows good corretation with the result obtained by Fi;:Jure 8. 
Cichocki ]4] 
Cichocki [4] waS concerned about the protective capacity of conta'n ment structures subjected to 
impulse loading. His study was therefore somewhat different to this study, which was intent to protect 
m....::h smaller objects than the structures of CichOCki [4]. However, it is of interest that his protective 
methods are similar to the protective methods as is suggested by this study for smaller units 
He suggested that one of the possible mesns of protecllOn of important structures, was that the 
protective One could be placed at a certa'in distance from the main one, and would act as s protective 
shell. This protective shell can be connected with the main structure by means of diaphragms, 
stiffeners and other structural elements The main purpose would be to dissipate the max'mum 
amount of energy in the protective containment. 
The ccrrelation between the principles of the solut>::>n that this study presents for the protection of 
smaller units agsinst the rigas of urlderwater blast loading, and the solution as offered by Cichocki [4} 
IS in essence 100 %. This study, however, uses the protective shield as part of the functionality of the 
unit i,e. the container of the electronic~ i~ designed to Withstand the pressure loading, but all internal 
















Morrison 115] reports on a different kind of shock-acceleration. i. e. the shock produced by launchirog an 
elect-onics container from a cannon. What is interesting and applicable about this paper, is the 
desc -; ption of his solutkm to counteract the effects of acceleration. i.e. concentratirog On the mounting 
methods, in stO!iId of making use of an outer st'uctum that absorbs lhe shock and protects an inner 
struclurl! 
One must take into account that lhe accelf:ratbns caused by cannon-launched mISsiles are much 
smalO!r than the accelerations that are considered by underwater explosions. Figure 183 shows that 
the peak acceeration that is experienced by the canoon-launched missile. is in the order of 9000 g 
The period over whd this acceleration is experienced (>10 ms) is much longer than the accelerations 
caused by underwater explosions « 1 00 ~s). The acceleration im pulse (integral of the acceleration 
over time) curve may have the same typical va lue 
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Figure 183: Accelerations caused by cannon-launched missiles, Morrison 
[15], 
This study by MOrrison [15] reports that a .ery carefUl component screening process must be adhered 
to before components are used in a production run During and after production the assembled units 
are also subjected to more tests, to ensure reliabillty_ In Figl.l'e 184 Morrison [151 shows the type of 
component screening that was done pn'" to assembly_ Unfortunately he did not report on the failure 
rate of components that were subjected to the tests to enable the reader to assess how successful this 
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Figure 18<1: Part and component sct8sn ing reported by Morrison [151. 
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Howev .... Momson 1151 did report (hat iI ' raJ/sbillty d~9mma was enCOUn(fffed USing Integrated c.rcuil 
(I e ) ccmponents '&JctWs~ 01 (h;)lr strain rare properties. bo{l'l plastJ<: 9I1rt epo"Y er>CrlpsuJa tfJd !e 
jJ !Irfs jJfO>I9d mo(9 loiaranl of canon-JauflChed envl<"OllllWll/ /fIan CfUatrUC ICs Nsvertl!tJess. Itw 
suf]«ior hetmflhc characie(lslics 01 ceramic components madii tOOm 1'1019 ~alJU1' II must ~ said 
Itoat 11'111 ltudy [l B[ was peoformed In Itoe eil'ly 1970s. and that tIE modefn te ·packag'ng is much more 
.uggM M well as mOle rehablo ThIS paraoo.c IS tnerefore noT apphcable loday as ~ W~ al trIe tIme 01 
the Siudy 118J 
Morroson 115) also repelted that cryslat devICe! ....ere lound to be suscepHble lO launth-onduced lallure. 
1-I_l9\Ier. a moonhng method was found (adM.onai !uppor1), w~Jeh a5s istad the pass rate 01 cr)'!la/s 
nls is an Interest:<lg fl1dlrlg, bee,H)Se the author 01 thiS dissertatIOn also used c.ystats 111 ~Ign­
acceleratIOn tests (a purpose·desrg~ sol! spot because 01 Its known lailure rate under ~ig~ 
acceleration) , ar.d lour.d these components to sustain internal fa~ure 
The on ly other device, which Morrison [151 reports t~at had problems dUring Ina Icreenlng process 
were transformers These transformers used a bonoed ClJp core spIr'ldle, wh 'ch had to be repl aced by 
a loll(] core spindle to achieve 100 % pass rate 
MOmlCH'1 (1 51 giNe spec",t allent.,., to eomponent moo.onbng art:! plaeemDnt methods Tne fact that the 
accelerallOn loading had a spoafiC d'rectlon In Ihe canl1Q(l-taunct..d mlss,1e's Itoe COI1lPOOents Could 
be placed such thallhe load was ,_erted at iI comp,esslOn rath .... than tenSIOn or Shea! Figure 185 
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Figure 185: Suggested mounting methods prescribed by Morrison [15]. 
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The prir>:iple of "soft-moonts" are Illustrated quite weI irl Figure 185. and the author will show in I"ter 
chapters that extensive use is made of de-localised soft mountin~ methods to ensure that acceler"tlon 
is damped before it is passed on to the components. It must also b~ said that de-localised soft-moonts 
are more successful when the time 01 accelerat~n is r~latlvely shart. irrespective of the "mplitude. De-
localised soft moonting may therele.-e not be a good solution to the relati~ely long "cceleration 
duration of the cannon~aunched u nrt. 
Me.-rison [15J discussed the potting principl~. and found that two problems arose when the entire card 
was potted. i.e. the total weight increased. and acceleration became problematic (not reported why). 
and rework 01 the cards became very d,ffic L.j 1. The author predicts that th,s method IS contr,,-

















Urick [23 p116j defines a "yelocity profile" as "the variation of sound with depth, or the velocity-depth 
function" 
Urick reports that s Yelocity >,"olile csn be obtained by velocity measuring instruments, OR by 
hydrographical oboervations 01 temperature, salinity and depth 




It IS assumed (intuitively at this stage) that the "depth" parameter may in lact have a relation to 
DENSITY although Urk:k gives non-linear curves 01 Yelocity YS depth. The author concludes that 
density varies non-linearly with depth, due to factors such as salinity and temperature, both of which 
contribute to the density The conclusIOn is thus that the density is s lunction of depth, salinity snd 
temperature 
Bad.ground' 
Urick states thst there are lour discernable layers in deep-sea waters 01 different velocity 
characteristics. i. e .. 
Surface layer: (top layer), In which the yelocity of sound is "susceptible" to dai~ and local changes of 
heating, cooling, and wind action From this statement the author identifies one distinct parameter, i.e. 
Temperature. Wind-actIon may inlluence tempersture. and is thus not seen as s sepsrate parsmeter 
Seasonal Thermo-cline layer: (bekJw the top layer) "The word 'thermo-ctine' denoting a layer in which 
the temperature changes with depth" He states that the seasonal thermo-cline i. characterized by a 
negative thermsl gradient (tem per~ture and velocity) rel<lflye to depth (and varies with seasons) 
Main Thermo-cline layer: (below the seasonal thermo-cline) Urk:k states that seasonal inlluence is 
minimal. and that the tem perature actually increases with depth 
Deep Isothermal Layer: (below the main thermo-cline) In this layer. Uric states that the temperature 
remainS 'nearly constant" at 39"1' Gust above 4"C) and that the sound yelocity increases w~h depth 
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Figu re 186: The different therm al I~yers illustrated by Urick [23: pl18] 
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Figure 187: Gr~phical presentati(}n of the s(}lInd ~elocity profile ittustr~ted 
















Urick's finding as dep~ted by Figure 186, is that the ,elocity typicall~ changes from 4850 ftls to 5000 
fti 5 in seawatar. Translated to the matric systam , thiS is 1478 mls to 1524 mls 
Urick [2S[ also showBd that the sound valocity varies drastically at shallow depths measured at 
different locations in the world, The range is from 1440 mls to 1540 mis, 
Conclusion 
The author draws the conclusion that tM term "speed of underwater souiod" relates to souiod, which 
propaQates in seawater at 1440 mls to 1540 mis, depending upon tne dansit~ of saawater onl~ In the 
absence of any stimulus, which would increaseldacreasa the dansity of the seawater lemporardy {Ihus 
in Its stead~ state) the density is a function of salinit~ , temperature and depth, explalnmg the yar~inQ 
















This manuscript concerns Itself with the engineering principles that support the desig n of explosives 
The author's (of this dissertation) interest lies with the qualitative description of a shock wave (Cooper 
[6: pI67]), which describes the shock wave In roodern. easy-to-read language. He states that in the 





c = sound velocity 
P = pressure In the medium 
p = density of the medium 
63 
If the medium is pressurised to beyond the elastic region, the wave vebcity increases with pres~ure or 
density and r ... p is oot Illearly proportional 
Cooper (2: pHO] describes the shock wave as a wave with a verticallront (an infinitely high slope rate 
01 the leading edge), and the wave velocity in this region was equal to the sum of the sound and 
particle velocities, and the wave speed increases with increaSing pressure (Cooper [6 p172Il, He also 
makes the following remarks relative to thi~ dissertation 
Cooper [6: pH4[ 
a. Shock waves occur when a material is stressed lar beyond its elastic limit by a pressure 
disturbance 
b. Because the rarefaction wave movll1g into the shocked region travels faster than the 
shock lront the shock is attenuated Irom behind 
The comment b, above suggests that the form 01 the shock wave does not change with distance It w'lIl 
be assumed by this study that this phenomenon occurs in the region (near lield) where the elastic I'mit 
is exceeded, because in the lar field Cole [5[ and Kira et al [1 0] give equations that the time constant () 
of the rarefaction wave increases With range 
Appendices 
